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The subject o f th is  d isse r ta tio n  i s  hope. Present 
l ite r a tu r e  in  r e lig io n , philosophy, and psychology  
evidences a growing in te r e s t  in  the nature and the dynamics 
of hope. I f  one o f  the developments o f th is  d isser ta tio n  
bears out, then th is  in te r e s t  should not be surprising, 
for  hope in  an atomic age i s  tru ly  an e x is te n t ia l  concern. 
Perhaps as nothing in  the h isto ry  of mankind, the Bomb 
reveals the dreadful contingency o f human l i f e .  In a time 
when "future shock" becomes a problem, hope becomes a 
concern. In an age o f p la s t ic  anonymity, the intimacy of 
hope o ffe r s  a promise o f (at l e a s t ,  a momentary) sa lva ­
t io n , Thus, in  th is  w r ite r 's  thinking, the relevance of 
a d isse r ta tio n  concerned with hope needs no ju s t if ic a t io n  
beyond idiat has been b r ie f ly  sa id , fo r  l i f e  in  the 
tw entieth  century i s  the ju s t if ic a t io n .
For p r a c tic a l purposes the content o f  th is  study 
w ill  be lim ited  to f iv e  major concerns: Gabriel M arcel's
understanding of hope; Albert Camus' understanding o f  hope; 
a comparison and contrast of Camus and Marcel on hope; 
ou tlin e  o f  a physical theory of hope; and, a d iscu ssion  o f  
the re la tio n  between hope and intim acy. The study has
been lim ited  to these f iv e  areas because no d isser ta tio n  
could adequately begin to  consider a l l  the fa c e ts  o f  hope. 
For th is  reason some ju s t if ic a t io n  should be o ffered  for  
se lec tin g  these f iv e  concerns out o f so many, and to that 
task I now turn.
F ir s t ,  Gabriel Marcel and h is  thoughts on hope were 
se lec ted  because he i s  l i t e r a l l y  the philosopher of hope. 
No other philosopher has w ritten  as sy stem a tica lly  or as 
p assion ately  on the nature of hope. As w i l l  be ind icated  
in  Chapter One, hope i s  not just a concept in  h is  p h ilo so ­
phy, but i s  the focus around which h is  philosophy revolves. 
His metaphysic o f hope in  Homo Viator i s  the outstanding  
phenomenological a n a lysis  o f hope in  a l l  o f  philosophic  
l i t e r a tu r e . Thus, Marcel was se lec ted  as a foundation  
fo r  th is  study. While the d isser ta tio n  w i l l  branch out 
in  several d irectio n s from Marcel, with one exception , a 
theory o f hope on the le v e l  of sensation , i t  w i l l  never 
su b sta n tia lly  leave  the foundation he has la id .
Second, A lbert Camus was o r ig in a lly  se le c te d  fo r  th is  
study as a contrast to Marcel, as the philosopher o f no 
hope, i , .£ . , as the author o f The Myth o f Sisyphus. As the 
second chapter w i l l  show, th is  standard understanding of 
Camus i s  incom plete, at b est, or in co rrec t. Camus and 
Sisyphus should not be id e n tif ie d ;  and w ith th is  recogni­
tio n  came a change in  th is  study, for Camus could not be
developed as the polar opposite to Marcel, However, 
rather than ra is in g  the problem of including Camus in  
th is  d is se r ta tio n , the value of h is  contributions became 
even more s ig n if ic a n t , for Camus o ffers  a contrasting  
option, many s im ila r it ie s ,  and several new in s ig h ts  into  
the nature of hope. I t  i s  Camus' w illin g n ess to struggle  
with Sisyphus and the promise that th is  shared struggle  
holds that contribute to the study of hope more than any 
other fa c to r  in  th is  d is se r ta tio n .
Third, in  considering the b est m ethodological strategy  
for developing the research connected with th is  d is se r ta ­
tio n , I  considered two options that offered  promise: to
develop by comparison and contrast corre la tive  concepts 
in  Marcel and Camus; or, to develop each man's under­
standing of hope as an independent whole. The second 
option i s  employed because, in  my judgment, i t  o ffe r s  the 
best stra tegy  fo r  system atic understanding. When one 
considers (a) that each philosopher may use the same words 
in d iffer e n t ways and (b) the additional problem of 
re la tin g  Sisyphus to the Rebel in  Camus, as w i l l  be done 
in Chapter Two, the second option i s  more promising for  
p hilosoph ica l c la r ity .  Such a procedure requires a la te r  
independent consideration of the contrasts and comparisons 
between Camus and Marcel and i s  undertaken in  Chapter 
Three,
Four, sin ce  Chapter One develops M arcel's under­
standing of hope. Chapter Two develops Camus' understand­
ing o f hope, and Chapter Three d iscu sses the d ifferences  
and s im ila r it ie s  between the two using the preceding 
chapters as in terp re ta tiv e  data, there i s  a need for  
c r i t ic a l  eva lu a tion . The method se lec te d  for c r it ic a l  
evaluation  i s  conç>arative; a comparison of Chapter
Three with my own th e s is  on the nature and dynamics of 
hope. In comparison, the two s ig n if ic a n t  parts o f my 
th e s is  are the development o f a doctrine o f hope on the 
le v e l  o f  sensation  and an an alysis o f the re la tion  between 
hope and intim acy. Such i s  the content o f  Chapter Four.
Following the Vita there are three appendices. 
Appendix A and Appendix B represent idiat might be ca lled  
the raw data fo r  Chapters One and Two, resp ectiv e ly . 
Appendix C o u tlin e s  a p ossib le  in s ig h t o f Camus concerning 
the nature o f alcoholism  and, in  so doing, o ffers  a 
valuable to o l fo r  understanding a seriou s contemporary 
problem.
Before turning to Chapter One, I want to mention two 
other considerations appropriate to the introduction: 
the p h ilosop h ica l method o f Camus and Marcel and th e ir  
general ph ilosoph ica l re la tion sh ip ; and the question of 
French, in which both men o r ig in a lly  wrote.
Marcel and Garnie can generally  be grouped together  
as exLetentisuL phenomenologists, or, fo r  short, e x is ten ­
t i a l i s t s .  (This statem ent, however, i s  adequate only as 
long as i t  i s  maintained as loose and open-ended. One of 
the factors which co c^ lica tes such an attempt to re la te  
the two i s  that both Camus and Marcel deny such a 
grouping. In a certa in  sense, both men deny that they 
have any p h ilosoph ica l system and, thus, cannot be grouped 
within any p h ilo sop h ica l method. Marcel w rites that he 
i s  not an e x i s t e n t ia l i s t ,  but a "N eo-Socratic." Camus 
s ta te s  that The Myth o f Sisyphus, o ften  considered a 
central book in  e x is te n t ia l  l ite r a tu r e , i s  an attack  upon 
the p osition  ca lled  e x is t e n t ia l .  Furthermore, both 
philosophers were often  severely c r i t ic a l  o f  the other. 
N evertheless, there i s  more s im ila r ity  of method and 
in te re st  than d ifferen ce , and such i s  a l l  any attempt at 
grouping should claim . Also, in  fa irn ess , i t  should be 
stated  that, perhaps the strongest ob jection  each had to 
being ca lled  an e x i s t e n t ia l i s t  was that Sartre was a 
world-renowned leader in  the movement: Marcel objected
to S artre’s ca u stic  an ti-theism  (anti-transcendentalism ); 
Camus objected to S artre's apparent lack  of empathy for  
h is  fe llo w  man.
I t  i s ,  n on eth eless, accurate to  say that Camus and 
Marcel employed a common method, e x is te n t ia l  phenomenology.
and shared a common concern, the meaning and value of l i f e ,
What i s  the e x is te n t ia l  phenomenological method? While
there are many d iffe r e n t  d e fin itio n s  o f  th is  method and
several v a ria tio n s, the follow ing statement by Peter
Koestenbaum may be considered adequately rep resen ta tive:
A ll knowledge and a l l  truth depend on the carefu l 
and accurate d escrip tion  o f  f ir s t-p e rso n  human 
experience, ex a ctly  as that experience m anifests 
i t s e l f  to u s . In other words, to know the truth  
and to achieve accuracy and r e l ia b i l i t y  in  any 
knowledge whatever, I must focus—or bracket— 
my relevant experience, detach m yself from any 
immediate involvement in  i t ,  and then observe, 
analyze, ab stract, and describe that experience 
. . . such as happiness, depression, the future, 
the an tic ip a tion  o f death. . . . The d escrip tion s  
must be of p r e c ise ly  these experiences as they  
present them selves. . . .
E x isten tia lism  i s  merely the assiduous ap p lication  
of the phenomenological technique to the human 
s itu a tio n . This e f fo r t  has led  to  a theory o f man 
based on se n s it iv e  and elaborate d escrip tion s o f  
how i t  f e e l s  to be a human being in  the world. 1
Both Marcel and Camus u t i l i z e  th is  d escr ip tiv e  method on
the same concern: vki&t i t  means and "how i t  f e e l s  to be
a human being in  the world," To th is  exten t they are
e x i s t e n t ia l i s t s .  But, they a lso  depart from the standard
phenomenological method by denying that any man can detach
him self from immediate involvement; thus, Marcel and Camus
deny the bracketing mentioned by Koestenbaum. This i s  to
^Peter Koestenbaum, Philosophy: A General Introduc­
tio n , pp. 30^ -5»
say that the e x is te n t ia l  phenomenologist d if fe r s  from the 
ordinary phenomenologist at p rec ise ly  th is  p o in t:  the
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  bracketing. The concern i s ,  however, the 
same fo r  both, and th is  i s  idiat makes them phenomenolo­
g i s t s :  . . f i r s t  person human experience, ex a c tly  as
that experience m anifests i t s e l f  to u s .” The r e l ia b i l i t y  
o f these comments should be evident in  reading Chapters 
One and Two. I now turn to a consideration of the 
language problem.
There are two l in g u is t ic  concerns relevant to th is  
d isse r ta tio n : F ir s t ,  in  both Marcel and Camus, there are
two uses o f the word "hope." One of these i s  an ordinary, 
non-philosophical, usage of the word found in  such s ta te ­
ments as the fo llow ing: "I hope the sun shines tomorrow";
"I hope to  see you Saturday"; e t c .  The second usage i s  
the p h ilosoph ica l one, Wiere "hope" i s  meant to  express a 
p hilosoph ica l r e la t io n . As indicated  in  Appendix B, the 
demarcation between the two uses i s  not as c lea r -cu t in  
Camus as i t  i s  in  Marcel. The concern o f th is  d is s e r ta ­
tion  i s  the p h ilo sop h ica l usage o f "hope."
Second, the works, p h ilosoph ica l or dramatic, o f both 
Camus and Marcel were o r ig in a lly  w ritten in French and 
la t e r  tran slated  in to  E nglish . The question th at a r ise s  
i s :  What s ig n ifica n ce  does th is  have fo r  the study? The
answer i s - - l i t t l e ,  i f  any. Two ju s t if ic a t io n s  can be
8glvan . The s ig n if ic a n t  works fo r  determining the under­
standing o f  hope on the part o f both philosophers have 
been translated  in to  E nglish—Appendices A and B should 
substantiate such a claim . However, th is  would not be 
ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r  p r a c t ic a lly  ignoring the French were i t  
not for the second J u stif ic a tio n :  There i s  no dispute or
problematic d if f ic u lty  in  the English word "hope" as a 
tra n sla tio n  o f the French word "esperance." The question  
as to the meaning o f "esperance" in Camus or Marcel i s  
not a sem antical or lex icograp h ica l one, but a p h ilosoph i­
ca l problem. The same statement i s  also true o f the 
verbal u ses o f "hope" by both men. "To hope" as an 
English verb and "esperer" as a French verb o ffe r  no 
semantical or lex icograph ica l problems, only philosoph ica l 
ones. Thus, with two exceptions which pose not a semanti­
ca l problem but a language a id , tran sla tion  problems w ill  
not enter in  th is  study. I now turn to the exceptions.
"Esperance" i s  feminine in  gender. In French, nouns 
of the feminine gender u su ally  f a l l  into one o f s ix  
c la sses :  nouns representing fem ales, f r u it s ,  cou n tries,
sc ien ces, nouns expressing dimension or capacity , or nouns 
ending in  ance. "Esperance" f a l l s  into these la s t  two 
c la sse s :  nouns expressing dimension or capacity and ending
in  ance. P h ilo so p h ica lly , the former of these two c la sses  
i s  most appropriate, fo r  hope i s  a capacity or a dimension
of the human b ein g , ”I hope" (j_* esp ère) i s  always used 
by Marcel in  the present in d ica tiv e , tdiich co incides  
with h is  eo^hasis that hope i s  a way o f p a rtic ip a tin g  in  
the futux*e w hile l iv in g  in  the p resen t. Chapter One w ill  
develop t h is .
Camus, in  contrast to  Marcel, has s ix  uses o f  
espérer in  ten ses  other than the present in d ica tiv e :
The P laguet espererent sans raison  p , 90 
etre  trop espere p . 195
The P a l l : j,* esperais  ^  ^ p , 38
2 ' avais e ^ e r e  p . 100
E xile  and the Kingdom: esp era is  p . 55
The P ossessed : espera is p . 13^ 1-
Four o f these u ses  are imperfect in d ic a t iv e , one i s  pluper­
fe c t  in d ic a t iv e , and one i s  present p a ss iv e . Chapter Two 
and Appendix B w il l  show that these s ix  exceptions are 
p h ilo so p h ica lly  in s ig n if ic a n t , i.,£* , they serve the 
l it e r a r y  purpose o f emotional d escr ip tio n . Thus, Camus 
and Marcel are in  agreement as to the p h ilo sop h ica l impor­
tance attached to "esperer" in  the present in d ic a t iv e ,
This importance i s  seen by considering the uses o f the 
present in d ica tiv e  in  French:
1 , To denote an action in  the en tire  carrying  
out;
2 . To denote a sta te  or action  in  progress 
without considering e ith e r  i t s  duration 
or i t s  beginning and end;
10
3. To Indicate that the s ta te  or action
expressed by the verb in  the present
i s  always true or at le a s t  u su ally  so;
I).. To denote a sta te  or action  as beginning
in  the p a st and s t i l l  in  progress (esper 
c ia l ly  to  denote an immediate past or 
immediate fu tu re ),
e sp e re ," as used by both Marcel and Camus, i s  a 
combination of 2 and I4., The su b stan tia tion  o f th is  usage 
i s  to be found in  the f i r s t  two chapters, to  which I now 
turn.
CHAPTER ONE: HOPE AND THE
MYSTERY OF BEING
The subject o f  th is  d isse r ta tio n  i s  the nature o f  
hope, e s p e c ia lly  the place o f  hope in  the intimacy of 
human r e la tio n sh ip s . Many men—philosophers, theologians, 
p sy ch o lo g ists . Jou rn a lists, e t c . —have w ritten  about hope. 
An in d ica ted  in the introduction, th is  study w ill  be 
lim ited  to a consideration o f hope in  the thought of 
Albert Camus and Gabriel Marcel as w ell as a provisional 
development of my own views on the to p ic .^  Marcel 
develops a con sisten t metaphysic o f hope; Camus' thoughts 
on hope are dispersed throughout h is  w r itin g s . Thus 
Marcel i s  tru ly  the philosopher o f hope, and i t  i s  h is
p
philosophy o f hope that th is  chapter w il l  exp lore. As 
ind icated  in  the in troduction , Camus' thoughts on hope 
w ill  occupy Chapter Two.
In any study o f hope Marcel i s  the natural place for  
the philosopher to begin because hope i s  not Just a topic  
upon which he w rites--hope p lays a cen tra l and a dominant 
role in  h is  thought. I ts  central s ig n ifica n ce  can be 
e a s i ly  seen by examining Appendix A: with few acceptions
^These views w ill  be developed in  the f in a l  chapter 
and w ill  co n stitu te  the major c r it ic is m  o f  Marcel and 
Camus.
^Most o f the content o f  th is  chapter w il l  come from 
a rev is io n  o f the f i r s t  chapter o f my masters th e s is :  
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Marcel r e la te s  hope to every s ig n if ic a n t  concept in  h is  
philosophy—Being, mystery-problem, primary-secondary 
r e f le c t io n , the body, the sou l, l i f e ,  p a rtic ip a tio n , 
communion, transcendence, love , f a i th ,  creative f id e l i t y ,  
death, despair, freedom, hum ility , prayer, choice, e t  a l . 
Marcel h im self has recognized the cen tra l sign ifican ce of 
hope to h is  thought, as i s  shown by the follow ing words 
from h is  speech o f acceptance of the Peace Prize o f the 
Borsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels, September 20, 1961|.:
I f  there i s  a concept in  a l l  my work dominating 
a l l  o thers, i t  i s  without doubt that o f hope, 
understood as mysterium. a concept, as I have 
p rev iously  sta ted , that i s  en livened  as though from 
w ithin  through ardent a n tic ip a tio n . 'I  hope for us 
fo r  Y ou,' I have w ritten , and that i s  s t i l l  today 
the only formulation which s a t i s f i e s  me.
We can say s t i l l  more accurately , I hope for  
You, Who are the liv in g  peace, and fo r  u s, idio are 
s t i l l  f ig h tin g  with ourselves and each other, that 
one day i t  w ill  be granted us to enter You and 
share your con çleten ess.
With th is  wish and prayer I conclude my 
r e f le c t io n s .3
Having ind icated  the s ig n ifica n ce  o f hope in h is  
philosophy, I want next to consider the follow ing: Where,
or with vdiat, does Marcel begin h is  r e f le c t io n s  or thoughts? 
The answer i s  a phenomenological one: with first-hand
personal experience. In one's own experience l i e  the 
truth  or den ial o f hope. So Marcel says: l e t  us look at 
those experiences o f immediate involvem ent. I f  we do,
^Gabriel Marcel, P hilosophical Fragments, p . 19.
m.
according to  Marcel, we w i l l  find an in tr in s ic  property
o f a l l  those experiences in  which I am involved: mystery.
Thus, to understand Marcel one must understand what he
means by mystery.
The best way to  understand h is  use of mystery i s  to
contrast i t  with the problem atic, as Marcel so o ften  does.
One such contrast i s  as fo llow s:
. . .  there can only be a problem fo r  me where I 
have to deal w ith fa c ts  idiich are, or idiich I can 
at le a s t  cause to be ex ter io r  to m yself; fa c ts  
presenting them selves to me in  a certa in  d isorder  
fo r  vdiich I struggle to  su b stitu te  an o rd er lin ess  
capable of sa t is fy in g  the requirements o f my 
thought. When th is  su b stitu tion  has been e ffec ted  
the problem i s  so lved . As for me, who devote my­
s e l f  to th is  operation , I am outside (above or 
below, i f  you l ik e )  the fa c ts  with which i t  d ea ls .
But vdien i t  in vo lves r e a l i t ie s  c lo se ly  bound up 
with my ex is te n c e , r e a l i t ie s  vdiich unquestionably  
in fluence my ex isten ce  as such, I cannot consciously  
proceed in  th is  way. 2hat i s  to say, I cannot make 
an abstraction  o f m yself, or, i f  you l ik e ,  bring  
about th is  d iv is io n  between m yself on the one hand 
and some ever-present given p r in c ip le  o f  l i f e  on 
the other; I am e f f e c t iv e ly  and v i t a l ly  involved  
in  th is  r e a lity  . . .  mystery . .
A problem I can detach from m yself because i t  i s  external
to me; a mystery cannot be so detached because I am deeply
involved in  i t —in  fa c t , according to Marcel, I  l i v e  i t .
Thus, a problem i s  b a s ic a lly  an ep istem ologica l concern
that admits, at le a s t  in  p r in c ip le , o f so lu tio n ; mystery
i s  an on to log ica l concern to  which the category o f
G a b r ie l Marcel, Homo Viator, pp. 68-9.
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s o lu b ility  i s  in ap p licab le .^  According to Marcel, one of 
the grave dangers in  contemporary philosophy, esp ec ia lly  
analytic philosophy, i s  the reducing o f m ysteries to 
problems. When th is  happens, as i t  often  does in  a 
so c ie ty  dependent upon technology and tech n ologica l 
thinking, man becomes dehumanized and in  danger o f becoming 
a naked ape, a tool-maker, a producer, a complicated 
cybernetic rob ot.& To correct th is  dehumanizing tendency 
i t  i s  necessary to reintroduce mystery in to  the human 
s itu a tio n , and one may understand the vdiole o f  Marcel's 
thought as such an attempt.
Hope i s  a mystery fo r  Marcel. Another way to say the 
same thing i s ;  Hope i s  a way of l iv in g  in the mystery o f  
being, as th is  chapter t i t l e  in d ica tes: "Hope and the
I^stery o f Being." The remainder of th is  chapter w ill be 
a sp e llin g  out o f ju st how hope i s  a way of l iv in g  in the 
mystery o f being. The next step i s  to explore Marcel's 
meaning o f "Being," because h is  thought concentrates upon 
man's experience o f  Being.
^In Chapter Two i t  w ill  be noted that Camus claims 
that the absurd i s  not a problem. Chapter Three w ill 
conqjare mystery and the absurd.
A^n ex c e llen t study o f Marcel and the Problem of 
dehumanization i s  to be found in a d isse r ta tio n : Harold
Baldwin Hoyt, The Concept of the Dehumanization o f Man 
in the Philosophy o f  Gabriel Marcel, unpublished 
d isser ta tio n , ^ e  U niversity  o f Oklahoma, Norman, 1970.
16
I t  should be c lea r  from the preceding d iscu ssion  that
"Being i s  a mystery," idiat Marcel c a l ls  the "ontological
mystery." The re la tio n  that Marcel i s  concerned with i s
the re la tio n  between human existence and Being, as Ronald
Grimsley has pointed out:
The b asic  e f fo r t  o f  h is  thought i s  to grasp the 
re la tio n  between the 'e x is t in g ’ in d iv id u a l, 
se ized  in  h is  concrete s in g u la r ity  and a c t iv e ly  
s tr iv in g  towards s e lf - r e a liz a t io n , and the 
presence o f Being by vdiich he i s  encon^assed.
He i s  in tere sted  in  the c a ll o f Being to the 
in d iv id ual s o u l .7
Marcel i s ,  thus, not in terested  in an abstract metaphysic
o f  Being, but in  the concrete experience o f  Being, of
which hope i s  one such experience.
What i s  Being? Or more accurately, what does i t  mean
to say that Being i s  a mystery? F ir s t ,  Being cannot be
defined since to define Being would be to trea t i t  as a
problem. Only once in  a l l  h is  w ritings does Marcel
attempt anything l ik e  a d e f in it io n , and he admits that i t
i s  not a d e f in it io n  but a suggestive p oin ter:
As fo r  d efin ing  the word ’b e in g ,' l e t  us 
admit that i t  i s  extremely d i f f ic u l t  ( i f  not 
im p ossib le). I would merely suggest th is  
method o f approach: being i s  idiat w ithstands—
or what would w ithstand—an exhaustive an a lysis  
bearing on the data o f experience and aiming 
to  reduce them step  by step to  elem ents increase  
in g ly  devoid of in tr in s ic  or s ig n if ic a n t  v a lu e .°
^Ronald Grimsley, E x isten tia l Thought, p . 191+.
^Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy o f E x isten tia lism , 
p . Ik*
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Second, Being as a mystery i s  necessary and not contin­
gen t, That idiich could be exhausted by the a n a ly tica l 
procedure described above would be contingent. But Being 
withstands the process and i s ,  according to Marcel, both 
etern a l and in exh au stib le . Third, Being as both an 
etern a l and inexhaustib le mystery excludes the p o s s ib i l i ty  
of non-Being, In words which echo the Greek p a st, non- 
Being cannot b e . The denial o f Being i s ,  not non-Being, 
but Having, In  keeping with the dichotomy. Having i s  a 
problem, fo r  to  have something i s  to control i t ,  e ith er  
through ab stract reasoning, power, or technology; but 
m ysteries cannot be controlled , they can only be 
accepted. The category of Having co in cid es w ith that of 
the problem atic: Having i s  always an external r e la t io n ­
ship; Being i s  an in tern al one, I cannot not-be, but I 
can deny Being by reducing m yself to a se r ie s  o f  func­
tio n a l ca teg o r ies  ( i , ,£ , ,  a se r ie s  o f "haves") : I have a
body, I have a mind, I have a w ife , I have , , , e tc .
The danger o f th is  reduction i s  that I  become my summa­
tion  o f  "haves" and in  so doing deny the c a l l  and depth 
of Being. In regard to the top ic  o f  th is  d isse r ta tio n , 
to s e l l  out to the world of Having i s  to  lo se  the 
p o te n t ia l ity  and the p o s s ib i l i ty  for  hope. Fourth, th is  
dual p o s s ib i l i t y  fo r  l i f e .  Being or Having, r a ise s  a 
problem fo r  Marcel: Since the temptation to have (idiich
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i s  the same as th at to control, manipulate, own) i s  so 
strong, how can I  concretely experience Being, or in
Q
Marcel's term inology, p artic ip a te  in  being?
In answer Marcel sta te s  that there are three le v e ls  
(or modes, ways, avenues) of ex isten ce a t which man 
p a r tic ip a te s  in  Being. They are (1) h ierarch ica l and 
(2) interdependent in  re la tion : the second le v e l i s
richer than the f i r s t ,  but dependent on i t .  The th ird  
i s  s im ila r ly  re la ted  to the f i r s t  and second: sensation ,
actu a lized  through incarnation; communion, actualized  
through lo v e , hope, and f id e l i t y ;  and transcendence, 
actu a lized  through prayer, prophetic hope, and c r e a t iv ity .  
Most o f the rest o f th is  chapter w il l  be a developing of 
these le v e ls  and th e ir  re la tio n  to  hope.
While th is  has not answered the question, "idiat i s  
being?" i t  has h inted  at what Marcel means by the term, 
and, in  the f in a l  an a lysis , the question cannot be 
answered because Being i s  a mystery. However, the fo llo w ­
ing can be concluded: Being, fo r  Marcel, can be sa id  to
9jn M arcel's thought there i s  a d e f in ite  value 
judgment involved  in  th is  problem, which i s  r e a lly  the 
question o f the re la tio n  between Being and ex isten ce:  
the value (or au th en tic ity ) of l i f e  i s  d ir e c t ly  propor­
tion ate  to  the exten t (or depth) of on e's p a rtic ip a tio n  
(or involvement) in  Being, While Being can be denied 
by Having, i t  i s  done so only at the lo s s  of the r ic h ­
ness o f l iv e d  experience and the reduction of human 
p o s s ib i l i t i e s .
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be the primary o n to lo g ica l, ep istem olog ica l, and e th ic a l  
category o f human ex is te n c e , and mystery i s  B eing’s domi­
nant ch a ra c te r is tic . I t  i s  Being that g iv es o n to lo g ica l 
weight to  human ex is te n c e . The structure o f knowledge i s  
i t s e l f  grounded in  Being, as Marcel s ta te s  in The E xisten ­
t i a l  Background o f Human D ig n ity ; ”. . .  there i s  a 
mystery of knowledge which i s  o f the on to log ica l order. ”^ 0 
Truth fo r  Marcel, then, becomes a dynamic feature o f  the 
on to log ica l order imbedded in  human ex isten ce: ”. . .
tru th , fa r  from being defined as a lo g ic a l form, i s  a 
function o f vdiat can be ca lled  p o ten tia l experience.
Using d iscu ssion s o f mystery and Being as background, 
I sh a ll now d iscu ss the three le v e ls  o f p a rtic ip a tio n  in  
Being, w ith the emphasis ly in g  on the p lace o f  hope in  
these le v e ls  o f  p a r tic ip a tio n .
Sensation as a Mystery
Marcel, as an e x is te n t ia l  phenomenologist, begins 
with "idiat i s  immediately given," and uses h is  d escrip tive  
methodology to draw out the im plications and meanings of 
th is  g iven . Sensation i s  th is  immediate given, and as 
immediate i t  i s  not a problem to d efin e , but a m ystery, as 
Pedro Adams has pointed out:
l^Gabriel Marcel, The E x is te n t ia l Background o f Human 
D ignity , p . 80.
llG ab riel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, p . 29*
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• • • sensation  i s  not a problem, but a mystery; 
i t  i s  s t r ic t ly  immediate and in  i t  r e a lity  i s  
immediately given  to me, and I am immediately 
present to the world, rather than being fenced  
in  a subjective world o f appearances. Sensation  
i s  a mode of p a r tic ip a tio n  • • .(I t^ th e  world 
as liv e d  in  i t s  intim ate communion with m yself . . .12
I t  i s  because sensation  i s  immediately given that i t  i s  a 
mystery for Marcel, which i s  to  say that sensation cannot 
be reduced to  a neurological problem—or an ep istem ologi­
cal one e ith er .
I t  i s  the nature of sensation that i t  i s  always 
"sensation o f,"  i , .^ ., sensation i s  in te n tio n a l. The base 
in tention  i s  the sensation  of "my body," expressed by 
Marcel as "I am my body." This primary sensation  pro­
vides the b asis for the unity  o f  human experience. What­
ever I experience, i t  i s  related  to me through my body; 
hence, my body becomes the central e x is te n t ia l  referen t 
for every actual experience. The recognition of th is  
in tention  o f "bodyness" leads d ire c tly  to a s ig n if ic a n t  
concept in Marcel—"incarnation."
Marcel begins w ith an immediate given sensation and 
finds that i t  i s  in ten tio n a l, i..e^. » I am my body. But to 
be tied -to-a-body means to be in  a p articu la r-co n crete- 
now s itu a tio n . Conceptually, to  be tied -to -a -b od y , or to 
be in  a particu lar-concrete-now  s itu a tio n , i s  to be
12pedro Adams, "Marcel, Metaphysician or M o ra list ," 
Philosophy Today, v o l.  10 (P a ll, 66) , pp. l8i}.-5.
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incarnate. Incarnation brings p a r tic u la r ity , concreteness, 
and tem porality to human e x is te n c e . I t  i s  incarnation  
that u nd erlies the formation o f  the p erso n a lity , as Marcel 
in d ica tes  in  Homo V ia tor: " . . .  the p ersonality  i s  only
rea lized  in  the act by which i t  tends to become incarnate.
. . , Because i t  p a r tic ip a te s  in  the inexhaustib le f u l l ­
ness o f  the being from which i t  emanatesi^^ Thus, 
sensation , which becomes experience v ia  incarnation (I am 
my body), i s  a mode o f p a rtic ip a tio n  in  Being, but i t  i s  
a p rim itive  and lim ited  mode. This lim ita tio n  i s  espe­
c ia l ly  important for  the concern of th is  d isse r ta tio n — 
hope. Incarnation of the body experienced through sensation  
i s  lim ited  to the here and now, the present. Hope, on the 
other hand, while a ffe c tin g  the presen t, i s  not lim ited  
to i t ,  but m ysteriously p a r tic ip a te s  in  the fu ture. This 
i s  to say th at, at the le v e l  o f  sensation , hope i s  not 
p o ss ib le , as Marcel s ta te s  in  Homo V iator:
. . . experience seems to  e s ta b lish  that hope i s  
able to survive an almost to ta l ruin o f the 
organism. . . .  the p r in c ip le  must be la id  down 
th a t any p h ysica l theory o f  hope, (a theory of hope 
based on sensation ], i s  absurd and . . . contra­
d ictory; perhaps we might be ju s t i f ie d  in  maintaining 
th a t hope co incides with the sp ir itu a l p r in c ip le
i t s e l f
^^Gabriel Marcel, Homo V iator, p . 26. 
^ I b id . .  p . 36.
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In th is  den ial o f  the im p o ss ib ility  o f  a p h y sica l theory  
of hope, I fin d  an in con sisten cy  and a major p oin t of 
disagreement. The in con sisten ce  occurs because Marcel 
t r ie s  to  hold the fo llow in g  two p o sitio n s: (1 ) sensation
i s  a mystery, and (2 ) hope i s  impossible a t the le v e l  o f  
sensation . An a n a ly sis  o f  these two statements and th e ir  
in con ^ atab ility  w i l l  be taken up in the fourth chapter.
Wÿ major point o f  disagreement i s  that I  think Marcel i s  
wrong in  h is  d en ia l. In other words, a theory o f  hope 
can be developed on the le v e l  o f sensation . The fourth  
chapter w ill  devote considerable space to  t h is .  However, 
before I continue with the present development, i t  might 
be o f  value to d iscu ss b r ie f ly  idiat a theory o f hope on 
the le v e l  o f sensation  might be. There are, I think, two 
p o s s ib i l i t i e s .  F ir s t ,  a theory o f hope can be developed  
idiich r e la te s  hope to the in s t in c t  for su rv iv a l. Chapter 
Four w il l  develop such a p o s it io n . Second, M arcel's use 
of the le v e ls  o f  sensation  and communion p lace the 
ex isten ce  and the concerns o f the so lita r y  ego ( ,  
man in  the absence of a communal re la tion ) in  the le v e l  
of sen sation . From th is  perspective a theory o f  hope can 
be developed as the w ill  turned inward—hope without a 
communal r e la t io n . Chapter Four w ill a lso  develop th is  
p o s it io n .
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Following the recogn ition  o f  incarnation and i t s  
s ig n ifica n ce  fo r  p erso n a lity  development and the nature 
of man, Marcel proceeds with a phenomenological an a ly sis  
o f incarnation which revea ls two further elem ents: what
might lo o se ly  be ca lle d  "thinking" or " reflec tio n ,"  and 
the mysterious union o f  soul and body. The former in car­
nate d iscovery, th inking, lea d s Marcel in to  a d iscu ssion  
of primary and secondary r e f le c t io n , wliich, id iile  i t  i s  
a most provocative d iscu ssion , i s  not needed to develop 
h is  metaphysic o f hope, and i t  w il l  be omitted h ere .
The la t t e r  incarnate d iscovery, union of soul and body, 
i s  most s ig n if ic a n t  because o f the re la tio n  o f soul and 
hope.
The union o f soul and body i s ,  according to  Marcel, 
a mystery. The how o f th is  union i s  unknown. The why i s  
a lso  unknown, except that i t  i s  the soul o f  man that 
responds to the c a l l  o f Being. Just what the soul i s ,  
remains a m ystery. However, s in ce  the how, vdiy, and v&at 
of the soul and body remain unanswered, Marcel does w rite  
that there are some c h a r a c te r is tic s  o f the soul that we 
can know. In h is  words: "The soul l iv e s  by hope alone;
hope i s  perhaps the very s tu f f  o f  vdiich our so u ls  are 
made. . . .  To despair o f a man—i s  not th is  to deny him 
a so u l^ ^
^ ^ a b r ie l Marcel, Being and Having, p . 8o.
2k
. . . there i s  the' c lo se s t  o f connections 
between the soul and hope. I almost think that 
hope i s  fo r  the soul idiat breathing i s  fo r  the 
l iv in g  organism. Where hope i s  lack ing the 
soul d r ie s  up and w ithers, i t  i s  no more than 
a fu n ction , i t  i s  merely f i t  to serve as an 
object o f  study to a psychology that can never 
r e g is te r  anything but i t s  lo ca tio n  or absence.
It i s  p r e c ise ly  the soul that i s  the tr a v e lle r ;  
i t  i s  o f the soul and o f the soul alone that we 
can say w ith supreme truth that * being' 
n ecessa r ily  means 'being on the way' Ten rou te) . l o
But the ch a ra cter is tic  o f  the soul which i s  
present and a t the d isposal o f  others i s  that i t  
cannot think in  terms of ca ses; in  i t s  eyes there 
are no cases at a l l . 17
These passages in d ica te  at le a s t  four c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f
the soul: f i r s t ,  the soul i s  that part of man ^diich
responds to the c a l l  o f Being th ou gh  hope; second, the
soul i s  the tr a v e lle r . Homo Viator; th ird , the soul by
i t s  very nature denies the power o f  induction; fourth ,
i t  i s  the sou l o f man that i s  open to the ex isten ce  o f
other men, which brings us to communion and to the f i r s t
p o s s ib i l i ty  fo r  hope.
However, before I begin a d iscussion  o f the nature
o f communion, a problem in  two of the preceding quotations
needs ex p lic a tio n . Is Marcel speaking l i t e r a l l y  about the
soul and hope, or m etaphorically? I t  i s  not an easy
question to  answer; indeed, any d e f in it iv e  answer may be
l% a b rie l Marcel, Homo V iator, pp. 10-11.
^^Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of E x isten tia lism .
p . 41.
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impossible* To see the d if f ic u lty  of the problem compare 
the follow ing two statem ents: " . . . hope i s  perhaps
the very s tu ff  of which our sou ls are made* . . and 
"* . . there i s  the c lo s e s t  o f connections between the 
soul and hope*” Taken l i t e r a l ly ,  the two statements may 
be in con sisten t sin ce the f i r s t  seems to id e n tify  the 
soul and hope and the second makes no such id en tifica tio n *  
But, does the f i r s t  id e n tify  hope and the soul? Any 
answer i s  most problem atic, for  i t  depends upon the 
meaning o f "very stu ff"  and the force o f "perhaps* " I  do 
not think any d e f in ite  conclusion can be reached about 
these words* In accordance with these considerations my 
evaluation i s  as fo llow s: Based upon in tu it io n  and the
p ossib le  in con sisten cy  (dependent upon meaning and force  
in  the above) in  a l i t e r a l  in terp reta tio n , Marcel i s  
speaking m etaphorically in these passages* Such a judg­
ment does not, however, claim any absolute certitude*
Communion as a Mystery
Because the sou l of man i s  an incarnated sou l, the 
existence o f (and p o s s ib i l i t i e s  fo r  fellow sh ip  with) other 
men i s  no problem fo r  Marcel, but i s  firm ly estab lish ed  
in  the mystery o f sensation* In fa c t ,  the b asic  sensation , 
I am my body, p o in ts immediately to  the ex isten ce of the 
other; as Marcel observes in  Being and Having and Homo
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V iator;
Not only do we have a right to a ssert that 
others e x is t ,  but I should be in c lin ed  to  con­
tend that ex isten ce can be a ttr ib u ted  only to  
oth ers, and in  v irtu e o f th e ir  o therness, and 
that I cannot think o f  m yself as e x is t in g  except 
in  so fa r  as I conceive o f m yself as not being 
the others; and so as other than them, I would 
go so fa r  as to say that i t  i s  o f  the essence  
of the other that he e x i s t s .  I cannot think of  
him as other without thinking o f him as 
e x is t in g .18
We might say . . .  that my re la tion sh ip  to  
m yself i s  mediated by the presence o f the other 
person, by what he i s  to  me and what I am for  
him. But i t  i s  of ca p ita l importance fo r  our 
subject that we see at the same time th is  
sp ir itu a l in terconnection  . . .  in variab ly  
appears as v e ile d  in  mystery to  him idio i s  con­
sc ious of having a part in  i t ,  . • .19
I t  i s  accurate, then, to say th at, fo r  Marcel, "to be" 
always means "to be w ith ." In Creative F id e lity  he comments 
on ju st how c lo se ly  being with determines even our 
a b i l i t y  to communicate when he w rites: " . . .  I communi­
cate e f f e c t iv e ly  with m yself only in so fa r  as I communicate 
with the other person. . . ."^0
Marcel has, at th is  p o in t, merely esta b lish ed  the 
ex isten ce  o f other men; in  h is  tern s, the ex istence o f  
"the Other." His ex isten ce , vdiile ra is in g  the p o s s ib i l i ty  
of communion, does not guarantee i t .  Experience does.
llG a b rie l Marcel, Being and Having, p . 104. 
^^Gabriel Marcel, Homo V iator, p . 4 9 . 
^^Gabriel Marcel, Creative F id e li ty ,  p . 34*
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however, in d ica te  that others do not always remain d is ­
ta n t, Sometimes human beings move in to  a relationsh ip  
of intim acy, and idien th is  occurs communion i s  rea lized .
In M arcel's language, in  communion the Other becomes 
present as a "Thou, " But what brings about th is  change 
from a fa ce  lo s t  in  the m ultitude to the sharing of i n t i ­
macy? Any answer that Marcel might g ive would be related  
to the m ystery o f Being, fo r  communion i s  a mode of 
p a rtic ip a tio n  in  Being and thus, there i s  no d e fin it iv e  
(com plete, adequate) answer for Marcel, But, there i s  
a p a r t ia l answer idiose roots l i e  in  the sharing o f l iv e d  
exp erien ces, Marcel w rites that
, • • what brings me c lo ser  to another being and 
r e a l ly  binds me to him i s  not the knowledge that 
he can check and confirm an addition  or subtrac­
t iv e  I had to do fo r  my business account; i t  is  
rather the thought that he has passed through the 
same d i f f i c u l t i e s  as I have, that he has undergone 
the same dangers, that he has had a childhood, 
been loved , that others have been attracted  to him 
and have had hope in  him; and i t  i s  a lso  means 
th at he i s  ca lled  upon to  su ffer , to d eclin e and 
d ie , 21
The re a liz a tio n  that the Other and I are fe llo w  tra v e lle r s  
creates the p o te n tia l fo r  communion—the esta b lish in g  o f  
a bond o f  intimacy between u s . Communion may then be 
defined as that intim ate immediacy in  idiich the Other 
becomes present to me as a Thou and I become present to  
him as a Thou, For Marcel the presence o f a Thou is
^ ^ Ib id ,, p . 8,
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immediate and mysterious* Die presence i s  immediate
because the ühou becomes a part o f  me, and even death
cannot remove the presence of the person idio i s  a Thou,'
The presence o f a Thou in  communion i s  a mystery because
the p o s s ib i l i t y  and the a c tu a lity  o f communion are
grounded in  the mystery o f  Being,
I t  i s  at the le v e l  o f  communion that hope f i r s t
becomes p o ssib le  because, for Marcel, hope i s  always a
re la tio n sh ip  o f presence, an a c tu a liza tio n  of communion,
and thus, a p a r tic ip a tio n  in B eing, Marcel e x p l ic i t ly
p o in ts  th is  out when he w rites th at hope i s
, , , only p o ssib le  on the le v e l  of the u s, or 
we might say o f the agape, and that i t  does not 
e x is t  on the le v e l  o f  the s o lita r y  ego, s e l f ­
hypnotized and concentrating ex c lu siv e ly  on 
in d iv id ual aims , , , , we must not confuse hope 
and ambition, fo r  they are not of the same 
sp ir itu a l dim ension,^3
Since hope i s  only p o ss ib le  on the le v e l o f  communion, i t
fo llo w s that hope cannot e x is t  on the le v e l  o f sensation
because i t  i s  lim ited  to  the s o lita r y  ego, Marcel w rites
that everything ", , , goes to show that hope does not
bear upon what i s  in  me, upon the region o f  my in te r io r
l i f e ,  but much more on what a r ise s  independently o f  my
p o ss ib le  action , and p a r ticu la r ly  o f  my action on m yself
A
#  e  #  #
w ritin gs o f Marcel abound with the l iv in g  in f lu ­
ence on h is  l i f e  o f a Thou udio d ied while he was a ch ild : 
h is  mother,
^^Gabriel Marcel, Homo V iator, p , 10. ^ I b i d , , p , 1|1,
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Tile se two considerations then lead  to  Marcel ' s w ell 
known statement o f  hope:
"I hope in  thee for  u s ,” such i s  perhaps 
the most adequate and elaborate expression  o f  
the act which the verb 'to  hope' suggests in  a 
way which i s  s t i l l  confused and ambiguous* 'In  
thee—fo r  u s . '  between th is  'thou* and th is  'us' 
which only the most p e r s is ten t r e f le c t io n  can 
discover. . . .25
"I hope in  thee fo r  us."  There i s  a seriou s danger o f m is­
understanding the meaning o f th is  statem ent: the danger
of over-enç)hasizing the sig n ifica n ce  o f the f i r s t  person 
pronoun. I ,  as Marcel w rites in  The E x is te n tia l Background 
o f Human D ign ity : ", . • the subject o f  'I  hope' i s  not
reducible to the ego which is  the subject o f d esire , or, 
in  other words, that the subject o f  'I  hope' excludes a l l  
c la im s."26 The subject "I" can make no claims because 
the hope mentioned i s  independent o f  "I." This indepen­
dence and cla im lessn ess of hope lead  to  vh&t Marcel c a l ls  
the s i le n t  modesty of hope:
When we said that hope was the very opposite 
of pretension  or defiance, we were ready to recog­
nize that i t  i s  e s s e n t ia lly  s i le n t  and modest, 
that i t  bears the mark o f in v io la b le  tim id ity  
except where i t  develops in  the department o f the 
us, that i s  to  say in  fe llow sh ip . We ta lk  to each 
other o f our common hope but hate to express i t  
before those who do not share i t ,  as i f  i t  were
^% i d . .  p . 61.
26Qabriel Marcel, The E x is te n tia l Background o f Human 
D ign ity , p . li{2 .
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re a lly —and perhaps i t  i s  indeed--a se c r e t . I f  
hope i s  not a d efiance, perhaps i t  i s  n evertheless  
conscious o f  appearing defiant or provocative in  
the eyes of those who claim that they are 
estab lish ed  on the firm  rock of e x p e r i e n c e s .^7
By saying that hope i s  dependent on more than the "I that 
hopes," Marcel i s  suggesting that hope i s  involved in  
something much b igger and more inexhaustib le than the "I"- 
Being. Hope i s  p o ss ib le  only in  communion (in  the I-Thou 
rela tionsh ip ) which p a r tic ip a te s  in Being.
Another way to understand the r e la tio n  between the 
"I" and the "I that hopes" i s  to  explore Marcel’s d is ­
t in c tio n  between d esire  (which belongs to Having) and 
hope (idiich belongs to B ein g). F ir s t, hope i s  an affirm a­
tio n  o f Being because i t  i s  one of the ways in  lôiich  
communion becomes a ctu a lized . In th is  sense hope i s  
in tern a l to the "I, " not belonging to i t  but becoming the 
"I," D esire, on the other hand, i s  a den ial o f Being 
because desire belongs to the realm of Having. D esire i s  
always the external d irectedness of an "I" for the p o sses­
sion  o f an o b ject. For desire there i s  no thou (as in  
hope), only an i^  to be possessed . Second, hope i s  
p o ssib le  only on the le v e l  o f in te r su b je c tiv ity , the  
le v e l  of "us." D esire, on the other hand, i s  egocen tric;  
there i s  only the "I" o f p ossession . Third, d esire  i s
^^Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator, pp. $ 0 - 1 ,
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lim ited  to the present: desire i s  for  now* Hope, on the
other hand, look s and w aits on the fu ture.
The d ifferen ce between hope and desire leads Marcel 
to another, more provocative, d is t in c tio n : that between
su icide (on the le v e l  o f d esire) and sa c r if ic e  (on the 
le v e l o f  hope), idiich turns out to be a furth er ex en ç)lifi-  
cation o f the o r ig in a l d ifferen ce between Being and 
Having. Marcel i l lu s t r a t e s  th is  d ifferen ce in  Being and 
Having and Presence and Immortality as fo llow s :
The d ifferen ce between s a c r if ic e  and su icide  
r e s ts  upon hope . . . e n t ir e ly  depends on hope.
There i s  not, and there cannot be, any sa c r if ic e  
without hope, and a sa c r if ic e  that excluded hope 
would be su ic id e .28
At the root o f absolute s a c r if ic e ,  we fin d  
so to  say not only an ’I do,* but a *you: you sh a ll
not d ie .*  Or, again, *because I d ie , you sh a ll be 
saved. . . .* A ctually , i t  seems that sa c r if ic e  
takes on i t s  meaning only in  re la tio n  to a r e a lity  
that i s  su scep tib le  of being threatened, that i s ,  
a r e a l i t y  that i s  h is to r ic a l ly  given and consequently 
exposed to the forces o f destruction  which are 
brought to bear on what e n d u r e s .29
This la s t  passage from Presence and Immortality brings
M arcel's development o f hope to two further p o in ts:
f i r s t ,  what might be ca lled  the necessary conditions ( i f
lo g ic a l terminology i s  app licab le) for  hope—and thus,
sa c r if ic e ;  and, second, the in teg ra l union o f hope with
^®Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having, p . 88.
29Gabriel Marcel, Presence and Immortality, p . i+o.
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love which forms the b a s is  fo r  M arcel's f in a l move from 
communion as a mystery to transcendence as a mystery.
According to  Marcel, love and hope cannot be sepa­
rated; they cannot e x is t  apart from one another. In the 
passage ju st  quoted, Marcel has defined love as the 
power to deny death. This power i s  availab le because leva  
lik e  hope i s  a response to Being and p a rtic ip a tes  in  
Being. S im ilar to the above, in  volume II  o f the Mystery 
of Being. Marcel defines love in  the follow ing manner:
". . . t o  lo v e  a being i s  to say, 'Thou, thou sh a lt not 
d i e ' . "30 I t  would seem then that death, t^ ich  love has 
the power to  conquer, i s  one o f  the s ig n if ic a n t  (neces­
sary?) cond itions fo r  the p o s s ib i l i t y  of hope. Such 
seems to be the in ten t o f th is  passage from Presence and 
Im m ortality:
. . • the only e s se n tia l problem i s  posed by the 
c o n f lic t  between love and death . . . .  a world 
deserted by love can only be swallowed up in  
death. But i t  i s  also true th a t, where love per­
s i s t s ,  idle re i t  triumphs over whatever seeks to  
degrade i t ,  death cannot but be d e f in ite ly  
vanquished.
I t  i s  e s se n t ia lly  in  th is  perspective that 
the r e f le c t io n s  on hope idiich I made some time 
ago and which are in  r e a lity  at the heart of my 
en tire  work must be seen. I t  i s  indeed no co in ­
cidence that I developed th is  phenomenology o f  
hope during the war years. . . .31
3®Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery o f Being, vol I I ,  p .
109.
3^Gabriel Marcel, Presence and Immortality, p . 230.
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The n e ce ss ity  o f  death (there are many kinds o f death, 
l iv in g  as w ell as n on -liv in g) as a condition  fo r  the 
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  hope w i l l  be d iscussed a t a la t e r  p o in t.
The important thing to notice in  th is  passage i s  the lin k ­
ing o f hope, death, and love in to  a re la tio n  by Marcel. 
Love i s  never an abstract concept in  Marcel; i t  i s  
always a re la tio n sh ip  and p ossib le  only as communion (the 
I-Thou p resen ce). Love l i t e r a l l y  im plies hope for  
Marcel, as he p o in ts  out in  the follow ing:
. . .  to lo v e  one’s brothers i s  above a l l  to have
hope in  them, that i s ,  to go beyond that in  th e ir  
conduct idaich almost always begins by b ru isin g  or 
disappointing u s . And on the other hand exp er i­
ence undeniably shows that the hope which we put 
in  them can help to  transform them w hile, 
in v er se ly , i f  by our thought we enclose them in  
what s tr ik e s  us as th e ir  nature, ^  contribute to 
stopping th e ir  sp ir itu a l growth.32
I t  i s  th is  bu ild ing of hope on the ground of human
love w ithin  the realm of communion as a mystery that leads
Marcel to make a major philosoph ica l move in  h is  thought:
the move from communion to transcendence, as evidenced
c lea r ly  in  these words from Being and Having:
Hope . . .  i s  not only a p ro testa tio n  insp ired  
by lo v e , but a sort o f c a l l ,  a desperate appeal to 
an a l ly  tdio i s  Himself a lso  Love. The supernatural 
element which i s  the foundation o f Hope i s  as 
c lea r  as i t s  transcendent nature, for  nature, 
unillum inted  by hope, can only appear to us the
^^Gabriel Marcel, The E x isten tia l Background of Human 
D ign ity , p . 1^8.
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scene of a sort of immense and inexorable book­
keeping, 33
I t  i s  in  those experiences which a ctu a lize  communion— 
lo v e , hope, and a third not yet introduced, f i d e l i t y — 
that man experiences h is transcendent a l ly .  Being, It i s ,  
in  fa c t . Being which makes the three means o f communion 
p o ss ib le , according to Marcel: "Human beings can be
linked to  each other in a rea l bond only because, in  
another dimension, they are lin k ed  to something that  
transcends them and con^rehends them in  I t s e l f , "34
The f in a l ,  and culminating, mode of man's p a r t ic i­
pation in  Being i s  transcendence as a mystery, which I 
sh a ll now d iscu ss .
Transcendence as a Mystery
A d iscu ssion  of transcendence as a mystery ra ises  
two problems. F ir s t ,  one in tern a l problem concerning 
the r e la tio n  in  Marcel's work between the Christian God 
and h is  transcendent B eing--other phrases which Marcel 
uses are "Absolute Thou," "Transcendent Thou," " In fin ite  
Being." Second, one external problem s ig n if ic a n t  to  th is  
d isse r ta tio n —the difference between M arcel's under­
standing o f transcendence, i . ,^ , ,  the transcendence of
33oabriel Marcel, Being and Having, p, 79*
3^3-abriel Marcel, Man Against Mass Society , p . 194*
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Being as a mystery, and Caraus* understanding o f trans­
cendence, i f  he has any. This la t t e r ,  Camus' understand­
ing o f transcendence, i s  most problematic since he i s  
not prone to use the word, and at le a s t  one o f h is  works, 
The Myth of Sisyphus  ^ denies the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f any 
transcendent re la tion sh ip  to man. This w il l  be d iscussed  
among the conç)arisons in  Chapter Three,
The former problem mentioned above, ^ ,£ , ,  the 
re la tio n  between the Christian God and M arcel's Absolute 
Thou, need not be d e f in it iv e ly  answered to  develop the 
concern o f th is  d isser ta tio n , hope; fo r  idiether the 
Absolute Thou be a synonyn for the Christian God or not, 
the re la tio n  o f hope to a trsmscendent ground of Being 
i s  unaffected . Personally, I think that there i s  no 
doubt as to  the re la tio n : for Marcel, the C hristian God
i s  the Absolute Thou, the ground of Being,
For Marcel, communion (i^.e.,, in tersu b jective  lo v e , 
hope, and f id e l i t y )  foreshadows transcendence, for in  the 
intimacy o f communion man becomes conscious w ithin  h im self 
of a need for transcendence, Donald McCarthy, in  
Philosophy Today, has summarized th is  communion-transcen­
dance re la tio n  in  these words:
Thus i t  develops that in tersu b jective  love  
on a purely human le v e l i s  but a shadow o f the 
I-Thou re la tio n  with the Absolute Thou, or a 
prelim inary condition for the f u l l  establishm ent 
through f a i t h .  The on to log ica l question, 'What
36
am I? ' can thus only be answered by an Absolute 
Thou, An on to lo g ica l need • • • shows the need 
o f a change o f a ^ s .  • • • The Absolute Thou i s  
more c o s ^ e t e ly  w ithin  the s e l f  than the s e l f  
i t s e l f  ,3 5
This p la ces Marcel face to face with the re la tio n  between 
hope and what he c a l ls  the "ontological mystery," i.#o*> 
the r e la t io n  o f hope to  Being as a mystery* In h is  
words :
We have now come to the center o f idiat I 
have c a lled  the o n to lo g ica l mystery, , ,  , To 
hope against a l l  hope that a person whom I love  
w ill  recover from a d isease which i s  sa id  to be 
incurable i s  to  say: I t  i s  im possible that
r e a lity  in  i t s  inward depth should be h o s t i le  
or so much as in d iffer en t to idiat I a ssort i s  
in  i t s e l f  a good. I t  i s  quite u se le ss  to  t e l l  
me o f  discouraging cases or examples: beyond 
a l l  experience, a l l  p ro b a b ility , a l l  s t a t i s t i c s ,
I  a sser t , • , that r e a lity  i s  on my side  
w illin g  i t  to be so , I do not wish: I
a sse r t , , , ,36
In th is  passage, by the "inward depth of rea lity "  Marcel
means Being, the Absolute Ihou, This passage re fers  to
one o f  the reasons fo r  the mystery of hope: i t s  re fu sa l
to be lim ited  to the v e r if ic a t io n  o f  experience and the
laws o f p ro b a b ility . The other reason i s  a lso  given:
hope draws upon the empathy o f a mystery. Being, The
en^athy o f Being experienced by man es ta b lish es  for
^^Donald McCarthy, "Marcel's Absolute Thou," 
Philosophy Today, 10 (P a ll, 66 ), p , 1V8,
3^&abriel Marcel, The Philosophy of B xjjstentialism , 
p , 28 . I t  i s  p o ss ib le  that William James  ^ The W ill tcT* 
B elieve  develops a sim ilar understanding.
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Marcel the o n to lo g ica l b asis  o f hope:
This i s  idiat determines the on to log ica l 
p o sitio n  o f hope--absolute hope, inseparable 
from a f a i th  lA ich  i s  lik ew ise  ab so lu te , trans­
cending a l l  lay in g  down of con d ition s, and fo r  
th is  very reason every kind o f representation  
idiatever i t  might b e. The only p o ssib le  source 
from which th is  absolute hope springs must once 
more be s tre ssed . I t  appears as a response o f  
the creature to the in f in it e  Being to  whom i t  i s  
conscious o f owing everything th a t i t  has and 
upon idiom i t  cannot impose any condition  whatso­
ever . • • . Indeed, seen in  t h is  p ersp ective , 
what i s  the meaning of despair i f  not a d eclara­
tio n  that God has withdrawn h im self from m e?37
The grounding o f hope in  an in f in i t e  Being once again
re fers  to the hum ility  o f hope, fo r  in  hoping, "I appeal
to the ex isten ce o f a certa in  crea tiv e  power in  the
world, or rather to  the actual resources a t the
d isp osa l o f th is  creative p o w e r . T h i s  le a d s , then,
to trsmscendent hope as the hope o f sa lv a tio n : ”. . .
a l l  hope i s  hope o f sa lv a tio n , and i t  i s  quite impossible
to trea t o f the one without trea tin g  o f  the other.
To say that hope i s  hope of sa lv a tio n  i s  a lso  to say
that hope i s  p rophetic , p o in tin g  to  future
37a-abriel Marcel, Homo V iator, pp. ^6-^7. This i s  
one o f  many passages in  which Marcel u ses  the word "God” 
rather than Absolute Thou, I n f in ite  Being, e tc . These 
passages are the reasons for my conclusion of id e n tity ,  
but one may read Marcel without any need to  make such an 
id e n t ity , and th is  i s  a mark of the v e r s a t i l i t y  o f  h is  
work.
—  38lb id . . p . 52.
^% abriel Marcel, Being and Having, p . 75»
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fu lf illm e n t through p a r tic ip a tio n  in  In fin ite  Being.
Ihere i s ,  then, the c lo s e s t  o f  connections between hope 
( l iv in g  in  Being) and prayer (ta lk in g  with Being):
"The zone o f hope i s  a lso  that o f  p r a y e r . A n o t h e r  
way to say the same thing i s  to say that there i s  the 
c lo se s t  o f connections between hope ( liv in g  in  Being) 
and m iracles (sharing in  the creative power o f Being) :
", . . hope i s  p o ss ib le  only in  a world where there i s  
room fo r  m iracles. • • ." ^  This re la tio n  between hope 
and the miraculous grows out o f hope's to ta l  in d ifferen ce  
to induction  and p ro b a b ility , as mentioned e a r lie r ,
A theory o f hope, developed in  th is  manner as 
grounded in  an I n f in ite  Being to \hom man the creature 
becomes conscious o f owing a l l  and depending upon 
drawing from that B eing's creative resources, might sug­
gest p a s s iv ity :  fo r  what could man do but s i t  back and
wait for  that which i s  the content o f h is  prayer, i,.e .., 
wait for Being to  react to  h is  p etitio n a ry  cammunication? 
But, Marcel warns, ju st the opposite i s  true: hope i s
an a c t iv ity ,  a d isp o s it io n  to a c t, a way of l i f e  committed 
to the depth o f  experience—to p a rtic ip a tio n  in  the depth 
of Being: "Between a c tiv e  w aiting and Hope there i s ,  i f
^°Ib id . ,  p . 7k> 
^ I b i d . ,  p . 75.
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not id e n tity , at le a s t  the c lo se s t  p rox im ity ," ^  In 
Homo V iator, Marcel s ta te s  that hope i s  always a liv e d  
a c t iv ity ;
• • . to hope • • • i s  to l iv e  in  hope in stead  of 
anxiously concentrating our a tten tion  on the poor 
l i t t l e  counters spread out in  front o f us idiich  
we fev e r ish ly  reckon up over and over again  
without r e sp ite , tormented by fear of being  
f o i le d  or ruiaed.^3
Im p lic it in  th is  passage i s  a "working" d e f in it io n  o f  what 
Marcel considers to  be the opposite of hope, the p o ss i­
b i l i t y  o f  despair.
Every man, in  h is  day-to-day liv ed  e ^ e r ie n c e —
i . e . ,  in  h is  e x is te n t ia l  s itu a tio n —is  confronted by 
and confronts such things (absurdities?) as i l l n e s s ,  
separation, lo n e lin e ss , strangeness, death, e t c .  I t  i s  
in  these encounters that man becomes open in  the deepest 
way to  deny Being—to despair—or to a ffiim  Being—to 
hope. I t  i s ,  thus, idien there i s  the g rea test danger to  
despair, that the greatest hope can emerge. In fa c t ,  
for  Marcel, i t  i s  despair i t s e l f  which o ffe r s  to  man the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  of hope. In h is  words: "The truth  i s  that
there can s t r ic t ly  speaking be no hope except when the 
temptation to despair e x i s t s .  Hope i s  the act by idiich  
th is  ten^tation  i s  a c tiv e ly  or v ic to r io u sly  overcome.
^+%abriel Marcel, "Desire and Hope," Readings in  
E x is te n tia l Phenomenology, p . 281.
^3oabriel Marcel, Homo V iator, p. 38. ^ I b id . .  p . 36,
ll-o
The s ig n if ic a n t  word i s  "actively": hope produces
a c t iv ity ,  stru gg le , f ig h t ,  change; despair, on the other 
hand, cr ip p les action , as the fo llow ing passage poin ts  
out:
To despair would be to  say, 'I  have been 
disappointed so many times there i s  every reason 
to ezpect that I sh a ll be disappointed again  
today'; i t  would be to declare the wound 
incurable, th is  wound Wiich not only i s  
in f l ic t e d  by separation but which i s  separation.
'I  sh a ll never again be anything but the wounded, 
m utilated  creature I am today. Death alone can 
end my trouble; and i t  w ill  only do so by ending 
me m yself. That i s  a l l  that destiny can do fo r  
me—d estin y , that strange doctor idiich can only 
cure the d isease by k il l in g  the su ffer e r . '45
To l iv e  in  despair i s ,  then, to c lo se  o n ese lf  o f f  in to  the 
actual world o f inductive experience and the p ossib le  
world of p ro b a b ility  and s t a t i s t i c s .  Such a c lo sin g  i s  
p red ictab ly  to do two th ings: F ir s t ,  i t  i s  to deny
mystery, ( i . .£ . ,  there i s  no place for mystery in  the world 
o f inductive inqu iry, or , to say the same th in g , i t  i s  to 
affirm  a world o f problems), idiich i s  to deny any per­
sonal, empathetic Being (or r e a lity ) ;  and second, i t  i s  
to close time in to  the past (i.e^ ., by induction the past 
determines the present and fu tu re). In The Philosophy of 
E x isten tia lism . Marcel describes the former lim ita tio n  in  
these words:
I  b e liev e  that a t the root o f despair there i s  
always th is  affirm ation: 'There i s  nothing in
^ ^ Ib id .. p . i|2 .
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the realm o f r e a l i ty  to  wtiich I can g ive c r e d it— 
no secu r ity , no guarantee.* I t  i s  a statement o f  
couplete  in so lven cy .
As against t h is ,  hope i s  idxat im plies  
c r e d it . . . .  Hope co n sis ts  in  a ssertin g  that 
there i s  a t the heart o f Being, beyond a l l  data, 
beyond a l l  in v en to r ies and a l l  ca lcu la tio n s , a 
m ysterious p r in c ip le  idiich i s  in  connivance with  
me, idiich cannot but w il l  idiat I w i l l ,  i f  idxat 
I w il l  deserves to be w illed  and i s ,  in  fa c t ,  
w illed  by the ^daole o f  my being.^o
The la t t e r  lim ita tio n  brought on by despair i s  the reduc­
tion  of time to  the ca tegories o f  the p a st, as the 
follow ing two passages i l lu s t r a t e :
despair . . .  seems to  be above a l l  the experience 
o f c lo sin g  or, i f  you l ik e ,  the experience o f  
time plugged up. The man who despairs i s  the r» 
one wnose s itu a tio n  appears to  be without e x lt .^ '
• . • despair i s  in  a certa in  sense the conscious­
ness o f  time as c losed  or, more ex a ctly  s t i l l ,  
o f time as a p r ison —w hilst hope appears as 
p iercin g  through time; everything happens as 
though tim e, in stead  of hedging consciousness  
round, allowed something to pass through i t ,  . • . 
one cannot say that hope sees idiat i s  going to  
happen; but i t  affirm s as i f  i t  saw . . .  .4 °
The preceding d iscu ssion  completes the d escrip tion
o f the movement o f Marcel’s phenomenology o f  hope from
^ Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy o f  E x isten tia lism , 
pp. 27-8 . The word "deserves*^ i s  cru c ia l, fo r  i t  shows 
once again that hope i s  an e th ic a l category for  Marcel. 
Thus, Being could not be ca lled  upon to a id  in  the hope 
of Camus' Just A ssa ssin s: to murder the Grand Duke.
^^Gabriel Marcel, "Desire and Hope," op. c i t . ,  
p . 281. The despair, or h opelessness, o f Being without 
e x it  has been dram atically presented by Jean-Paul Sartre 
in  ^  E x it .
^^Gabriel Marcel, Homo V iator, p . 53»
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sensation  through transcendence• A number o f metaphysi­
cal and ep istem olog ica l questions have been d e lib era te ly  
omitted, since the task  o f  th is  f i r s t  chapter was 
descrip tive rather than c r i t i c a l .  Questions and c r i t i ­
cisms w il l  fo llow  in  Chapter Four.
Before proceeding to  the next chapter, an an a lysis  
of Camus' p o s it io n  on hope, I  sh a ll d iscu ss  two other  
item s. F ir s t ,  severa l elements in  the previous examina­
tion  o f  hope w i l l  be re la ted  in  a new manner—b arriers  
to hope, cond itions fo r  hope, the temporal order, 
p o s s ib i l i ty ,  and a d e f in it io n  o f hope. Second, a b r ie f  
summary statement o f M arcel's system atic phenomenology 
o f hope w ill  conclude th is  chapter.
There are many b arriers to hope, and a l l  belong to  
the world o f  Having. For tw entieth-century man the major 
barrier i s  technology because of i t s  m etaphysical th ru st. 
That thrust i s  toward the problem atic, i,.e^. » the reduc­
tion  o f  m ysteries to  problems, problems fo r  vdiich so lu tion s  
can be proposed. In e f f e c t ,  the world o f  technology  
reduces the p o te n t ia l ity  o f experience to  a category of 
p rob ab ility , ^.e_., to  a category o f induction; thus, i t  
c lo ses  experience to the categories o f  the p a st. Hope 
cannot emerge from the world o f c a lcu la tio n  and induc­
tion; i t  can, l i t e r a l l y ,  only die from the te m in a l  
i l ln e s s  o f having a zero p rob ab ility  c o e f f ic ie n t .  I t  i s
th is  world o f technology and problems, our world, that
Marcel as a philosopher o f  hope d ecr ies idien he w rites:
The capacity to hope dim inishes in  proportion  
as the soul becomes in crea sin g ly  chained to i t s  
experience and to the ca tegor ies lA ich arise  
from i t  .  , , to the world o f the problem atical.4-9
• • • a world v iieve  techniques are paramount 
i s  a world given over to d esire  and fear; because 
every technique i s  there to serve some desire or 
some fe a r . I t  i s  perhaps ch a ra c te r is tic  o f Hope 
to  be unable e ith e r  to  make d irec t ^ e  of any 
technique or to c a l l  i t  to  her a id .50
I t  i s  th is  kind o f world—o f techniques and problems, o f
inductive p rob ab ility  and p r e d ic ta b ility —that, to  use
Marcel *s words, "plugs up tim e, " and fo rces  man in to  the
c a p tiv ity  of the p a st. As one o f M arcel's heroines puts
i t —th is  i s  a broken world:
Don't you f e e l  sometimes that we are l iv in g  
. . .  i f  you can c a l l  i t  l iv in g  . . .  in  a broken 
world? Yes broken l ik e  a broken watch. The 
mainspring has stopped working. Just to look at  
i t ,  nothing has changed. Everything i s  in  p la ce .
But put the watch to  your ear, and you don't hear 
any t ick in g . You know what I am ta lk ing  about, 
the world, Wiat we c a l l  the world, the world of  
human creatures . . .  i t  seems to  me that i t  must 
have had a heart at one tim e, but today vou would 
say that the heart has stopped b e a t i n g . 51
L ife in  th is  broken world i s  a l i f e  overWielmed by ca p tiv ity
and i t s  resu ltin g  despair, a world of no e x i t s .
^% abriel Marcel, The Philosophy of E x isten tia lism ,
p . w .
^G abriel Marcel, Being and Having, p . 76.
^ G abriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, v o l. I ,  p . 27.
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From th is  d iscu ssion  o f the broken world o f  
technology i t  might seem that hope i s  inq)ossible—that 
i t  went out idien the steam engine came in* But at th is  
point Marcel makes a fa sc in a tin g  philosoph ical move: 
without man's experience o f cap tiv ity  and despair, hope 
i s  not p o ss ib le , as the three follow ing passages point 
out:
. . . the la s s  l i f e  i s  experienced as a ca p tiv ity  
the le s s  the soul w ill  be able to see the shining  
of that v e i le d , mysterious l ig h t ,  idiich . . , 
illum in es the very center of hope's dwelling
p la ce . 52
I t  may be that we are capable of hoping only  
in so far  as we s ta r t  by rea liz in g  that we are 
captives • • • a t the back of hope l i e s  some 
sort o f tragedy. To hope is  to carry w ithin me 
the p rivate assurance that however black things 
may seem, my present in to lerab le s itu a tio n  can­
not be f in a l ;  there must be some way o u t .53
I t  remains true . . . that the correla tion  
o f  hope and despair su b sists u n t i l  the end. • . . 
id iile  the structure of the world we l iv e  in  
perm its—and may even seem to counsel—absolute 
despair, y e t  i t  i s  only such a world that can 
give r is e  to  an unconquerable hope.54
The s ig n ifica n ce  of the word "only” in  the l a s t  two 
passages w il l  be c la r if ie d  in  la te r  d iscu ss io n . The
^^Gabriel Marcel, Homo V iator, p . 32.
S^Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, v o l. I ,
p . 179.
^ ^ a b r ie l Marcel, The Philosophy o f E x is te n t ia l­
ism, p . 28.
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sig n ifica n ce  o f ca p tiv ity  and despair for the p o s s ib il i ty  
o f hope should be c lear  from these passages.
I t  i s  d i f f ic u l t  to arrive at Marcel's understanding 
of time, and i t  i s  a long an a ly tica l procedure idiich I 
do not propose to undertake here.^^ What w il l  be 
offered  i s  a sim p lified  an a lysis su ff ic ie n t  for the pur­
pose o f showing th at, for Marcel, hope r e la te s  to the 
quality  of ex isten ce  in  time and not to the quantity of 
ex isten ce in  tim e. Another way o f saying th is  i s :  
q u a lita tiv e  time belongs to  the realm of Being whereas 
quantitative time belongs to the world o f Having. This 
i s  to say that there are two temporal orders operative 
in  M arcel's theory of hope.
F ir s t ,  there i s  the time in  the world o f Having, 
the quantified  time that underlies induction, prob ab ility , 
and p r e d ic ta b ility ;  the time which Marcel says can get 
plugged u p--c losed  time. This i s  the time o f despair 
and o f death, as i s  m etaphorically pointed out in  Being 
and Having : "Time i s  l ik e  a w ell whose sh aft goes down
to death--to  my death—to my p erd ition . The g u lf  of 
time: how I shudder to look down on timel My death is
good study o f Marcel's understanding o f time 
and i t s  re la tion  to  ex istence i s  to be found in  a d is ­
serta tion : J . V. V igorito , Time in  the Philosophy of
Gabriel Marcel, U n iversity  of Colorado, 1968.
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at I t s  bottom and i t s  dank breath mounts up and c h i l l s  
me."^^ This time i s  of a kind sim ilar to the Greek 
time ca lled  chronos, the time o f  quantity—even, undis­
turbed, homogeneous. I t  i s  a u n iversa l time, the same 
for  a l l  men. I t  should, then, be c lea r  from the 
ch a ra c ter is tic s  that chronos time i s  the time by which 
man i s  a captive in  the broken world—i t  i s  technological 
tim e. Thus, chronos time i s  one of the prior conditions 
for hope, as Marcel im plies in  the fo llow ing passage:
I t  seems to me that the cond itions that make i t  
p o ssib le  to hope are s t r ic t ly  the same as those 
idiich make i t  p ossib le  to despair. Death 
considered as the springboard o f an absolute 
hope—a world where death was m issing would be a 
world ^ e r e  hope only ex is ted  in  the larva l 
sta g e .57
Chronos--q u a n tified  time—i s  the time o f  that ultim ate  
event o f ca p tiv ity  and despair: death.
Second, there i s  another kind of time that i s  a 
part of man's ex isten ce , what Marcel c a l ls  open time :
". • .w e  cannot but think o f hope as an expansion: i t
in ^ lie s  an open time as opposed to a c losed  time. • • , ”5® 
Open time i s  the time o f Being, i t  i s  q u a lified  time, 
the time o f hope, love and f id e l i t y ,  the time o f com­
munion and transcendence. I t  i s  sim ilar to the Greek
56oabriel Marcel, Being and Having. p . 8o.
^7Ib id . .  p . 93.
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Gabriel Marcel, The Mfcrstery of Being, v o l. I I ,
p . 181.  ^ ------------ ^
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time ca lled  k a iro s» I t  i s  uneven, d isturbed, h etero­
geneous* I t  i s  personal, su b jective , e x is t e n t ia l ,  
d ifferen t fo r  a l l  men* I t  i s  a time that cannot be used 
to p red ict by in du ction , for i t  i s  the time that p a r t ic i­
pates in  the mystery o f Being* Kairos time i s  
o n to log ica l time* I t  refuses to deal with p r o b a b ilit ie s , 
problems, as Marcel in d ica tes  in  Being and Having:
I t  im plies a kind o f rad ica l re fu sa l to  reckon 
p o s s ib i l i t i e s ,  and th is  i s  enormously iimpor- 
tant* I t  i s  as though i t  carried with i t  as 
p ostu la te  the a ssertio n  that r e a lity  overflow s 
a l l  reckonings; as though i t  claimed, in  v irtu e  
of some unknown secret a f f in ity ,  to  touch a 
p rin cip le  hidden in  the heart o f  th in gs, or 
rather in  the heart of events, which mocks such
reckonings. 59
For kairos time there i s  no p a st, only a present and a 
future; and, because th is  time refuses to p r e d ic t- -to  
reckon inductive p o s s i b i l i t i e s - - i t  m ysteriously  breaks 
down any s t r i c t  d is t in c tio n  between present and future* 
Therefore, hope as actu a lized  in  kairos time brings 
present and future together as a way o f  l i f e ,  active  
waiting* Indeed hoping may be said to be a way o f  
a c tiv e ly  l iv in g  in  the fu ture.
This understanding of hope and time serves as a 
b a sis  fo r  examining the re la tio n  between hope and p o ss i­
b i l i t y  and p r e d ic ta b ili ty . In fa c t , the preceding  
passage from Being and Having im plies the re la tio n : hope
59,G abriel Marcel, Being and Having, p . 79*
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denies the future e f f ic a c y  o f p r e d ic ta b ility  because 
p r e d ic ta b ility  bu ilds upon chronos tim e. Hope a lso  
denies the inductive determ ination o f  future p o s s ib i l i ­
t i e s  o f the p ast and chronos tim e. To re la te  the word 
" p ossib ility"  to  hope one must use i t  in  a d ifferen t  
manner. By p o s s ib i l i t y  i s  u su a lly  meant "a good 
p ro b a b ility ."  Remove th is  in du ctive element from the 
word, and i t  can be applied to hope in  the sense of 
"undetermined p o s s ib i l i ty ,"  or " lim it le s s  p o s s ib i l i t y ," 
Before I examine a d e f in it io n  o f  hope, one f in a l  
concern is s u e s  from the d iscu ssion  of home and time: 
does Marcel speak of necessary con d itions fo r  hope? 
E x p lic it ly , he does not, and th is  should not come as a 
su rp rise, fo r  "necessary condition" i s  a lo g ic a l term 
as w ell as an inductive term. But there i s  a sense in  
which Marcel does speak o f necessary conditions for hope. 
In a passage quoted e a r lie r ,  Marcel in d icated  such con­
d itio n s  in  these words: "We are capable o f hoping only
in  so fa r  as we sta r t by r e a liz in g  that we are 
ca p tiv es. . . . "  "Only" in th is  passage, in  my under­
standing, in d ica tes  a necessary r e la t io n . There are, in  
Marcel, two necessary conditions fo r  hope: the
experience o f ca p tiv ity  and chronos t im e .^  The former.
80The question o f  a s u f f ic ie n t  condition for  hope i s  
e x p l ic i t ly  lack ing in  Marcel. At the le v e l o f sensation  
and communion such an absence i s  not problem atic, but at
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the experience o f c a p tiv ity , includes many human experi­
ences: pain , lo n e lin e s s , strangeness, lo s tn e ss ,
in fe r io r ity  f e e l in g s , anxiety, despair, fear o f death, 
e t c .  The la t t e r ,  chronos time, i s  the time o f common 
day-to-day experience, o f  chronological age, and thus, 
serves as a springboard, a necessary condition, fo r  the 
emergence o f  k a iros time which changes the boredom of 
the every day in to  an excitement and l iv e l in e s s .
In h is  w ritin g s , Marcel o ffers  three d iffe r e n t  
passages which might be considered d efin itio n s  o f hope, 
i f  one keeps in  mind that no adequate d e fin it io n  can ever  
be given o f  a mystery:
To pray in5) l ie s  a refu sa l to  treat the present 
s itu a tio n  as a case that i s  capable o f occurring  
a second tim e, • • • RejLigious thought i s  • • , 
exercised  on the p resen t, , , , So prayer i s  
renewal, i t  i s  so to speak an active negation of 
experience. Moreover, the re lig io u s soul knows 
no precedents. The re lig io u s soul i s  forever  
ca llin g  everything back in to  question; there i s  no 
such th ing  as an estab lish ed  p ossession —and th is  
i s  only an in d irec t way of d efin ing hope.&l
the le v e l o f transcendence such i s  not the ca se . Con­
sid er the transcendent e^q>erience of Marcel*s Absolute 
Thou: could man have such an experience, i . , e , ,  be
assured of such a r e a lity , and f a i l  to l iv e  Tn hope? I t  
would seem d i f f ic u l t  in  the face o f such an assurance 
fo r  man to d esp a ir. Thus, i s  trancendence a su ff ic ie n t  
condition? I t  i s  an open question. In Chapter Pour I 
w ill  develop the p o s it io n  that mystery must be an 
o n to lo g ica lly  s u f f ic ie n t  condition for hope and c r it ic iz e  
Marcel fo r  f a i l in g  to recognize th is ,
^^Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, p . 266,
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• * , the idea o f in e r t  hope seems to me a 
contrad iction  in  terns. Hope i s  not a kind of 
l i s t l e s s  waiting; i t  underpins action  or i t  runs 
before i t .  But i t  becomes degraded and lo s t  
once the action  i s  i^ ect. Hope seems to me • • • 
the prolongation in to  the unknown o f an a c t iv ity  
idiich i s  cen tra l—that i s  rooted in  being. Hence 
i t  has a f f in i t i e s ,  not with d es ir e , but the w i l l .
The w il l  implants the same re fu sa l to calcu late  
p o s s ib i l i t i e s .  . • • Could not hope therefore be 
defined as the w ill when i t  i s  made to bear on 
vftiat does not depend on it s e l f? o 2
Hope i s  e s se n tia lly  • • • the a v a ila b ility  of 
a soul idiich has entered in tim a te ly  enough into  
the experience of communion to accomplish the trans­
cendent a c t—the act esta b lish in g  the v ita l  
regeneration o f tdiich experience affords both the 
pledge and the f i r s t - f r u i t s .63
I t  i s  th is  th ird  "definition" which Marcel seams to con­
sid er  most Important, for i t  captures what i s  included in  
the f i r s t  two: hope, as an a c t iv ity  o f the human w ill
(perhaps, w i l l  to  l iv e ) ,  becomes p o ss ib le  f i r s t  at the 
le v e l  o f  communion and then, w ith the experience of 
love (i..e^.» the denial of separation, even the separa­
t io n  o f death), accomplishes the experience o f transcen­
dence. As a man l iv e s  in hope, he l iv e s  in  Being. Thus, 
the value and depth of existence i s  in  part determined 
by hope, since hope i s  a way o f p a rtic ip a tin g  in  the 
mystery o f Being.
ftp
Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy o f E xisten tia lism ,
P. 33.
^% abriel Marcel, Homo V iator, p . 10.
51
To Slim up; hope i s  both an entree and a repense 
to  Being. These two French words in  th e ir  English  
meanings capture every s ig n if ic a n t  element in  M arcel's 
understanding of hope,
Hope i s  an en tree in to  Being:
1 . Entrance (opening)—Hope i s  an entrance in to
Being. In Marcel’s tenninology, i t  i s  
through communion, actualized  in  hope, that 
man p a r t ic ip a te s , enters in to , i s  open to . 
Being;
2. AvELllability—Through hope the resources o f
Being become ava ilab le  to him who hopes and 
he lÀio hopes becomes h im self a v a ila b le  to  
rela tion sh ip s at the le v e ls  of communion 
and transcendence;
3. Beginning—He idio l iv e s  in  hope begins again,
i s  no longer captive to the ca tegor ies o f  
the past and th e ir  predictable im p lica tio n s.
Hope i s  a repense to Being:
1. Response—Hope i s  a response to the power and
influence o f Being, This i s  why the word 
"call" i s  o ften  used by Marcel : Hope i s  a
response to  the c a ll  of Being as heard by 
man in  h is  l iv e d  experience;
2, Sympathy ( fe llo w -fe e lin g )—Hope i s  p o ss ib le
only a t the le v e l  o f  in te r su b je c t iv ity , i . e . ,  
the le v e l  o f  fe llo w -fe e lin g  that Marcel "caTls 
communion, udiich can advance to transcendence,
Hope, for Marcel, i s ,  then, both an entree in to  and
a réponse to Being,
R ecapitulation
Marcel began w ith sensation  as the phenomenological 
given . The f ir s t  d iscovery about th is  "given" was that
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sensation  was in te n tio n a l, and the most prim itive (b asic) 
in ten tio n  was "I am my Body," This in ten tio n  in ^ lied  
in d iv id u ation  that was based a lso  upon the unquestioned 
ex isten ce  o f the Other, The ex isten ce  o f  the Other, 
im p lic it  in  the phenomenological g iven , le d  to com­
munion v ia  incarnation , where the Other became present 
as a Thou, The a c tu a liza tio n  o f communion through hope, 
lo v e , and f id e l i t y  foreshadowed man's experience o f the 
transcendent Being, in  tdiich communion and sensation as 
w ell as transcendence were grounded. The prin cip a l 
nature o f th is  Being was developed as mystery, and to  
the ex ten t that man through sen sation , communion, and 
transcendence experienced Being, these modes of 
p a r tic ip a tio n  in  Being themselves became m ysteries.
This movement from sensation  to tremscendence represented  
an ascending order o f p a r tic ip a tio n  in , and awareness 
o f. Being, I t s  ascendance was e th ic a l as w ell as 
o n to lo g ica l and ep istem olog ica l, At every le v e l o f  
p a r tic ip a tio n  man had the opportunity to deny Being: 
F ir s t ,  at the le v e l  of sensation , he could reduce h im self 
to the summation o f a se r ie s  of haves; second, at the 
le v e l  o f  communion, he could reduce the Thous present to  
him through lo v e , hope, and f i d e l i t y ,  to I t s ,  things to  
be p ossessed  through d esire; and th ir d , at the le v e l  o f
transcendence, he could s e l l  out to  despair, to the in ­
solvency or in d ifferen ce o f Being,
53
In th is  mataphysic o f Being and ea isten o e , hope 
became an entrance in to  Being, a way o f  e:q>eriencing 
the a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  Being and becoming a v a ila b le , a 
con tin u a lly  new beginning freed  of the p a st, a response 
to the c a l l  and power o f Being, and a sharing o f fe llo w -  
fe e l in g  grounded in  Being, In short, hope i s  both an 
entree in to  and a réponse to Being,
This co n s is te s  the d iscu ssion  o f hope and the 
mystery o f Being, an examination of Marcel as a
philosopher o f  hope. The next chapter w il l  consider hope 
and absurdity—the thoughts on hope by Albert Camus, a 
man often  (and m istakenly) c a lle d  the "Philosopher o f No 
Hope," The th ird  chapter o f th is  d is se r ta tio n  w ill  be 
a c r i t ic a l  comparison and con trast.
CHAPTER TWO: BETWEEN THE PLAGUE
AND EXILE—ABSURDITY AND 
HOPE
In the f i r s t  chapter, the thought o f a philosopher 
who has been c a lle d  the "prophet o f  community and hope" 
was d iscu ssed . This second chapter was o r ig in a lly  to 
serve as a con trasting (opposing) viewpoint by d iscu s­
sing the thought o f Albert Camus, a philosopher o f  
pessimism (or worse, sometimes a philosopher of 
n ih ilism ), the man who wrote the "Gospel of No Hope"
(The Myth o f S isyphus) . But several months of study into  
most o f Camus' w ritin gs have convinced me that Camus i s  
not a "prophet o f  ^  hope and o f so litu d e ,"  but a man 
idio shares much, though not a l l ,  with the prophet of 
community and hope. Thus, the content o f  th is  chapter 
has come as a su rp rise , for few w riters on Camus have 
captured th is  sid e o f the man. Indeed, i t  might be said  
that Meursault, Sisyphus, the ending paragraph of The 
Plague, and Cl amen ce have mistakenly overshadowed the 
rela tion sh ip  between Rieux and Tarrou, the Rebel, and 
the man ^ o  once again picks up that rock of Sisyphus in  
the B razilian  jun gle, D’Arrast. Perhaps th is  i s  to say 
that there i s  a tension  in  Camus between so litude and 
community, n ih ilism  and value, hope and hopelessness, 
and impotence versus cr e a t iv ity  in  the face of the absurd, 
In the d iscu ssion  idiich i s  to fo llow , I sh a ll e s ta b lish
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th is  tension by concentrating on these polar concepts.
To summarize the strategy is^ lie d  in  the preceding d is ­
cussion, the purpose o f th is  chapter, by v ir tu e  of the 
tension and overshadowing ju st described, i s  twofold; 
f i r s t ,  to develop Camus' thoughts on hope; and second, 
out o f th is  development to correct the view of Camus as 
a philosopher o f no hope, ^.e^., to show how Sisyphus 
rejo ins the community o f man and re-d iscovers "the gentle  
s t ir r in g s  o f hope."
Before taking a suxnmary look a t the ten sion  in  Camus' 
thoughts on hope, I want f i r s t  to  c lea r  up a question— 
one that was m issing from the consideration  of Marcel. 
M arcel's l i t e r a r y  works played a very small part in  
developing h is  views o f hope because h is  "philosophical 
writings" provided the d e f in it iv e  p assages. Indeed, 
while h is  p h ilosoph ica l w ritings ( fa r  more numerous than 
Camus") str ik e  right at the heart o f  contemporary 
ex isten ce , h is  plays seem almost V ictorian  in  th e ir  p lo ts  
and d ia logues. Such i s  not the case w ith Camus fo r  at 
le a s t  two reasons: F ir s t ,  Camus, unlike Marcel, does
not develop an e x p lic it  metaphysic (theory) o f hope; and 
thus, h is  w ritin gs, both l ite r a r y  and p h ilo so p h ica l, must 
be considered in  broader d e ta il to analyze h is  thoughts on 
hope. Second, Camus' l ite r a r y  characters and situ a tio n s  
are as much v eh ic le s  o f h is  ph ilosophical understandings
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as are h is  p h ilo so p h ica l works. Thus» before proceeding  
to the task o f  th is  chapter, an examination of Camus* 
thoughts on hope, one must f i r s t  have an understanding 
of h is  view o f  a r t , h is  use of symbolism, and the r e la ­
tio n  which Camus has to h is  l ite r a r y  characters—to  that 
task I now tu rn .
The p lace  to begin in  understanding Camus and h is  
art i s  with Camus* own words. There are many p la c e s  in  
idiich Camus w rites  o f  the a r t is t  and h is  works, but 
noidiere does the r e sp o n s ib ility  and commitment o f a r t, 
a r t is t ,  and the fellow sh ip  o f man ring more c le a r ly  than 
in  h is  acceptance speech for  the Nobel Prize fo r  l ite r a tu r e  
in  1957:
I cannot l iv e  as a person without my a r t . And 
yet I  have never s e t  that art above everything  
e l s e .  I t  i s  e s se n tia l to me, on the contrary, 
because i t  excludes no one and allow s me to  l i v e ,  
just as I  am, on a footing with a l l .  To me art i s  
not a s o l i ta r y  d e lig h t . I t  i s  a means of s t ir r in g  
the g re a te st  number o f men by providing them with a 
p riv iled g ed  image o f our common joys and woes. . . .  
Because h is  vocation i s  to u n ite  the g rea te st  
p o ss ib le  number o f men, i t  cannot contenance f a ls e ­
hood and slavery , idiich breed so litu d e s  vdierever 
they p r e v a il. Whatever the f r a i l t i e s  may be, the 
m ob ility  o f our c a llin g  w ill  always be rooted in  two 
commitments d i f f i c u l t  to  observe : re fu sa l to  l i e
about i ^ t  we know and resistan ce to  op p ression .!
Camus i s  saying that the a r t is t  and h is  art cannot be
separated from the world o f human joys and fru str a tio n s .
^Albert Camus, "The Acceptance o f the Nobel P rize,"  
The A tla n tic  Monthly, v o l .  201 (May, 1958), PP. 33-4*
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They are o f the world, are shaped by the world, speak for
the world, are responsible to the world—the world o f
humanity. Therefore, in  considering Camus* p h ilo sop h ica l 
in s ig h ts , one cannot ignore h is  short s to r ie s ,  n ovels , 
and drama—j^.ei., h is  a r t . Indeed, for purposes o f th is  
exploration  in to  hope, Camus' art i s  e s p e c ia lly  important, 
as h is  short d escrip tion  o f the trag ic  clim ate in  an 
essay  e n t it le d  "On the Future o f Tragedy" p o in ts  out: 
the "tragic c lim ate . . . [is]} torn between absolute hope 
and f in a l  doubt.
The r e la t io n  o f Camus to  h is  characters w i l l ,  I
th ink , always prove puzzling, fo r  he i s  none o f  them and
he i s  a l l  o f them. For example, Camus i s  not to be 
id e n tif ie d  w ith  Clamence in  The F a ll; y e t , n e ith er  Camus 
nor any o f us can d isa sso c ia te  ourselves from Clamence 
or from h is  lack  o f innocence. This puzzlement o f being 
and not being h is  characters i s  most c le a r ly  posed in  
analyzing The Plague : Who i s  Camus? Rieux? Tarrou?
There i s  no d e f in it iv e  answer because, as Hazel Barnes in  
her book Humanistic E x isten tia lism  has n oticed :
Perhaps the truth o f  the matter i s  that 
Tarrou and Rieux represent two aspects o f  Camus 
him self; One the one hand, there i s  the th ir s t  
for  p u r ity  o f heart and the fe e lin g  that i t  i s  
wrong to  compromise with any so c ie ty  or w ith any
^Albert Camus, "On the Future o f Tragedy," in  L yrical 
and C r it ic a l Essays, p . 307#
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party which permits the s a c r if ic e  o f  ind iv iduals  
fo r  the good o f  the m ajority; on the other hand i s  
the re a liza tio n  that preoccupation with one's own 
innocence and retreat from the world form one more 
way o f consenting to the e v i l s  vdiich already e x i s t .
I f  men are to be saved there must be reb e llio n s  «
. . .  In The Plague • • • Rieux and Tarrou recognize 
th e ir  d ifferen ces , but each o f them synq)athetically  
comprehend what the other wants; each f e e l s  that 
the o th er 's  path i s  right fo r  h im ,3
Thus, Camus i s  h is  characters id iile  not being any one o f  
them. Is  not the same true o f a l l  men: am I not Rieux
and Tarrou? Do I not su ffer from Clamence's inner plague 
as w ell as have the p o ten tia l fo r  D 'A rrast's act o f human 
brotherhood in  the jungle? Germaine Bree, in  "Albert 
Camus and the Plague," further c l a r i f i e s  the id e n t i f ic a ­
tion:
Camus' point of view does not change throughout 
the n ovel. The dilemma o f  h is  characters i s  h is  
dilemma, th e ir  reactions w ithin the s itu a tio n  are 
h is  rea ctio n s. TSie movement o f h is  characters w ith­
in  the outer pattern  o f events he se ts  fo r  them i s  
idiat revea ls the d irection  o f h is  concern.4
To understand Camus ph ilosoph ical thoughts on hope
one must g ive serious a tten tion  to  h is  l ite r a r y  works, as
I sh a ll do throughout th is  chapter.
Another fa cto r  in  the l i t e r a r y  works that makes them
so in te g r a lly  s ig n if ic a n t to  the p h ilosop h ica l ones i s
the symbolism Camus ençloys. In Camus we fin d  a twentieth*
3Hazel E, Barnes, Humanistic E x isten tia lism : The
Literature o f P o s s ib il i ty , pp, èh.à-7 ,
Germaine Bree, "Albert Camus and the Plague," Yale 
French Studies, v o l. 8 (1951)» p . 97#
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century adaption o f the Greek (e sp e c ia lly  P latonic)
en^hasis on myth and symbol as p h ilosoph ica l to o ls  fo r
understanding the world and man. Emily Zants, w riting
in  "Camus* Deserts and Their A llie s ,"  has cogently
summarized the meaning o f  Camus* symbolic universe:
Much of Camus' preoccupation with death i s  explained  
on a symbolic l e v e l .  By h is  use o f murders, wars 
and plagues he r e s ta te s  in  contenqporary terms 
Odysseus' tem ptation on Calypso's is lan d  to remain 
e ith er  in  perpetual confrontation w ith the absurd 
or to succumb to one of i t s  terms, anything but 
the revo lt idiich would carry the individual away 
from her is la n d  o f debauchery back to  man. I t  i s
the a r t is t ic  atteropt to bring the stranger back
from such is la n c y  to  the harmonious seashore where 
the balance p r e v a ils  between men's id ea ls  and 
th e ir  individual l iv e s  that forms the nucleus o f  
Camus' symbolic u n iv e rse .5
There are many symbols in  Camus' work: the sun, the sand,
the sea, the rocks, the wind, the n ight, e tc . Of a l l ,
however, the one vdiich I consider most s ig n if ic a n t  fo r
understanding Camus i s  the sea.
The sea has many a ttr ib u tes  in  Camus, but above
a l l  i t  i s  ambiguous, 3^.e., the sea i s  f i r s t  one th ing,
then another. I t  i s  never idiat i t  was—the sea. At
times the sea i s  a p lace o f love and friendsh ip , o f
immediate joy. At other times the sea i s  the p lace of
anguished s ile n c e . The rocks are a lso  a place o f s ilen ce
^Bmily Zants, "Camus' Deserts and Ih eir  A llie s ,  
Kingdoms o f the Stranger," Symposium, v o l. 17 (Spring, 
1963), p . 40.
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Id Camus, but i t  i s  a d iffe r e n t place of s ilen c e , as
Qnily Zants has noted:
The s ilen ce  o f the sea i s  d ifferen t from 
that o f  the rocks: the la t te r  i s  the s ilen ce  of
an im p o ss ib ility  o f communication lAereas the 
former i s  that o f a mutual understanding. • • •
The friendsh ip  o f the sea demands a constant 
reb irth  o f  i t s  p leasu res. . . .  I t  e x is ts  in  i t s  
en tire ty  at a present moment. I t  i s  in  th is  
sense a lso  that in d ifferen ces, tran q u ility  and 
permanence are a ttr ib u tes  of the sea .o
I t  i s  the sea that i s  Camus* b irthrigh t and, in  a
sp ir itu a l sense, h is  restin g  p lace . We sh a ll come back
to the sea o ften  in  Camus—indeed, many times in  the
development o f th is  chapter w il l  the ambiguity o f the sea
haunt the dream fo r  philosophical c la r i t y ,  for Camus i s
the seal And human hope i s  of the sea fo r  Camus, as sh a ll
be shown.
Having b r ie f ly  glimpsed the ambiguity of the sea 
and the p o ssib le  importance of such a symbol fo r  the 
thought o f Camus, I now turn to  an an alysis of Camus' 
understanding o f that symbol.
In h is  Nobel acceptance speech Camus alludes to the 
ambiguity o f  man and the world by referr in g  to the tension  
of l i f e  and the e lu siv en ess  of truth and freedom, saying:
e  # # having ex to lle d  the m obility o f  the w r iter 's  
c a llin g , I should show him as he i s ,  with no other 
righ ts than those he shares with h is  fellow  
f ig h te r s;  vulnerable but stubborn, unjust and
^Ibid. . p . 33.
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eager fo r  ju s t ic e , constructing h is  work without 
shame or pride w ithin  s ig h t o f a l l ,  constantly  
torn between pain and beauty, and devoted to  
extracting  from h is  dual nature the creation s he 
ob stin a te ly  s tr iv e s  to ra ise  up in  the d estru ctive  
flu ctu a tio n  o f h is to r y . Who, a fte r  th a t, could  
ejqpect o f him ready-made so lu tion s and f in e  moral 
codes? Truth i s  m ysterious, e lu s iv e , ever to be 
worn anew. L iberty i s  dangerous, as hard to  g et  
along with as i t  i s  e x c it in g .'
In fa c t , the most concise statement o f the ambiguity o f
man and of the human s itu a tio n  i s  found in  one o f  Camus'
most often  quoted statem ents: "Man i s  the only creature
idio refuses to be what he is."®  Above a l l ,  the plague,
that sp ectra l myth that haunts the human s itu a tio n , i s
a myth of ambiguity, as Roger Q u illio t  has noted:
. . .  the plague appeared and disappeared l ik e  the 
d ev il in  Germanic leg en d s. I t s  epidemic character 
requires that a s ta te  o f  plague be decreed. Thus 
Oran cut o f f  from the world takes on an aura o f  
strangeness. Forebodingly d istan t l ik e  Moses or 
Meursault in  h is  p r iso n , nonetheless i t ,  l ik e  them, 
remain curiously  c lo se  to  u s .
This combination o f  fa m ilia r ity  and mystery 
confer on the myth o f the plague an ambiguity which 
g ives i t  i t s  v a lu e .°
The same ambiguity i s  evidenced in  The F a ll ,  fo r  no one
i s  innocent--no one i s  g u i l t y .  Thus, vdio can judge ?
The ambiguous, s e a - lik e  s itu a tio n  o f  man lea d s to
the same d if f ic u lty  in  try in g  to understand Camus' thoughts
^Albert Camus, "Nobel Speech," 0£ . c i t . ,  p . 3^ 1-. 
®Albert Camus, The Rebel, p . 11.
^Roger Q u illio t , Ihe Sea and Prisons, p. 136.
63
OQ hope* A quick glance at Appendix B should show the 
problem c lea r ly : Of the passages indexed, there are 73
passages (25 in  Sisyphus alone) in  which Camus denies 
the au th en tic ity  o f hope and 52 passages to the contrary* 
What i s  one to  make o f  th is?  Has Camus changed h is  p o s i­
tion? Or, i s  there evidence o f an evo lu tion  in  h is  
thought? The answer to  both i s  a d e f in ite  for the 
ambiguity involved  (^*£*, the ten sion  between these two 
d ifferen t views on hope) i s  continuous from early  to  
la t e r  writings* The next question i s :  Is  Camus, then,
in con sisten t?  I t  would seem on the b a s is  o f  idiat has 
been said that Camus i s  m aintaining (p*"*p.), i.*e*, 
denying the p r in c ip le  o f noncontradiction* One may, I  
suppose, accuse him o f  in con sisten cy , but the charge would 
be e ith er  t r iv ia l  or irrelevan t*  Dais affirm ing and 
then denying the p o s s ib i l i ty  of hope r is e s  n atu ra lly  out 
of the ambiguity o f the w orld -situ ation  in  which a man 
fin d s himself* Die re fo re , i f  one wants to charge Camus 
with in con sisten cy , f in e ;  but he must then a t bottom so 
charge man h im self and h is  s itu ation *
To see the tension  ju st d iscu ssed , consider and 
con^are the fo llow ing  passages from Camus:
And carrying th is  absurd lo g ic  to i t s  con­
clusion , I must admit that that struggle im plies  
a to ta l absence o f hope* * * A man idxo has 
become conscious o f the absurd i s  forever bound 
to  it*  A man devoid o f hope and conscious of
6k
being so has ceased to belong to the future.^®
There was no room in  any heart but fo r  a very 
o ld , gray hope, that hope vdiich keeps men from 
le t t in g  themselves d r if t  in to  death and i s  
nothing but a dogged w ill  to  l iv e  *11
To begin w ith, I f e e l  a so lid a r ity  with the 
common man. Tomorrow the world may burst in to  
fragments. In that threat hanging over our 
heads there i s  a le sso n  of tru th . As we face  
such a fu ture, h ierarch ies, t i t l e s ,  honors are 
reduced to  idiat they are in  r e a lity ;  a passing  
puff o f smoke. And the only certa in ty  l e f t  to  
us i s  that o f naked su ffer in g , common to a l l ,  
interm ingling i t s  roots with those o f  a stubborn
hope.12
In a more dramatic manner, the ambiguity in  Camus* 
p o sitio n  on hope can be evidenced by comparing the two 
follow ing passages from approximately the same period of  
time:
He who despairs o f events i s  a coward, but he 
d^io has hope fo r  the human lo t  i s  a f o o l .13
I have always thought that i f  the man \Aio has 
hope fo r  the human condition is . a f o o l ,  he tdio 
g iv e s  up a l l  hope i s  a coward.1^
"W ell," I can imagine the reader in q u ir in g , "is
hope p o ss ib le , or notî^^Just what does Camus have to say
Albert Camus, The Ityth o f Sisyphus, pp. 23-k»
^^Albert Camus, The Plague, pp. 226-27.
^^Albert Camus, "The Wages o f Our Generation," in  
R esistance. Rebellion and Death, p . I 83 .
^^Albert Camus, Notebooks, 191^ 2-1951. Sept. 1 ,
1943, p . 80.




about it? "  An answer to  the f i r s t  might be: yes or no.
Why? Because truth i s  f le e t in g ,  e lu s iv e , m ysterious. 
Because man i s  l ik e  the sea . Thus hope fo r  Camus i s  
both p o ssib le  and fo o lis h  (i_.e^., to be rejected  by the 
ra tio n a l man). Surely such an answer w il l  not s a t is fy  
the lo g ic a l  m etaphysician, but fo r  now i t  w ill  have to  
do and w il l  have to re st  on the in tr in s ic  ambiguity of  
the world and the human s itu a tio n . An answer to the 
second question w ill  occupy much o f the remainder of  
th is  chapter.
Before exploring Camus' thoughts on hope, I sh a ll 
make two further comments: F ir s t ,  I sh a ll develop Camus'
thoughts concerning the re jec tio n  o f hope by concen­
tra tin g  on two heroes: Meursault and Sisyphus. Having
then given  h is  "gospel o f no hope," I sh a ll show how 
Meursault and Sisyphus are only the f i r s t  stages in l i f e ' s  
way and grow in to  the Rebel and D'Arrast by way o f Rieux 
and Tarrou. This w ill  be to  argue fo r  a development in  
Camus' thought, but against any change, evolu tion , or 
in co n sisten cy . The very use of such charges would, I 
th ink , re su lt  from a misunderstanding o f and an over­
emphasis upon Meursault and Sisyphus. Such misunder­
standing and over-en^hasis are, sad ly , well-documented in  
the philosophic l ite r a tu r e  on Camus. Second, because 
o f such misunderstanding, the procedure followed through­
out th is  chapter w il l  be more ex eg etica l than e is e g e t ic a l .
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Tbis i s  to say that primary quotas w il l  abound, w ith the 
main in te r e s t  being to l e t  the passage speak rather than 
to develop any c r i t ic a l  commentary on the passage. This 
la t t e r  w il l  co n stitu te  a major portion  o f both Chapters 
Three and Pour,
I now turn to  an examination o f  hope and the absurd-- 
the "gospel o f no hope"!r Meursault and Sisyphus.
The Gospel o f  No Hope: Meursault and Sisyphus
The p lace to  begin an exp loration  o f such a gospel 
i s  with an ansuLysis of the absurd, for  i t  i s  absurdity 
that renders hope impotent. The Myth o f Sisyphus might 
w ell have been t i t l e d  The Logic o f  Absurdity, and, 
therefore, I sh a ll r e ly  h ea v ily  upon th is  tex t in  the 
d iscu ssion  vôiich fo llo w s, I sh a ll a lso  show Camus* 
thoughts on absurdity from other w ritin gs and than 
re la te  absurdity and hope.
The notion—fe e lin g , experience—o f the absurd was 
something which grew not from the quiet study, but from 
the very ambiguity o f  Camus’ l i f e .  The most well-known 
experiences o f the absurd fo r  Camus are the ambiguities 
of h is  l ife -d e a th  struggle with i l l n e s s  and the second 
World War with i t s  occupation o f Prance, There were many 
other such form ative experiences in  h is  l i f e ,  Roger 
Q u illio t , the biographer and commentator idio most
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in tim ately  knew Camus, d iscu sses the ambiguity in Camus' 
world o f human re la tio n sh ip s:
He maintained the same ambiguous r e la t io n ­
ship w ith  p eop le. He entered  in to  marriage 
with Simon Hie^ , fa sc in ated  by th is  young 
woman's dazzling youth g iven  over to  the 
a r t i f i c i a l  paradise o f  n a rco tic s . These two 
very young people were u n ited  by the same 
in tu it io n  o f the in e lu c ta b le , by the same hope 
of being cured. Each was fo r  the other a 
l iv in g  example o f the a b s u r d . 16
In June of 1938, Camus made an entry in  one o f h is  note­
books idiich shows the acumen o f Q u illio t  in  viewing 
h is  marriage as a passionate attempt to f ig h t  the absurd 
through lo v e :
The m isery and greatness o f the world: i t
o ffe r s  no tru th s, but only ob jects fo r  lo v e .
Absurdity i s  king, but love saves us from
i t . l 7
Not only with lo v e , but a lso  with a ze st  for l i f e  
did Camus f ig h t  h is  confrontation with the absurd. An 
entry in  the Notebooks during September o f  1939, shows 
th is :
The war has broken o u t. But where i s  i t ?
Where does th is  absurd event show i t s e l f ,  
except in  the news b u lle t in s * . . . I t ' s  not in  
the blue sky over the blue sea, in  the ch irring  
of grasshoppers. . • «
We want to  b e liev e  in  i t .  We look  for  
i t s  face and i t  h ides* . . . The world alone i s  
being. . . .
l^Roger Q n ill io t , Ihe Sea and P risons, p . 12, 
l^A lbert Camus, Notebooks^ 1935-1(2, p . 93»
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We have liv e d  hating th is  b east. Now i t  
stands before us and we can*t recognize i t .
So few th ings have changed. Later on, 
c e r ta in ly , there w il l  be mud and blood and an 
immense fe e lin g  of nausea. But today we fin d  
that the beginning o f war i s  l ik e  the f i r s t  
days o f peace: n eith er  the world nor our
h earts know they are th ere. . .18
The e s s e n t ia l absurdity of th is  catastrophe does 
not a lte r  the fa c t that i t  e x i s t s .  I t  
g en era lizes the rather more e s s e n t ia l absurdity  
of l i f e  i t s e l f .  . .19
The "later-on  certainty" o f the war and i t s  absurdity  
gave Camus an in tu it io n  o f what happens when absurdity  
and power become lin k ed . On March 15, 19l|2, he jo tted  
down the fo llow in g thought: "The Absurd and Power—
develop ( c f .  H i l l e r ) ."^0
Thus, wo can surely  conclude that the absurd was 
not a thought; i t  was something through which Camus 
l iv e d . I t  should not be surprising , then, to fin d  that 
Camus* characters a lso  l iv e  through the absurd. In 
Act I , C aligula g iv es  one o f  the most dramatic, emo­
tio n a l d escrip tion s o f the absurd in  a l l  o f  Camus' 
w riting:
Men weep because . . .  the w orld's a l l  
wrong#. , . I knew that men f e l t  anguish, but 
I d id n 't know idiat that word anguish meant.
Like everyone e ls e  I fancied  i t  was a sickn ess
i Glbid. .  pp. 137-8.
19ib id . .  pp. 138-9 .
^Qlb id . . p . 190.
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o f the mind—no more. But no, i t* s  my body 
that*8 in  pain . Fain everytdiere, in  my ch est, in  
my le g s  and arms. Every sk in  i s  raw, my head 
i s  buzzing, I f e e l  l ik e  vom iting. But worst 
o f  a l l  i s  th is  queer ta s te  in  my mouth. Not 
blood, or death, or fev e r , but a mixture o f  
a l l  three. I ’ve only to  s t i r  my tongue, and the 
world goes black, and everyone looks horrib le  
How hard, how cruel i t  i s ,  th is  process of 
becoming a man,21
A fter the plague has abated, Rieux faces the most ser io u s,
impotent confrontation with the absurd, the death o f
Tarrou:
And thus, vhen  the end came the tears that 
blinded Rieux*s eyes were tears of iiapotence; 
and he did not see Tarrou r o l l  over, face to  
the wall and die with a short hollow groan, .  , »
The next night was not one of struggle  
but o f s ile n c e , ,* ,2 2
Having shown how the absurd played a s ig n if ic a n t  
part in  the l i f e  of Camus and in  the l iv e s  o f h is  
characters, I now w ill  consider the question: What i s
the absurd? To give a d e f in it iv e  answer to th is  question  
we must turn to  The %yth o f  Sisyphus—the study o f  the 
absurd. F ir s t , I  want to quote an entry from the Note­
books made in  November o f 1943, a few months a f te r  the 
French pub lication  o f Sisyphus, for  the meaning o f the 
absurd r e s ts  upon ràiat Camus w rites there and i s  nothing  
but a drawing out o f the iia p lica tio n s of the passage:
Albert Camus, C aligula and Three Other P lays, p ,
15»
^^Albert Camus, Tie Plague, p . 252,
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"The greatest saving one can make in  the order o f  thought 
i s  to  accept the u n in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  o f the world and to 
pay a tten tion  to  m a n , T h i s  basic  u n in t e l l ig ib i l i t y  
o f the world—sometimes referred  to as in d ifferen ce— 
r e su lts  in  a strangeness for man, 1A.0 i s  a creature 
seeking both i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  and value. This strange­
ness between man and the world i s  explored in  the 
fo llow ing passages from the Myth o f Sisyphus, the 
d e f in it iv e  passages on the absurd:
A world th at can be explained even with bad 
reasons i s  a fa m ilia r  world. But, on the other  
hand, in  a universe suddenly d ivested  o f  
i l lu s io n s  and l ig h t s ,  man fe e ls  an a lie n , a 
stranger. His e x i le  i s  without remedy since he 
i s  deprived of the memory of a lo s t  home or the 
hope of a promised land. This divorce between 
man and h is  l i f e ,  the actor and h is  s e tt in g ,  
i s  properly the fe e lin g  of absurdity. A ll 
healthy men having thought of th e ir  own su i­
c id e , i t  can be seen , without further  
explanation, that there i s  a d irect connection  
between th is  fe e l in g  and the longing fo r  
death, 21+
Tomorrow, he was longing fo r  tomorrow, whereas 
everything in  him ought to re jec t i t .  That 
revolt o f  the f le s h  i s  the absurd,
A step  lower and strangeness creeps in :  
perceiving that the world i s  'dense,* sensing  
to  what a degree a stone i s  fo re ig n  and ir r e ­
ducible to  u s, w ith xdiat in te n s ity  nature or 
a landscape can negate u s. At the heart o f a l l  
beauty l i e s  something inhuman , , • the 
prim itive h o s t i l i t y  o f the world r is e s  up to
^^Albert Camus, Notebooks, 191+2-1951. p , 86,
^^Albert Camus, The Myth o f Sisyphus, p , 5 .
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face us across xnillennia** • . The world evades 
u s , .  .  . I t  draws at a d istance from us • • • «
Just one th ing: that denseness and that
strangeness o f the world i s  the a b s u r d . 25
Hence, the in te ll ig e n c e , too , t e l l s  me in  
i t s  way that the world i s  absurd. I t s  contrary, 
blind  reason, may w ell claim that a l l  i s  c lear;
I was w aiting fo r  proof and longing fo r  i t  to  
be r ig h t . But desp ite so many pretenious  
centuries and over the heads o f so many eloquent 
and persuasive men, I know that i s  f a l s e .  . . .
In . . . lu c id ity , the fe e lin g  o f the absurd 
becomes c lea r  and d e f in ite . I  sa id  that the 
world i s  absurd, but I  was too h asty . The world 
in  i t s e l f  i s  not unreasonable, that i s  a l l  that 
can be sa id . But what i s  absurd i s  the confron­
ta tio n  o f th is  ir ra tio n a l and the w ild  longing  
fo r  c la r ity  whose c a l l  exhoes in  the human heart.
The absurd depends as much on man as on the 
world. For the moment i t  i s  a l l  that lin k s  them 
together. I t  binds them one to the other as ,
only hatred can weld two creatures together. , ,
. . , man stands face to face with the 
ir r a t io n a l. He f e e ls  w ithin him h is  longing for 
happiness emd reason. The absurd i s  born o f th is  
confrontation between the human need and the 
unreasonable s ilen ce  o f  the world. This must not 
be fo rg o tten .2?
The absurd i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  a d ivorce. I t  l i e s  in 
neither o f the elements compared; i t  i s  born of 
th e ir  confrontation . . . .  I can therefore say 
that the absurd i s  not in  man . . .  n o r .in  the 
world, but in  th e ir  presence together.2o
Here than are Camus' thoughts on the absurd. So much
has been w ritten  that I do not plan to explore these
^^Ibid. .  p . 11.
2&Ibid. ,  p . 16.
^ ^ ib id ., p . 21. ^^Ibid. .  p . 23.
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passages a n a ly t ic a lly  or c r i t ic a l ly .  Rather, I  w il l  draw 
out several inq>lications and r e su lts  of the absurd 
relevant to  hope and la te r  comparison to Marcel, and in  
so doing I  sh a ll again make references to  other works. 
F ir s t ,  the absurd has a way of overwhelming man,
£ ,£ , ,  Rieux*s fe e l in g s  o f  impotence in  try in g  to  save 
Tarrou, One might say that the rule o f the absurd i s  an 
inductive ru le , , a l l  th ings are d etem in ed . This 
i s  to say that man, confronted by the absurd, has no 
ch oice. In October o f  1949, Camus wrote in  a notebook: 
"The absurd in ç l i e s  an absence o f c h o i c e , T h i s  leads  
to the second poin t b u ilt  on induction .
Second, the inductive determinism o f the absurd 
c lo se s  the contingency o f  the fu ture, as Camus w rites in  
Sisyphus: "The absurd en ligh tens me on th is  p o in t: there
i s  no f u t u r e , A t  f i r s t  glance i t  may seem to  be 
in co n sisten t to  say both of the fo llow in g: There i s  no
fu ture, and induction  ru le s . Surely induction has to do 
with the fu tu re , and the present i s  always the future of  
some p a s t . Therefore, what sense does i t  make to speak 
of no future and assert the power of induction? The
^^Albert Camus, Notebooks, 1942- 1951, p , 221,
Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, p . 68,
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answer i s ,  I  th in k , to  be found in  the word "contingency": 
The absurd su re ly  cannot do away w ith the fu ture, fo r  i t  
w ill  arrive# Rather, the inductive determinism of the 
absurd reduces the future to  the ca teg o r ies  and p o ss i­
b i l i t i e s  of the p a st , i . e . ,  c lo se s  the contingency o f the 
fu tu re . This lea d s to  an immediacy o f the present that 
I  sh a ll take up la t e r .
Third, another result of the absurd power o f induc­
t io n  i s  the ca n ce llin g  of the realm o f the m iraculous.
In an essay t i t l e d  "On a Philosophy o f Expression by 
Brice Parain, " Camus wrote of m iracles and the absurd:
The e s s e n t ia l  in  any case i s  not y e t to  know which 
to choose: m iracles or absurdity. The important
thing i s  to  show that they form the only p o ssib le  
choice, and th a t nothing e ls e  m a t t e r s . 31
. . .  i t  i s  certa in  th a t, whether we turn toward 
m iracles or toward absurdity, we sh a ll do nothing  
without those virtues in  which human honor l i e s — 
honesty and poverty«32
Fourth, another resu lt o f  the inductive nature of 
the absurd i s  to  ru le out the absolute and a l l  that goes 
with i t :  God, im mortality, m irac les, and transcendent
values and meaning. This i s  a lso  to p lace man only within  
the r e la t iv e , as Camus clearly  in d ica te s  in  a passage 
from the Notebooks, 19242-1951, October, 19i|2: "Torn
Albert Camus, "On a Philosophy o f  Expression by 
Brice Parain," L yrical and C r itic a l E ssays, p . 239.
S^Ib id . , p . 2 l |l .
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between the world that does not su ff ic e  and God idio i s  
lack in g , the absurd mind passion ately  chooses the 
world, Divided between the r e la t iv e  and the
absolute, i t  lea p s  eagerly  in to  the r e l a t i v e , F i f t h ,  
as ind icated  e a r l ie r ,  the absurd p laces man in to  the 
immediacy o f  the p resen t. I f  l i f e  i s  m ortal, i f  there 
i s  no transcendent meaning and value, i f  there i s  no 
fu ture, i f  induction ru le s , then the b est course o f l i f e  
i s  to exhaust o n ese lf  in  the immediacy o f the p resen t.
This emphasis on the presen t, a sensuous p resen t, per­
meates Camus* w r itin g s . At a la te r  p o in t in  th is  chapter, 
I sh a ll show how th is  e f f e c t  of the absurd lea d s to a 
p o s s ib i l i ty  Marcel den ies: a physical doctrine of hope.
S ixth , the absurd makes the search for tru th  a very 
problematic task  and the achievement o f truth a most 
uncomfortable p o sit io n  fo r  Camus, idio w rites:
L et’s imagine a thinker tdio says: ’There, I know
that i s  tru e . But in  the end I d is l ik e  the 
consequences and withdraw, ’ Truth i s  unaccept­
able even to  the one \Aio finds i t ,  “T h is  
rep re sent s“ Eh'e "ab surd thiinke r an3 h is  constant 
d iscom fort,34
Seventh, the absurd, in  confronting man, confronts 
him with the challenge o f a contradEdtion: the contradic­
tio n  between l i f e  and va lu e. In Camus’ words: "The
33Albert Camus, Notebooks, 1942-1951, pp. 45-6 , 
% b id , , p , 62,
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absurd i s ,  in  i t s e l f ,  con trad iction . I t  i s  contradictory
in  i t s  content because, in  wanting to  uphold l i f e ,  i t
excludes a l l  value Judgments, xdieni to  l iv e  i s ,  in
i t s e l f ,  a value j u d g m e n t . T h i s  statement from The
Rebel lead s to the f in a l  im plication  o f the absurd and
one that has been m issed in  much o f the lite r a tu r e :  that
the absurd i s  Just a p oin t of departure.
Eighth, the absurd i s  only a springboard, a stage on
l i f e ' s  way, a p oin t o f departure that leads to  reb e llio n .
In an a r t ic le  t i t l e d  "Pessimism and Courage" in  Combat.
September, 19^5, Camus in d icated  the coming o f the
Rebel, ïdiose re la tio n  to  Sisyphus would b est g ive h is
understanding o f man and lead  to  a new stage on l i f e ' s
way, where hope could become part o f a l i f e - s t y l e :
We b e liev e  that the truth o f th is  age can be 
found only by l iv in g  through the drama o f i t  
to  the very end. I f  the epoch has suffered  
from n ih ilism  we cannot remain ignorant o f  
n ih ilism  and s t i l l  achieve the moral code we 
need. No, everything i s  not summed up in  
negation and absurdity. We know t h is .  But 
we must f i r s t  p o s it  negation and absurdity  
because they are what our generation has 
encountered and what we must take in to  account.
^^Albert Camus, The Rebel, p . 8 ,
Those who have fa i le d  to  recognize that Sisyphus
Il€
36,
was only a stage on l i f e ' s  road have m istakenly ca lled  
Camus a p essim ist and n i h i l i s t .  As sue exan^le of 
such a fa ilu r e  see the a r t ic le  in  the Bibliography 
by Roudiez, "To Him Sisyphus Symbolized Man,"
Albert Camus, R esistan ce, R ebellion and Death,
p,  kS*
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This co n fie te8 my d iscussion  o f absurdity in  Camus.
The poin ts which I have made were done in  a b r ie f  and
u n cr itica l manner. Evaluation w ill fo llow  la t e r .
Before moving to the next step —hope and the absurd--,
I  wish to  id en tify  two further m anifestations o f the
absurd, which play a s ig n if ic a n t role in  Camus* w riting:
plague and e x i le .
In an entry dated August, 19i^2, Camus in d ica tes  the
two major myths o f absurdity:
Plague. Impossible to get away from i t .  Too 
many elements o f  'chance* th is  time in  the 
con^osition . I must c lin g  c lo se ly  to the id ea .
The Stranger describes the nakedness o f man 
facing the absurd. The Plague. the basic  
equivalence o f ind ividual points o f view facing  
the same absurd.. , . In addition pie Plague 
shows that the absurd teaches nothing. 3°
The plague, lik e  the absurd, cancels out the contingency
of the future and stands s i le n t  before the agonized cry
of men: Why? Early in  the novel, the then unknown
narrator Rieux comments:
How should they have given a thought to anything 
l ik e  plague, which ru les out fu tu res, cancels  
journays, s ile n c e s  the exchange o f view s. They 
fancied  themselves fr ee , and no one w il l  ever 
be free  so long as there are p e s t i l e n c e s . 39
A few days la te r ,  the narrator lin k s plague and e x ile  to
the resu ltin g  separation o f the absurd in  the following
38Albert Camus, Notebooks, 19L2-1951, p . 2!;..
Albert Camus, The Plague, p . 32.
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two passages: "• • • the ache o f separation from those
one loves suddenly became a fe e lin g  in  which we a l l  
shared a lik e  and—together with fe a r —the greatest 
a f f l ic t io n  o f  the long period o f e x ile  that lay  
ahead . • .
Thus the f i r s t  thing that plague brought to 
our town was e x i le  • • • the fe e lin g  o f e x i le - -  
sensation  o f  a void within which never l e f t  us, 
that ir r a t io n a l longing to hark back to the past 
or e ls e  to speed up the march o f tim e, and 
those keen sh a fts  o f memory that stung lik e  
f ir e  * , . In short, we returned to  our prison- 
house, we had nothing l e f t  us but the p ast, and 
even i f  some were tempted to  l iv e  in  the future, 
they had sp eed ily  to abandon the idea  • •
I now turn to a consideration o f  the follow ing three 
top ics: Hope and the Absurd; Hope and the Plague; Hope
and E x ile . Following a d iscussion  o f these three re la ­
t io n s , I sh a ll  explore several other to p ics: Hope as an
Evasion; Hope and Time; Hope and Freedom; Hope and the 
Body—as given to  the absurd man (Sisyphus and Meursault), 
Hope and the Absurd: Very s in g ly , the absurd
cancels out hope or the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f hope. The two 
major reasons why hope cannot e x is t  in confrontation with  
the absurd have already been discussed: an inductive
universe ru le s  out hope, fo r  everything i s  lu c id ly  given, 
^ .e . ,  p o s s ib i l i t y  i s  ruled out; and the absurd does away
^Olb id . ,  p . 59.
^ A lb er t  Camus, ühe Plague, p . 61.
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with the contingent fu ture, i . e . ,  reduces i t  to  the 
p resen t. As ear ly  as December, 1938, four years before 
S is3rphust Camus was clear on hope and the absurd:
On the absurd?
There i s  only one case in  lA ich despair i s  
pure: that o f  the man sentenced to death • . •
A man driven to  despair by love might be asked 
i f  he wanted to be g u illo t in e d  on the fo llow ing  
day and would refu se . Because o f the horror o f  
the punishment? Yes. But here, the horror 
springs from the conçlete certa in ty  o f idiat i s  
going to  happen,. . . Here the absurd i s  per­
fe c t ly  c lea r . I t  i s  the opposite of ir ra tio n ­
a l i t y .  I t  i s  the p la in  and simple tru th . What 
i s  and would be ir ra tio n a l i s  the f le e t in g  hope, 
i t s e l f  already near death, that i t  i s  a l l  going . 
to stop and that th is  death can be avoided*. .
In Sisyphus, Camus u t i l i z e s  th is  in s ig h t to  show th at the
lo g ic  o f the absurd r e je c ts  hope: ”. . .  carrying th is
absurd lo g ic  to i t s  conclusion, I must admit that the
stru ggle inQ}lies a to ta l absence o f hope (idiich has
nothing to  do with d espair)* . .
I t  i s  again to Sisyphus, the Logic o f the Absurd,
that one must turn to understand the twofold re jec tio n
of hope by the absurd man. The f i r s t  re je c tio n  o f hope
by way of the inductive power of absurdity i s  i t s e l f
two-pronged. F ir s t ,  the absurd universe denies hope
through the inductive reduction of the p o ssib le  to the
given , as Camus in d ica tes  in  these words:
^ A lb ert Camus, Notebooks, 1935-19^2, pp. 11^-16.
^^Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, p . 23.
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The absurd man thus catches s ig h t o f a burning 
and f r ig id ,  transparent and lim ited  universe in  
idiich nothing i s  p ossib le  but everything i s  
given , and beyond idiich a l l  i s  co llap se and 
nothingness. He can then decide to accept such 
a universe and draw from i t s  strength , h is  
2»efusal to  hope, and the unyielding evidence o f  
a l i f e  without consolation .
He recognizes the stru gg le , does not ab so lu te ly  
scorn reason, and admits the ir r a t io n a l. Thus 
he again embraces in  a sin g le  glance a l l  the 
data o f experience and he i s  l i t t l e  in c lin ed  to  
leap  before knowing. He knows sin p ly  th a t in  
a le r t  awareness there i s  no further p lace fo r  
hope.^5
Thus, "everything i s  g iven , " "he embraces in  a sin g le  
glance a l l  the data o f experience"—the absurd man would 
be a fo o l to hope, fo r  hope i s  o f the p o ss ib le . This 
leads to the second inductive re je c tio n —that o f  con­
sciousness or lu c id ity .  In Camus* words, "This absurd, 
godless world i s ,  then, peopled with men who think  
c lea r ly  and have ceased to hope,"^& Later Camus speaks 
of the heroic character of Sisyphus in  consciously  
rejectin g  any fo o lis h  hope:
I f  th is  myth i s  tra g ic , th a t i s  because i t s  
hero i s  con scious. Where would h is  torture be, 
indeed, i f  at every step  the hope o f succeeding  
upheld him? . • • Sisyphus . . .  knows the whole 
extent o f  h is  wretched condition: i t  i s  what he
thinks o f  in  h is  descent. The lu c id ity  that was 
to  co n stitu te  h is  tortue at the same time crowns 
h is  v ic to r y . There i s  no fa te  that cannot be sur­
mounted by s c o r n , 47
44 ib id , , p , 45 ib id . .  p . 28.
4&lbid, . p , 68. 47ib id . .  pp. 89-90.
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Second, the absurd r e je c ts  hope by re jec tin g  the fu ture. 
As Camus says: "One has to pay some th in g . A man who
has become conscious o f  the absurd i s  forever bound to 
i t .  A man devoid o f hope and conscious of being so has 
ceased to belong to  the fu ture. That i s  natural. .
I t  i s  thus that the absurd cancels out the p o ss i­
b i l i t y  of hope, and th is  fa c t  of the absurd i s  what l i e s  
at the bottom o f the many charges of pessimism and 
n ih ilism  lev e le d  at Camus, Granting the givenness of the 
absurd, Camus i s ,  I thhk, correct. Those who use the 
absurd to characterize Camus or Sisyphus, to characterize 
h is  understanding of man, are e ith er  ignoring h is  la te r  
work or ignorant o f  the fa c t  that the absurd man i s  only 
a stage on l i f e ’s way--although a necessary stage to the 
Rebel.
Hope and the Plague: I t  has already been observed
that the myth o f the plague i s  a m anifested form of the 
absurd. Commenting in  the Notebooks, Camus, in  two 
passages dated October, 19^2, and January 15> 19^3, 
several years before The Plague was published, indicated  
the death of hope in  the confrontation with the plague:
The f i r s t  stage o f  the plague produced u n ity
through su ffer in g  and thus, ’They s t i l l  had
kQIb id ., p . 21}..
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hope. The second phase r e a lly  began vtien they 
could no longer think except in  tern s o f the 
plague. .  idien hope was dead.49
The separated people perceive that in  r e a lity  
they have never ceased, in  the f i r s t  phase, 
hoping fo r  something: that l e t t e r s  would arrive,
that the plague would end, that the absent one 
would s lip  in to  the c i ty .  I t ' s  only in  the 
second phase that they no longer h o p e . 50
In State o f  S iege, a more allegorical-dram a form o f The
Plague, Nada, the town drunk and cr ip p le , announces the
abandonment o f hope in  the face o f the plague:
Nada: I have to ld  you already, my son, that
we are in  i t  already, up to  the neck. So 
abemdon hope, the comedy i s  s ta r tin g . In 
fa c t  I 'v e  only ju st time enough to  hurry 
to the market and drink a b o tt le  to the 
triumph o f death, 51
Thus fa r , hope and the plague sound exactly  l ik e
hope and the absurd; but, in  The Plague, while i t  i s
true that Rieux in facing the plague i s  confronted with
the same challenge as Sisyphus in  facin g  the absurd,
there i s  a s ig n if ica n t d ifferen ce: Sisyphus has only the
rock, but Rieux has Tarrou. Though the plague i s  Rieux'
absurd, he has something in  addition to Sisyphus in  the
stru gg le , Tarrou; and the re la tio n  o f intimacy with
Tarrou becomes a f i r s t  step from pessimism and n ih ilism
^^Albert Camus, Notebooks, 1942- 1951, p . 53* 
^ I b id . ,  p . 55.
^ A lb ert Camus, "State of S iege, " in  Caligula and 
Three Other P lays, p . 433.
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to hope. The p lace o f Tarrou and i t s  meaning for hope
w il l  be developed la t e r .
Hope and E x ile : Several passages already quoted
have adequately shown the re la tio n  between the absurd and
e x i le ,  , the plague and e x i le .  Just as the plague
i s  a form o f  the absurd, so a lso  i s  e x i le .  When the
narrator o f  The Plague describes the se ttin g  of the
plague, he i s  a lso  cogently  describing the se tt in g  o f
e x i le :  ". . . in  a se tt in g  so h op elessly  remote.
Sisyphus knows the u ltim ate e x i le ,  the u ltim ate absurdity,
which Camus describes in  these words:
. . .  in  a universe suddenly d ivested  o f  i l lu s io n s  
and l ig h t s ,  man f e e l s  an a lien , a stranger. His 
e x ile  i s  without remedy since he i s  deprived o f  
the memory o f  a lo s t  home or the hope o f  a promised 
land. This divorce between man and h is  l i f e ,  the 
actor and h is  s e t t in g , i s  properly the fe e lin g  o f  
absurd ity ,53
The ultim ate e x i le ,  the u ltim ate absurdity, i s  then, 
according to  Camus, the to ta l  negation o f any sa lv a tio n . 
The strongest and most p e r s is te n t fe e lin g  o f e x i le ,  
absurdity, i s  strangeness. I t  i s  th is  that Sisyphus 
shares w ith Meursault, The Stranger, th is  aloneness o f  
e x i le .  However, hare again the e x i le  of Rieux i s  
d ifferen t from the e x i le  o f Meursault and Sisyphus, and 
that d ifferen ce i s  Tarrou, to whom we sh a ll return.
Albert Camus, The Plague, p . 157«
^^Albert Camus, ihe Myth of Sisyphus, p . 5»
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This concludes the d iscussion o f hope and the absurd
in  Gamus* Before I  take up the question o f stages in
moving from Sisyphus to the Rebel, several additional
aspects o f hope lim ited  by the absurd w il l  be b r ie f ly
discussed fo r  puiposes o f  la ter  conç)arison with Marcel.
Hope as an Evasion: In The % th o f Sisyphus, Camus
w rites about the evasive f u t i l i t y  o f  try ing  to l iv e  on
hope fo r  the absurd man: ", , .  man idio l iv e  on hope do
not thrive in  th is  universe idiere kindness y ie ld s  to
gen erosity , a f fe c t io n  to  v ir i le  s ile n c e , and communion
to so lita r y  c o u r a g e . L a t e r  on, the h ero ic character
o f Sisyphus in  confronting the absurd i s  linked  to  the
f u t i l i t y  o f  the hopelessness and the h opelessness o f the
f u t i l i t y  he endures: "They had thought w ith  some reason
that there i s  no more dreadful punishment than f u t i l e
and hopeless l a b o r . S e v e r a l  years la t e r  in an essay
t i t l e d  "Summer in  A lg ie rs , " Camus wrote o f  hope as an
evading resign ation , a s in  against the immediacy o f  l i f e :
. . .  i f  there i s  a s in  against l i f e ,  i t  l i e s  
perhaps le s s  in  despairing of i t  than in  hoping 
fo r  another l i f e  and evading the implacable 
grandeur o f the one we have*, , • For hope, 
contrary to popular b e lie f ,  i s  tantamount to  
resign ation . And to  l iv e  i s  not to be re  signed , 5 °
^ I b id , .  p . 53. ^% i d , ,  p, 82,
^^Albert Camus, "Summer in A lg iers,"  in  Lyrical 
and C r it ic a l Essays, pp. 91-2.
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For the absurd man, hope I s  a ten^tatlon he must be on
the a ler t fo r  because o f  i t s  power over the human heart
and because o f i t s  i l lu s o r y  character: "There i s  so
much stubborn hope in  the human heart the most d e s t itu te
men often  end up by accepting illu s io n ." ^ ?
Eluding i s  the invariab le game. The ty p ica l act 
o f  elud ing, the fa ta l  evasion that c o n stitu te s  
the th ird  theme o f th is  essay , i s  hope. Hope o f 
another l i f e  one must 'deserve* or tr ick ery  of 
those who l iv e  not l i f e  i t s e l f  but fo r  some 
great idea that w il l  transcend i t -  re fin e  i t ,  
give i t  a meaning, and betray i t , 58
In another passage in  Sisyphus, Camus r e la te s  absurd art
and the i l lu s io n  of hope:
I  can perform absurd work, choose the creative  
a ttitu d e  rather than another. But an absurd 
a tt itu d e , i f  i t  i s  to  remain so, must remain 
aware o f i t s  gra tu itou sn ess. So i t  i s  w ith  the 
works o f a r t . I f  the commandments of the absurd are 
not respected , i f  the work does not i l lu s t r a t e  
divorce and r e v o lt , i f  i t  s a c r if ic e s  to i l lu s io n s  
and arouses hope, i t  ceases to be g ra tu ito u s ,59
F in a lly , in  Sisyphus, Camus s ta te s  th at, i f  the absurd
man hopes, then he i s  ly in g  to h im self:
I  can understand only in  human tenus. What I 
touch, what r e s is t s  me—that i s  idiat I understand. 
And these two c e r ta in t ie s —my appetite fo r  the 
absolute and fo r  u n ity  and the im p o ss ib ility  o f  
reducing th is  world to a ra tion a l and reasonable 
p r in c ip le —I a lso  know that I cannot recon cile  
them. What other truth can I admit without ly in g , 
without bringing in  a hope I lack  and idiich means 
nothing w ith in  the l im it s  o f my con d ition ?^
^^Albert Camus, The % th o f Sisyphus, p , 76.
^^Ib id . . p . 7. "^^ Ibid, , p , 75. ^ I b id , . p , 38,
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la  c losin g  these thoughts on hope as an evasion , I should 
l ik e  to  say one f in a l word concerning the e s se n tia l part 
of the "condition" referred to above: so litude* I t  i s
the so litu d e o f absurdity, ^*£*, the aloneness o f both 
Meursault and Sisyphus from the world, God, and the 
community o f  man, that makes hope an evasive and f u t i le  
i l lu s io n .  Indeed, what stands out about both Sisyphus 
and Meursault i s  th e ir  respective aloneness#
Hope and Time: Those experiences in  human l i f e  that
bring a consciousness o f  time are those o f pain and 
death. Camus knew both well and put down these thoughts 
on March 9, 19^J:
The sensation of death that i s  henceforth  
fam iliar  to me; i t  i s  deprived o f  the aid  of  
pain. Pain c lin g s  to the present; i t  c a l ls  fo r  
a struggle that keeps one busy. But fo r e ­
seeing death from the mere s i ^ t  o f  a handker­
ch ief f i l l e d  with blood i s  being plunged 
suddenly and e f fo r t le s s ly  in to  time in  a dizzying  
way: i t  i s  fear o f  what's ahead.61
Such a fear  i s  a kind o f luxury in  idiich pain, dying, or
the plague (the absurd) take away both past end future,
plunging one d izz in g ly  in to  the p resen t. Meursault,
from prison , echoes the absurd r e je c t io n  o f the past:
"I have never been able rea lly  to  regret anything in  a l l
my l i f e .  I 'v e  always been fa r  too much absorbed in  the
present moment, or the immediate fu tu re, to think back."^^
6lAlbert Camus, Notebooks, 1 9 ^ -1951* p . 6?.
^^Albert Camus, The Stranger, p . 12?.
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In two passages from h is  Notebooks Gamus speaks o f the
plague and i t s  reduction o f time to  the present
(November, 1943, and October, 1942): "The plague leaves
no t i me. "Moral of the plague: i t  was of no use to
anything or anyone. Only those who were touched by death 
d ir e c t ly  or in  th e ir  fa m ilie s  learned something. But 
the tru th  they have arrived at concerns only them selves.
I t  has no fu tu re . However, fo r  the absurd man, th is  
erasing o f the future and of hope has, according to 
Camus, a constructive, as w ell as d estru ctive, s id e . The 
la t t e r  i s  the lim ita tio n  o f man to  the present, the
immediate, which Camus puts in  these words: ", • • man
• , • has forgotten  how to hope. This h e l l  o f the present 
i s  h is  Kingdom a t la st." ^ ^  The fom er involves man*s 
a v a ila b il ity  and freedom: "Now i f  the absurd cancels a l l
my chances o f eternal freedom, i t  restores and magni­
f i e s ,  • , my freedom o f  a ctio n . That privation  of hope 
and future means an increase in  man's a v a ila b il ity ,
Hope and Freedom: Mention has already been made o f
Camus* notion that denial of the future leads to a freedom
^^Albert Camus, Notebooks. 1942- 1931. p. 88. 
^^ Ib id . .  p . 50.
^^Albert Camus, The Myth o f  Sisyphus, p. 39. 
6&Ibid.. p . 42,
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of the p resen t. A lso, many o f the preceding quotations
have im plied th is  same idea in  h is  thought. A c r it ic a l
d iscussion  and evaluation  o f th is  r e la tio n  between freedom
and hope and the future w il l  be undertaken in  both
Chapters Three and Pour. Before moving on to the la s t
part o f  th is  sectio n  of the chapter, Hope and the Body,
I want to g ive one additional example o f  freedom coming
from the absurd man's re jec tio n  o f hope. The passage i s
from The Stranger, Meursault's f in a l  words during early
morning before h is  sunrise execution:
With death so near. Mother must have f e l t  lik e  
someone on the brink o f freedom, nearly ready to 
s ta r t  l i f e  a l l  over again. No one, no one in  the 
world had any right to weep fo r  her. And I, too, 
f e l t  ready to s ta r t  l i f e  a l l  over again. I t  was 
as i f  that great rush o f anger had washed me 
clean , emptied me of hope, and gazing up at the 
dark sky . • . fo r  the f i r s t  time . . .  I la id  
my heart open to the benign in d ifferen ce  o f the 
u niverse* . . .o?
Hope and the Body: There i s  an ambiguity in Camus'
thoughts on hope and the body, i»e^., on liiether a physical 
doctrine of hope i s  p o ss ib le . At th is  point I sh a ll 
develop those thoughts that deny such a p o s s ib i l i ty  and 
sh a ll d iscu ss la t e r  in  the chapter those passages d iich  
in d icate the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  a p hysica l doctrine o f hope.
As might be expected from the d iscu ssion  o f the absurd 
man, Sisyphus denies such hope. But Meursault poses a
^^A lbert Camus, The S tra n g er , p . iSk*
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puzzle , for  there i s  one passage in  The Stranger which
opens the in terp re ta tiv e  door to a physical doctrine of
hope and would seem to deny h is  response to the follow ing
(the Chaplain to  M eursault):
'Have you no hope at a ll?  Do you rea lly  
think th a t when you die you die ou tr igh t, and 
nothing remains?' , «
I sa id : 'Y esl'^°
Sisyphus would cer ta in ly  agree here w ith Meursault:
"Death is  the only rea lity *  A fter death the chips are
down. I am not even fr e e , e ith e r , to perpetuate m yself,
but a s la v e , and above a l l ,  a slave without hope o f an
eternal rev o lu tio n . . Camus, in  h is  Notebooks,
during August, 1938, wrote down some thoughts on the way
in which the body i t s e l f  denies any p o s s ib i l i t y  of hope:
Thought i s  always out in  fr o n t . I t  sees  
too fa r , farth er  than the body, which l iv e s  in  
the p resen t.
To ab o lish  hope i s  to bring back thought 
to  the body. And the body i s  doomed to p er ish .
The s ig n if ic a n t  p o in t here i s  that i t  i s  the body's 
lim ita tio n  to  the present and the fact o f  i t s  corrupti­
b i l i t y  that negate any p o s s ib i l i t y  o f hope on a bodily  
le v e l .  Camus commented on th is  negation in  an essay  
e n t it le d  "The Desert":
^ I b id . ,  p . 147.
Albert Camus, The Myth o f Sisyphus, p . 42. 
Albert Camus, Notebooks, 1935- 194-2, pp. 105-6.
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What they have exp elled  from these faces moulded 
fo r  e ter n ity  i s  the curse o f the mind; at the  
price o f  hope. Per the body knows nothing o f  
hope. A ll i t  knows i s  the beating o f i t s  own 
h eart. I t s  e ter n ity  co n sis ts  o f  in d iffe r e n c e .. . . 
The in^assiveness and the greatness that man shows 
idien he has no hope, the eternal present, i s  
p r e c ise ly  what perceptive theologians have ca lled  
h e l l .  And h e l l ,  as everyone knows . • . c o n sis ts  
o f bodily su ffe r in g .71
This concludes the study o f The Gospel o f No Hope. 
Most o f what has been done i s  to report and to c la r ify  
Camus’ thought on the re la tio n  between hope and the 
absurd. C r it ic a l questions and evaluations o f the d is ­
cussion  w ill be undertaken in  the follow ing chapters. The 
next task before turning to  the Camus o f hope i s  to  
substantiate the claim  made e a r lie r :  that Meursault and
Sisyphus (the absurd heroes) represent only a f i r s t  stage 
along l i f e ’s way; th at Rieux and Tarrou (the absurd 
comrades) represent the second and middle stage; and that 
the Rebel and D'Arrast (the men o f hope) represent the 
achievement o f  the f in a l  stage.
Prom the Absurd to Hope: From Sisyphus to D’Arrast
The considerations o f th is  section  o f the paper once 
again ra ise  the question o f consistency on Camus’ past in  
moving from the s o lita r y  hopelessness of Sisyphus to  the
^^Albert Camus, "The D esert," in  Lyrical and C ritica l  
E ssays, pp. 94-2.
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hopeful ”we-ness" of the R e b e l . A s  sta ted  e a r lie r , I 
understand t h is  change as a further development of h is  
p o s it io n  and not as an in con sisten cy . I w il l  a lso  o ffe r  
tex tu a l evidence that Camus so recognized the re la tio n  
between Meursault and Sisyphus and the Rebel.
In thinking through th is  development in  Camus, I  
found i t  h e lp fu l to characterize Meursault and Sisyphus. 
Roger Q u illio t  has done an ex c e llen t job o f  summarizing 
Sisyphus and h is  world (and thus Meursault and h is )  in  
these words:
Le Mythe de Sisyphe thus o ffe r s  us the decor 
o f a world en ç^ ed  of the d iv in ity , the e ter n ity , 
and o f the hope they engender. Within i t ,  a p er­
so n a lity  evolves, a stranger to  h im self, to h is  
fa llow  men, to the universe and, a t the same 
time, quite close to them, i f  only through h is  
longing. A character idio senses that he was made 
fo r  happiness, e te r n ity , and d ia logue, and Wio by 
the feeb leness of h is  I n te l le c t ,  h is  physical and 
moral strength, i s  condemned to  anguish, f r a i l t y ,  
and uncertain ty . Bound to  the l iv in g  world by 
in tertw in ing desire and d isg u st, he has to admit 
that contradiction  i s  h is  true nature and that no 
d ia le c t ic  whatever can free  him from i t .  Pron the 
in tu it io n  o f the absurd we have come to the 
tangib le evidence of the absurd: a l l  true knowledge
i s  im p ossib le .73
7^There have been many such charges made. As an 
example see the a r t ic le  in  the Bibliography by Herbert 
Hochberg, "Albert Camus and the E th ics o f Absurdity." 
Hochberg has a t le a s t  recognized the tension  between 
Sisyphus and the Rebel, but in  claim ing in con sisten cy  
he has, I  th ink , fa i le d  to rea liz e  that Sisyphus i s  but 
a stage on l i f e ' s  way leading to the Rebel.
f^Roger Q u ill io t , The Sea and P risons, pp. 100-01.
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The overriding t r a it  in  Sisyphus* world, and in  that 
o f Meursault, i s  strangeness—to  h im self, to  the com­
munity o f  man, and to  the world. He i s  alone, and thus, 
without hope. M istakenly, some commentators have taken 
th is  view o f man--as a stranger to ta lly  alone—and 
generalized  i t  in  Camus. That the absurd man was not the 
whole p ictu re was evident at le a s t  as ea r ly  as 19U4» when 
Camus wrote in  the preface to C aligula, a p lay about 
another absurd hero:
But, i f  h is  truth i s  to  rebel against fa te ,  
h is  error l i e s  in  negating idaat binds him to  
mankind. One cannot destroy everything without 
destroying o n e se lf . This i s  tAy Caligula depopu­
la t e s  the world around him and, fa ith fu l to  h is  
lo g ic ,  does itdiat i s  necessary to arm against him 
those idio w il l  eventually k i l l  him. Caligula i s  
the story of a superior su ic id e . I t  i s  the story  
o f the most human and most tragic o f  errors. 
U nfaithfu l to  mankind through f id e l i t y  to h im self, 
C aligula accepts death because he has understood 
that one cannot be free at the expense of o thers.
About one year la t e r ,  Camus made the follow ing entry in  a
notebook during November of 1945, two years before the
p u b lica tion  o f The Plague : "What balances the absurd i s
the community o f men figh tin g  against i t . "75 Here, then,
i s  the in d ication  o f the. movement of the absurd hero from
f u t i l e  hopelessness to hope in  the community o f  man that
7^Albert Camus, "C aligula," in  C aligula and Three 
Other P lays, p . v i .
75Albert Camus, Notebooks, 1942-1951, p . 126.
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culminates in  the Rebel and D'Arrast, but with an in te r ­
mediate stage found in  Rieux and Tarrou or The Plague » 
That Camus planned such a development i s  c lear from h is  
own statem ents. In an interview  w ith Gabriel d*Aubarede 
published in  Les Nouvelle s L e ttera ires . May 10, 19$1, 
Gamus responded to the question:
Question: To what extent should we look upon your
books • • • as symbolic tra n sla tio n s o f  the 
philosophy o f the absurd?
Answer: . . .  I f  we assume that nothing has any
meaning, then we must conclude that the world 
i s  absurd. But does nothing have a meaning?
I have never b elieved  that we could remain at 
th is  p o in t . Even as I was w riting  The Myth o f  
Sisyphus. I was thinking about an essay on 
r e v o lt  that I  would w rite la t e r  on, in  which I  
would attenq)t, a fter  having described the 
d iffe r e n t  aspects o f the f e e l in g s  o f the Absurd, 
to  describe the d ifferen t a ttitu d e s  o f  man in  
r e v o l t .76
In a l e t t e r  to  Roland Barthes, almost four years la te r ,
January 11, 1955, Camus s t i l l  f e e l s  the need to correct
those who would lim it  him to the absurd s itu a tio n  of
Meursault, C aligu la , and Sisyphus:
Conqpared to The Stranger, The P la ^ e  does, beyond 
any p o ss ib le  d iscu ssion , represent the tra n sit io n  
from an a ttitu d e  of so lita r y  rev o lt  to the recog­
n itio n  o f  a community whose stru g g les  must be 
shared. I f  there i s  an evo lu tion  from The Stranger 
to The Plague, i t  i s  in  the d ire c tio n  o f so lid a r ity  
and p a r t ic ip a t io n .77
7^Albert Camus, "Interview, " in  Lyrical and C r itica l 
Essays, p . 365.
7 7 lb id .. p . 339.
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As has been sta ted  e a r lie r ,  Rieua and Sisyphus, In
facin g  the same absurd, do so in  a d iffer e n t way.
Sisyphus fa ces  i t  in  the courageousness of s o lita r y
hopelessness; Rieux fa ces  the plague in  the intim acy of
fr ien d sh ip . Thus, the struggle w ith  the absurd has
moved from so lita r y  courage to the creative bond o f
intim ate friendship  ( i.. o.., the beginning o f hope ) .  Camus
describes th is  crea tiv e  rev o lt  against the absurd in  a
midnight swim in  The Plague :
*Do you know, * he sa id , 'idiat we should do 
fo r  fr ien d sh ip ’ s sake?’
’Anything you l ik e ,  Tarrou.’
’Go fo r  a swim. I t ’s one o f these hamnless 
pleasures that even a sa in t-to -b e  can indulge in, 
don’t  you agree?’ Rieux sm iled again, and Tarrou 
continued; ’lAth our p a sses , we can g et out on 
the p ie r . R eally , i t ’ s too damn s i l l y  l iv in g  only 
in  and fo r  the p lague. Of course, a man should 
f ig h t  fo r  the v ic tim s, but i f  he ceases caring  
for anything ou tsid e  th a t, id iat’s the use o f his 
f ig h tin g ? ’
’R ig h t,’ Rieux sa id . ’L et’s g o . ’
Once they were on the p ie r  they saw the sea 
spread out before them, a g en tle  heaving e^qpanse 
o f deep -p itted  v e lv e t# . . .  Before them the dark­
ness stretched  out in to  in f in i t y .  Rieux could  
f e e l  under h is  hand the gnarled, weather-worn 
visage o f the rooks, and a strange happiness 
possessed  him. Turning to Tarrou, he caught a 
glin^ se on h is  fr ie n d ’ s face o f the same happiness, 
a happiness that forgot nothing, not even murder.
They dressed and started  back. N either had 
sa id  a word, but they were conscious o f being  
p e r fe c tly  at one, and the memory o f th is  n ight 
would be cherished by them both. When they caught 
sig h t o f the plague watchman, Rieux guessed that 
Tarrou, l ik e  h im se lf, was thinking that the disease
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had given them a r e sp ite , and th is  was good, but 
now the? must se t  th e ir  shoulders to  the wheel 
aga in .78
But, i t  would be "th e ir  shoulders" that they set to  the 
vdieel. They had made themselves a va ilab le  to  one another, 
and in  th is  a v a ila b il ity  la y  both the hope and the 
strength  o f th e ir  reb e llio n  against the absurd. The next 
stage would then be the R ebel's a v a i la b i l i ty  not only to 
a fr ien d , but to mankind. However, before considering  
the Rebel, we must look at one other character who stands 
between Sisyphus and the Rebel—D'Arrast, the man who 
picked up the old  stone of Sisyphus and carried i t  for , 
and w ith, a fr ien d . In the B razilian  jun gle, he fin d s a 
struggling  Sisyphus—the cock:
The cook advanced again with h is  Jerky tr o t ,  
not l ik e  a man who wants to progress but as i f  he 
were f le e in g  the crushing load , as i f  he hoped to 
l ig h te n  i t  through motion. . . The man trembled; 
the sa liv a  began to tr ic k le  from h is  mouth again, 
tAiile the sweat l i t e r a l ly  spurted from a l l  over 
h is  body. He tr ied  to  breathe deeply and stopped 
short. He sta rted  o f f  again, took three s tep s , and 
to ttered . And suddenly the stone slipped onto h is  
shoulder, gashing i t ,  and then forward onto the 
ground, w hile the cook, lo s in g  h is  balance toppled  
over on h is  s id e . . . .
Leaning over him, D'Arrast w ith h is  bare hand 
wiped the blood and dust from h is  shoulder, ^ i l e  
the l i t t l e  man, h is  face against the ground, 
panted*. , . D'Arrast grasped him around the w aist 
and ra ised  him up • • . A fter a moment, the cook, 
bloody and caked with earth , detached h im self, • . .
He staggered toward the stone, which the others
7®Albert Camus, The Plague, pp. 222-24*
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were ra isin g  a l i t t l e .  But he stopped, looked at 
the stone with a vacant stare , and shook h is  head. 
Then he l e t  h is  arms f a l l  at h is  sid es and turned 
toward D'Arrast, Huge tears flowed s i l e n t ly  down 
h is  ravaged fa c e . He wanted to  speak, he was 
speaking, but h is  mouth hardly formed the s y lla b le s ,  
'I  promised,' he was saying. And then: 'Oh,
Captain! Oh, Captain1' and the tears drowned h is  
voice , , , the cook, weeping, co llapsed  , , , 
defeated, with h is  head thrown back,
D'Arrast looked a t him, not knowing what to  
say, • • • Suddenly he tore the cork mat from the 
hands holding i t  and walked toward the ston e. He 
gestured to the others to hold i t  up and then he 
loaded i t  almost e f fo r t le s s ly .  His head pressed  
down under the weight o f  the stone, h is  shoulders 
hunched, and h is  breathing rather hard, he looked  
down at h is  f e e t  as he lis te n e d  to the cook's sobs. 
Then with a vigorous tread he started  o f f  on h is  
own, , , ,
The stone weighed p a in fu lly  on h is  head now 
and he needed a l l  the strength of h is  long arms to  
lig h ten  i t .  H is shoulders were already s t i f f e n in g ,
• , , He hastened h is  pace, f in a l ly  reached the 
l i t t l e  square where the cook's hut stood, ran to 
i t ,  kicked the door open, and brusquely hurled the 
stone onto the s t i l l  glowing f i r e  in  the center o f  
the room. And there, straightening up u n t i l  he 
was suddenly enormous, drinking in  w ith desperate 
gulps the fam iliar  smell o f poverty and ashes, he 
f e l t  r is in g  w ithin  him a surge o f obscure and 
panting joy that he was powerless to  name.
When the inhabitants o f the hut arrived , they  
found D'Arrast standing with h is  shoulders against 
the back wall and eyes closed , • • . Whereupon the 
brother led  the cook up to the stone, where he 
dropped on the ground. The brother too sa t down, 
beckoning to the o th ers, • . . Standing in  the 
darkness, D'Arrast. . . . jo y fu lly  acclaimed h is  
own strentth ; he acclaimed once again, a fresh  
beginning in  l i f e .  . . . The brother moved a l i t t l e  
away from the cook and, h a lf turning toward D'Arrast 
but without looking at him pointed to the empty 
place and said: "Sit down with u s ,"79
^^Albert Camus, "The Growing Stone," in  E xile  and 
the Kingdom, pp. 207-13»
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Thus5 from the SlsTphian task of sharing the keeping of
a promise, i t  i s  but one step (stage) further to “ s it t in g
with u s , ”—i_.e^., to the reb e llio n  fo r  the community of
man, to  The Rebel,
Early in  The Rebel, Camus d e f in it iv e ly  re la te s  the
act of reb e llio n  to the community o f man:
In absurdist experience, su ffering  i s  in d iv id ual.
But from the moment # ien  a movement o f reb e llio n  
begin s, su ffer in g  i s  seen as a c o lle c t iv e  experi­
ence, Therefore the f i r s t  progressive step fo r  
a mind ovemAêlmed by the strangeness o f things 
i s  to r e a liz e  that th is  fe e lin g  of strangeness i s  
shared with a l l  men and that human r e a lity , in  i t s  
e n tir e ty , su ffer s  from the distance which separates 
i t  from the rest o f the universe. The malady 
experienced by a sin g le  man becomes a mass p lague.
In our d a ily  t r ia l s  reb e llio n  p lays the same role  
as does the 'cog ité* in  the realm o f thought; i t  i s  
the f i r s t  p iece  o f evidence. I t  founds i t s  f i r s t  
value on the whole human race, I reb el—therefore  
we exist,oO
There i s ,  at the base o f reb e llio n , a knowledge o f the
so lid a r ity  of su ffer in g  and a love that Camus describes
in these words:
, , , r eb e llio n  cannot e x is t  without a strange form 
o f  lo v e . Those idio fin d  no r e s t  in  God or in  
h isto ry  are condemned to  l iv e  for  those who, l ik e  
them selves, cannot l iv e :  in  fa c t ,  for the
hum iliated . The most pure form o f  the moment of 
reb e llio n  i s  thus crowned with the heart-rending 
cry of Karamazov: i f  a l l  are not saved, what good
i s  the sa lva tion  o f one o n ly ,8 l
Albert Camus, The Rebel, p , 22,
^^Ib id , , p , 304.
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The re la tio n  between hope and reb e llio n  w il l  be explained  
in  the f in a l sec tio n  o f  th is  paper, as w ell as the 
re la tio n  between r e b e llio n  and "we,"
This concludes the sectio n  on the sta g es o f  l i f e ’s 
way in  Gamus: the lo n e ly  strangeness o f Heursault has
given way, f i r s t ,  to the sharing o f that strangeness in  
the friendship  o f  Rieux and Tarrou, and, then to  the 
reb e llio n  fo r  a l l  men against that strangeness. The 
lo n ely  struggle o f  Sisyphus with the rock o f f u t i l i t y  has 
given way, f i r s t ,  to the sharing o f that stone by D’Arrast, 
and, then, to the eventual bearing of the stone of mankind 
by the Rebel. I t  i s  thus that we come to  man as Camus 
would have him: to  the hope (reb e llio n ) o f  the Rebel.
"A t i t l e :  The hope of the world,
As might be suspected from the preceding d iscu ssion , 
hope f i r s t  makes i t s  appearance in  the second sta g e , that 
stage between Sisyphus and the Rebel, in  the p lague.
Indeed, i t  i s  only in  the midst o f plague that hope can 
begin to  emerge, fo r  there i s  a re la tio n  between these two, 
according to Camus, In  an essay w ritten  during the war 
years, "The Wages o f Our Generation," Camus in d icated  the 
re la tio n  between hope and danger, and there i s  no doubt 
that the danger he w rites  o f i s  the plague c a lled  war:
®^Albert Camus, from an entry dated March, 1936, in  
Notebooks. 1935- 19L2. p , 16,
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•  # • n ev er th e less , I should not want to  change eras, 
fo r  I a lso  know and respect the greatn ess o f t h is  one. 
Moreover, I have always th o u ^ t that the maximum danger 
im plied the maximum hope."®^ In the stageplay about the 
plague. S tate o f  S iege. Camus in d ica ted  th a t, when the 
absurdity o f the plague s tr ik e s  the community o f man, 
hope i s  the only strength l e f t  him, the only weapon with  
idiich to face the plague:
Chorus: Yes, but i s  hope w aiting  fo r  us at the end
o f  the road?
Diego : Cease ta lk ing  o f d esp a ir1 Despair i s  a
gag. And today the thunder o f hope and a 
l i ^ t n i n g  f la sh  o f  happiness are sh atterin g  
the s ilen ce  o f th is  beleaguered c i t y .
Stand up, I t e l l  you, and act l ik e  men!
. . .  leave the ranks o f  fe a r , and shout 
your freedom to  the four winds o f  heaven!
Chorus: We are d ispossessed  and hope i s  our only
r ic h e s—how could we l iv e  w ithout i t ?
Y es, brother, we w i l l  f l in g  away these  
gags. • . «oPopa buoys us up l ik e  a great 
wave. • .
In th is  context hope might be understood as the f i r s t  act 
of re b e llio n  against the absurd. Camus must have con­
sidered  hope to  be ju st t h is ,  "a r e b e llio n  against the 
absurd," in  The Plague, fo r  i t  i s  hope that ends the 
reign  of the p lague. In the words o f  the narrator, Rieux:
®^Albert Camus, "The Wages o f  Our G eneration ," in  
R esistance. R ebellion  and Death, p . l8 9 .
®^Albert Camus, "State of S ieg e ,"  in  C aligula and 
Three Other P lays, pp. 210-11.
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"The change, no doubt, was s lig h t*  Yet however s l ig h t ,
i t  proved idiat a vast forward str id e  our townsfolk had
made in  the way o f hope. And indeed i t  could be sa id
that once the fa in te s t  s t ir r in g  o f hope became p o ss ib le ,
the domain o f the plague was ended. Several days
la te r  RLeux, speaking o f  h im self, wrote th a t love and
hope were those creative a c ts  o f  r e b e llio n  that negated
the e x i le  enforced by absurdity:
As to fdiat e x ile  and that longing fo r  reunion 
meant, Rieux had no ideas . . .  he was thinking  
i t  has no iiiQ>ortance idiether such th in gs have 
or have not a meaning; a l l  we need consider i s  
the answer given to  man*s hope.
Henceforth he knew the answer. . . .  i f  there i s  
one th ing one can always yearn for and sometimes 
a tta in , i t  i s  human lo v e .°o
These thoughts bring us to The Rebel, fo r  hope i s  an act 
o f r e b e llio n  against the p lague. Hope in  r e la tio n  to 
the plague i s ,  th erefore , only an i n i t i a l ,  incon^lete act 
o f  r e b e llio n ; fo r  i t  i s  an act aga in st, and the most 
authentic hope i s  always an act f o r .
Hope and the Rebel : What stands out in  the hope of
the Rebel as compared to  the hope o f Rieux i s  i t s  d irec­
tio n : the R ebel’s hope i s  always fo r  u s . This d irectio n
stands out most c lea r ly  in  the quotation on page 96,
®^Albert Camus, The Plague. p . 235*
Q^Ibid.. p . 261,
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'Ëilch ends in  these words: "It foimds i t s  f i r s t  value
on the whole human race. I rebel— therefore we exist."G ?
The reb el acts fo r —for the "idiole human race." I t  i s  in
th is  sense that reb e llio n  and hope merge, for the rebel
acts in  hope; to  rebel i s  to  hope--to hope i s  to reb e l.
In a l e t t e r  to an Algerian reb el, M. Aziz Kessous,
Gamus makes reference to the hope that he shares with
h is  brother reb e l—i t  i s  a hope fo r  u n ity  in  the midst o f
a p lague, the b it t e r  plague o f Prench-Algerian hate:
N evertheless, you and I ,  liio are so much a lik e  — 
having the same background, sharing the same 
hope, having f e l t  l ik e  brothers for so long now, 
united  in  love for our country—know that we are 
not enemies and that we could l i v e  happily
together on the s o i l  that belongs to u s. • « .
You have sa id  i t  very w a ll, b e tte r  than I 
can say i t ;  we are condemned to l iv e  together. * 88
Less than one year la te r , midst the continuing hatred
between A lgeria and France and in frequent v io len ce , in
a lec tu re  given in  A lg iers, the hope o f a rebel made an
"Appeal for  a C iv ilia n  Truce":
Reason c lea r ly  shows that on th is  po in t, at 
le a s t ,  French and Arab so lid a r ity  i s  in ev ita b le , 
in  death as in  l i f e ,  in  destruction as in  hope. • • .
G7ln chapter three I  sh a ll compare th is  statement o f  
Camus, "I reb e l—therefore we e x is t ,  " w ith one o f Marcel, 
"I hope in  You fo r  Us," These two statem ents, in  my 
understanding, are almost id en tica l.
^^Albert Camus, "Letter to an A lgerian M ilitan t, M. 
Aziz Kessous" ( f i r s t  appeared in October, 1955» in  the 
newspaper ed ited  by Kessous, Algerian Community) , in  
R esistance. R eb ellion , and Death, p. 9ii.
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• • • there Is a lso  a community o f hope that 
j u s t i f ie s  our appeal* That common hope i s  
flzm ly baaed on r e a l i t ie s  over idiich we have no 
con tro l. On t h is  s o i l  there are a m illio n  
Frenchmen idio have been here for a century, 
m illio n s  o f  Moslems • • • lAo have been here for  
cen tu ries, and severa l vigorous r e lig io u s  communi­
t i e s .  Those men must l iv e  together at the  
crossroads where h istory  has put them* They can 
do so i f  they w il l  take a few steps toward each 
other in  open confrontation. . * .
• • • we may hope someday to  break a ltogeth er  
the block o f hatreds and crazy demands in  idiich we 
a l l  are caught.o9
The hope o f the rebel l i e s  in  the so lid a r ity  o f  human 
su ffering  in  the "community o f hope, " reb e llin g  for  
c o lle c t iv e  humanity. Camus did more than ju st  write 
about the Rebel, fo r  he was h im self a Rebel; and thus, he 
was a man o f great hope—indeed, hope fo r  the world#
A Rebel and His Hope fo r  the # )r ld : The purpose o f
th is  section  o f  the chapter i s  to show the hope that 
Camus held  fo r  the human world* That hope would f i r s t  
begin in  those s o lita r y  acts of reb e llio n  in  the name o f  
a l l ,  as Gamus in d ica ted  in  a lecture given at the Univer­
s ity  o f Uppsala and t i t l e d  "Create Dangerously";
Great id ea s , i t  has been sa id , come in to  the 
world as gen tly  as doves. Perhaps then, i f  we 
l i s t e n  a t te n t iv e ly , we sh a ll hear, amid the uproar 
o f  en tire s  and nations, a fa in t  f lu t t e r  o f  wings, 
the gen tle  s t ir r in g s  o f l i f e  and hope. Some w il l  
say that th is  hope l i e s  in  n ation s, o th ers, in  a 
man* I b e liev e  rather that i t  i s  awakened, revived, 
nourished by m illio n s  o f so lita r y  in d iv id u a ls  \diose
®^Albert Camus, "Appeal for a C iv ilia n  Truce," in  
R esistance. R ebellion , and Death, pp. 101, 103*
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deeds and works everyday negate fro n tie r s  and the 
crudest ix i^ lioations o f  h istory*  As a r e su lt ,  
there sh ines forth  f le e t in g ly  t ^  ever threatened  
truth that each and every man, on the foundation  
of h is  own su ffer in gs and jo y s , b u ild s fo r  a l l *90
In the "gentle s t ir r in g s  o f  l i f e  and hope" o f  reb els  here
and there, reb e llin g  in  the hope o f  human community, l i e s
the rea l power to  overcome the n ih ilism  of the 20th
century, as Gamus makes c lear in  the essay "The Wages o f
Our Generation":
Europe (and France) has not yet emerged from 
f i f t y  years of n ih ilism , but the moment people 
begin re jec tin g  the m y stif ic a tio n s  on idiich that 
n ih ilism  i s  based then hope i s  p o s s ib le . The 
idiole question i s  to  know idiether or not we sh a ll  
develop fa s te r  than the rocket w ith a nuclear 
warhead. . . .  This i s  the wager o f our genera­
t io n . I f  we are to  f a i l ,  i t  i s  b e tte r , in  any 
case to have stood on the sid e o f those idio choose
l i f e  than on the sid e of those who are d estro y in g .91
These are not the words o f a n i h i l i s t .  C ertainly Gamus,
as any ra tion a l man, knew that the wager might f a i l ,  but
that was no excuse for f a i l in g  to  work to beat the bomb,
to create dangerously a world where l ib e r ty  and ju s t ic e
w il l  be the ru les  o f  l i f e .  Indeed, th is  i s  the r e b e l's
hope, the hope o f  h is  r e b e llio n : a l i f e  o f l ib e r ty  and
ju s t ic e , idiich Gamus defined in  a January 10, 191*4 essay
^^Albert Gamus, "Create Dangerously" ( lec tu re , 1957* 
at U niversity  o f  Uppsala), in R esistan ce. R ebellion  and 
Death, pp. 208-9.
Albert Gamus, "The Wgges o f  Our Generation," in  
R esistance. R ebellion  and Death, pp. 107-8.
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la  Combat;
Wa sh a ll c a l l  • • • ju s t ic e  a so c ia l s ta te  in  which 
each in d iv id u a l rece iv es  every opportunity at the 
s ta r t ,  and in  tdiich the country's m ajority i s  not 
h eld  in  abject conditions by a p r iv ileg ed  minority* 
And we s h a ll  c a l l  l ib e r ty  a p o l i t i c a l  clim ate in  
which the human being i s  respected  fo r  ih a t he i s  
as w ell as th a t he e x p r e s s e s . 92
These were words o f hope w ritten  by a reb e l—a rebel
speaking out against the e v i l s  o f  Nazi con trol in  France.
Seven months la t e r ,  August 2lj., 1944# the eve o f P aris'
lib e r a tio n , in  an essay in  Combat, a l l  the passionate hope
for l ib e r ty  and ju s t ic e  o f a rebel came burning to the
press:
Yes, th e ir  reasons are overwhelming. They 
are as b ig  as hope and as deep as r e v o lt . They
are the reasons o f  the future fo r  a country that
others tr ie d  so long to  l im it  to  the gloomy 
rumination o f her p a s t . P aris i s  f ig h tin g  today 
so that France may speak tomorrow. The people 
are under arms tonight because they hope for  
ju s t ic e  fo r  tomorrow. . . .  And th is  i s  why, d esp ite  
the blood and wrath, d esp ite  the w ild  b u lle t s , we 
must u tte r , not words o f reg re t, but words o f hope, 
o f  the dreadful hope o f men is o la te d  w ith th e ir  
f a t e .
This huge P aris , a l l  black and warm in  the 
summer h eat, w ith a storm o f bombers overhead 
and a storm o f  sn ipers in  the s tr e e ts  . . .  i s  
bursting with a l l  the f ir e s  o f  hope and su ffer in g;  
i t  has the flame o f lu c id  courage and a l l  the 
glow, not only o f  l ib e r a tio n , but o f  tomorrow's 
l ib e r ty .
^^Albert Camus, essay in  Combat. January 1 , 1944# 
tran sla ted  and included in  Emmett Parker, The A r tis t  in  
the Arena, pp. 90-91.
^^Albert Camus, "The Blood o f  Freedom" Combat. August 
24, 1944# in  R esistance. R ebellion , and Death, pp. 2 8 -9 .
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Now, a scap tlc  might say that i t  was easy enough to  
speak o f hope on the eve o f  lib er a tio n , but lAat about 
hope during the long s ieg e  o f  the plague? What hope i s  
to be found in  that darkness? Where are Camus' hopes 
in  that sickness? The answer i s  that Camus spoke o ften  
o f hope even in  the midst o f  that p lague. Many s ta te ­
ments already quoted show th is  hope, but i t  i s  most 
c le a r ly  evidenced in  l e t t e r s  w ritten  to  a German fr ien d  
during the siege o f  the Nazi p lague. In a l e t t e r  dated 
July, 194-3» Camus wrote:
I b e lie v e  that Prance lo s t  her power and her sway 
for a long time to come and that fo r  a long time 
to come she w i l l  need a desperate p atien ce, a 
v ig ila n t  rev o lt  to  recover the element o f  p res­
t ig e  necessary fo r  any cu lture. But I b e lie v e  
she has lo s t  a l l  that fo r  reasons that are pure.
And th is  i s  uhy I have not lo s t  hope. This i s  
the whole meaning o f  my l e t t e r ,
Five months la te r , December, 1943» Camus wrote o f  h is
love and hope in  France: , , as I have already to ld
you, i f  a t  times we seemed to  p refer  ju stic e  to  our
country, th is  i s  s in g ly  because we wanted to lo v e  our
country in  ju s t ic e , as we wanted to love in  tru th  and in
h o p e , "95 Again, in  A pril, 1944-» Camus spoke o f  the hope
he had fo r  Europe to  the same Gennan friend : "During a l l
94-Albert Camus, "Letters to a German Friend, " in  
R esistance. R ebellion , and Death, pp, 7-8#
"^^Ibid, , pp, 9-10,
105
the time we were ob stin a te ly  and s i le n t ly  serving our 
country, we never lo s t  sigh t of an idea and a hope, 
forever present in  u s—the idea and the hope o f E urope*”9^ 
The preceding are a l l  ezas^ les o f  the hope with which 
a rebel fought the plague o f  absurdity w ithin h is  own 
country. But a rebel knows no s in g le  homeland, fo r  he i s  
a brother o f  a l l  \ùio rebel against the absurd plague 
c a lle d  tyranny. The two follow ing passages are the words 
of Camus fo r  h is  brother rebels in  Hungary and in  East 
B erlin :
I  hope with a l l  my strength that the mute 
resista n ce  o f  the Hungarian people w il l  continue, 
grow stronger, and, echoed by a l l  the vo ices we 
can g ive i t ,  get unaminous in tern ation a l opinion  
to boycott i t s  oppressors. And i f  that opinion  
i s  too flabby or s e l f i s h  to do ju stice  to a 
martyred people, i f  our vo ices are a lso  too weak,
I  hope that the Hungarian resistan ce w ill  continue 
u n t i l  the counter-revolutionary sta te  co lla p ses  
everyidiere in  the East under the weight o f i t s  
l i e s  and i t s  contrad ictions. • , .
The Hungarian workers and in te l le c tu a ls ,  
beside idiom we stand today w ith  so much Impotent 
g r ie f ,  rea lized  that and made us rea lize  i t .
This i s  idiy, i f  th e ir  su ffer in g  i s  ours, th e ir  
hope belongs to us to o . D espite th e ir  d e s t itu ­
t io n , th e ir  e x i le ,  th e ir  chains, i t  took them but 
a s in g le  day to transmit to us the royal legacy  
o f  l ib e r ty .  May we be worthy o f  it ]9 7
June 7: There are r io ts  in  East B erlin : 'When a
worker someidiere in  the world ra ise s  h is  bare 
f i s t s  in  front o f a tank and c r ie s  out that he i s  
not a s la v e , idiat are we, then, i f  we remain
96 ib id . . p . 15.
"^^Albert Camus, "Radar Had H is Day o f Pear, " Franc- 




These are not the words o f an iso la te d , weary, hopeless  
Sisyphus treading the m ill o f  absurdity, but o f  a rebel 
idio, even midst the plague and e x ile s  of h is  world, puts  
h is  hope and a c t iv ity  in to  the community o f man.
C ertainly th is  rebel i s  a r e a l is t ,  but no pessim ist*
This concludes the sec tio n  on a rebel and h is  hope 
fo r  the world. In Chapter Three, the re la tio n  between 
th is  hope and a doctrine o f  sa lvation  w il l  be d iscu ssed . 
A ll that remains o f th is  chapter i s  a b r ie f  d iscu ssion  
o f four additional dimensions of hope in  Camus and the  
consideration o f  one ad d ition al problem regarding com­
munity and transcendence.
Dimensions o f Hope: F ir s t ,  A Physical Doctrine o f
Hope: Several passages have already been c ite d  in  which
Camus denies a p hysica l doctrine o f hope, ^ , e , ,  that the 
body can know anything o f hope. As shown in  Chapter One, 
Marcel would agree with him. But there are other  
passages in  Camus idiioh suggest the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  such 
a physica l hope. When one puts these together with those 
passages that deny the same, no defensib le p o s it io n  on 
Camus can be reached, except to  say that he i s  ambiguous
^®Albert Camus, from a speech given in  Paris in  
defense o f East B er lin  workers in  re b e llio n , quoted in  
Roger Q u ill io t , The Sea and Prisons, p . x x i i .
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on the xoatter* However, I  w i l l  ind icate the supporting
passages to  e s ta b lish  the ambiguity and fo r  c r i t i c a l  use
in  Chapter Four. The f i r s t  p lace that the p o s s ib i l i t y
of a p h ysica l hope appears i s ,  su rp rising ly , in  The
Stranger, in  a conversation at the v is ito r s*  room between
Meursault and Marie:
• • • Marie was shouting to  me that we musn*t lo se  
hope.
* Certainly not,* I answered, I^ y gaze f e l l  
on her shoulders, and I  had a certa in  longing to  
squeeze them, through the th in  d ress. I t s  s ilk y  
texture fascin ated  me, and I had a f e e l in g  that 
the hope she spoke o f centered on them, somehow.99
The other two passages that might suggest a p hysica l hope
are both statem ents o f Rieux as narrator o f The Plague :
. . .  the r is in g  wind o f hope, a fte r  a l l  these  
months o f endurance and depression, had fanned 
impatience to a b laze and swept away th e ir  s e l f -  
con tro l. They were se ized  with a sort o f  panic 
at the thought th at they might die so near the 
g o a l. . . .  the f i r s t  t h r i l l  o f hope had been 
enougjh to sh atter idiat fea r  and h opelessness had 
f a i le d  to iiapair.lOO
Hope had returned and w ith  i t  a new z e s t  fo r  life.^ ® ^  
The only claim s that can be made are the fo llow in g: F ir s t ,
these quotations only suggest the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  a p h y si­
ca l doctrine o f hope. Second, the p o s it io n  o f Camus on
* *^^Albert Camus, The Stranger, p . 92,
A lbert Camus, The Plague, p . 230.
lO llb id . .  p . 2i|Ij..
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such a doctrine cannot be decided since there are passages 
that both support and deny a physica l hope. I t  i s  
p o ssib le  that many o f the statem ents in  Ihe Rebel con­
cerning the so lid a r ity  o f human su ffer in g  would support 
such a d octr in e . This p o s s ib i l i t y  w il l  be considered in  
Chapter Pour,
Second, Hope and Induction: In another sectio n  o f
th is  chapter, i t  was stated  that one o f  the ways in  which 
the absurd destroyed hope was through i t s  ru le o f  
in du ction . I t  fo llow s from t h is ,  as Marcel has sta ted , 
that fo r  hope to  e x is t  i t  must r e je c t  in du ction . In one 
o f  h is  notebooks, Camus put down some thoughts on the 
human power to deny inductive determ ination:
There i s  one f a t a l i t y  which i s  death, and out­
s id e  th is  a l l  other f a t a l i t y  d isappears. In the 
^ a c e  o f time between b ir th  and death, nothing i s  
predetermined. You can change everything, you can 
stop the way and even m aintain peace, i f  you want 
to  do so in te n se ly , and fo r  a long t i m e , 102
There are two passages in  The Plague in  which Camus in d i­
cates th at hope i s  ir ra tio n a l (i.*£,* denies the reason o f  
induction) and that hope proceeds regard less of any 
inductive den ia l (regardless o f "being unavowed"). In 
Rieux*s words:
Thus each of us had to  be content to  l iv e  only  
fo r  the day, alone under the vast in d ifferen ce  of
102Albert Camus, Notebooks, 1935-19L2, p , llj2 .
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the sky* This sense o f being abandoned • • • 
began sapping to the point o f  f u t i l i t y *  * * * at 
the mercy o f the sky*s caprices • • * ^allQ suffered  
and hoped irra tion a lly*103
* * * th is  new development the decrease 
in  the death r o l l  and the appearance o f  
healthy  r a ts )  was the ta lk  o f the town, and 
people began to nurse hopes none the l e s s  heart­
f e l t  fo r  being unavowed*lOy.
Further d iscu ssio n  on induction and hope w il l  fo llo w  in  
both Chapters Three and Pour*
Third, Hope without God: Camus* d en ia l o f any tran­
scendent r e a l i t y  i s  w ell known* However, th is  does not 
mean that he i s  a n ti-r e lig io u s  or h o s t i le  to  r e lig io u s  
groups* Rather, i t  means that he does not accept any 
divine being* For the ty p ica l westerner th is  means that 
he r e je c ts  the C hristian  God* The main reason fo r  th is  
re jec tio n  l i e s  in  the ex isten ce o f  the absurd, or , in  
th eo lo g ica l language, in  the problem o f e v i l ,  as he in d i­
cated in  a le c tu r e  to the monks a t the Dominican Monastery 
of Latour-Maubourg, in  19lj.8:
* * * the world o f today needs C hristians idio 
remain C hristians* * * * I don't l ik e  p r ie s t s  idio 
are a n t ic le r ic a l  any more than philosophers who 
are ashamed o f themselves* Hence I sh a ll not
* * * tr y  to  pass m yself o f f  as a Christian* * * •
I  share with you the same revu lsion  from ev il*
But I do not share your hope, and I continue to
^^^Albert Camus, The Plague* pp. 6J4.-5*
lo ^ ib id *. p* 233.
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stru ggle against th is  universe in which children
su ffer  and d ie .105
Thus Camus does not renounce the C hristian, only the 
C hristian God. The Christian may be a brother-rebel w ith  
Camus, and he would rejo ice  in  th e ir  brotherhood o f  
su ffer in g  and hope. What Camus cannot to ler a te  in  the 
C hristian  fa ith  i s  i t s  escapism in to  eternal r e a l i t ie s  
and the consequent ir r e s p o n s ib ility  and unconcern fo r  
th is  world o f  men. The hope o f e ter n ity  so  often  becomes 
fo r  the Christian a re jec tio n  o f  th is  world o f humanity, 
an excuse from reb e llin g  against the plagues o f tyranny 
and p reju d ice. This worldly cowardice and ir r e sp o n s ib ility  
Camus cannot abide. For the Christian liiose transcendent 
re la tion sh ip  plunges him in to  th is  "worldly" reb e llio n , 
Camus i s  h is  brother, for  they are both about the task o f  
build ing  a church in  th is  world—one a church with a God 
and one a church without a god. I t  is  the building that 
i s  s ig n if ic a n t , fo r  the bu ild ing  i s  an act of hope, 
regard less o f  idiether i t  has a transcendent ground or not. 
What then i s  th is  world church? I t  is  a community idiere 
l ib e r ty  and ju s t ic e  are sacred r ig h ts  o f  each in d iv id u a l, 
and that i s  the R ebel's hope for  the world.
lO^Albert Camus, lectu re  at the Dominical Monastery 
o f  Latour-Maubourg, 1948, in  R esistance, R ebellion , and 
Death, p . 53*
I l l
Fourth, Hope and Despair: This f in a l  consideration
of Camus* thoughts on hope i s  included fo r  la te r  compari­
son with Marcel. Marcel i s  very c lear about the opposite 
of hope: despair. Camus makes no statement as to idiat
i s  the opposite o f  hope. He considers despair and rejects  
i t  in  The Myth o f  Sisyphus in  these words: "Being
deprived o f hope i s  not d e s p a i r i n g . H e  a lso  ra ises  
the p o s s ib i l i ty  that the absurd might be the "contrary" 
of hope, and then re je c ts  i t .  Therefore, no conclusion  
can be reached as to what Camus considered the opposite 
of hope.
Community and Transcendence: Evidence has already
been offered  to show that Camus re je c ts  any transcendent 
rela tionsh ip  for  man. Within C h ristian ity , th is  has been 
in terpreted  to mean that he re jects  the Christian God as 
an o n to lo g ica l r e a l i ty .  Such a re jec tio n  i s  a r e su lt  o f  
the awareness of absurdity. However, i t  i s  p ossib le  to 
in terp ret th is  re je c tio n  by Camus as ep istem ological 
rather than o n to lo g ica l. This i s  to say that absurdity 
pushes man in to  the epistem ological p o s it io n  of agnosti­
cism. For Camus, though, ep istem ological agnosticism  has 
the same p ra c tica l e f fe c t  as on to log ica l atheism: For
the day to day problems of l i f e ,  agnosticism  does not
lOÔAibort Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, p . 67.
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d if f e r  from atheism because in  n e ith er  case does the 
in d iv id ual have a transcendent r e la tio n sh ip ,
I f  these thoughts are co rrect, then a problem occurs 
in  Camus: What i s  the source o f community? This i s  a
problem that does not plague Marcel because h is  transcen­
dent A lly  i s  the source of community. As e ith er  agnostic  
or a th e is t ,  th is  transcendent A lly  cannot be the source 
for Camus, The source i s  courage. What binds the human 
community together in  the face o f absurdity—•which 
counsels d isso lu tio n —i s  nothing more and nothing le s s  
than courage. This i s  idiy Camus can become a brother 
Rebel with a man who has a d iffe r e n t  hope ( i , ,£ , ,  a tran­
scendent A lly ) : They can unite th e ir  courage in  the
struggle against the d estru ctiven ess o f  absurdity.
F in a l Remarks : The d iscu ssion  has, I think, achieved
the two purposes in i t i a l l y  designated . F ir s t ,  the thoughts 
of Camus on the nature of hope have been e ^ lo r e d  and 
evidence has been given o f a development in  h is  thought 
from Sisyphus to the Rebel, Second, evidence has shown 
that Camus i s  not the n ih i l i s t  and p essim ist that many 
claim , but rather, a man of hope—a rebel se tt in g  out to  
build  a church without a god, i.*®.*» & community o f  hope 
idiere l ib e r ty  and ju stic e  are the ru les o f l i f e .
The groundwork has now been la id  to  compare a rebel 
idio would bu ild  a church without a god and a prophet of 
hope b u ild in g  a church with h is  God,
CHAPTER THREE: HOPE: A REBELLION
AGAINST ABSURDITY
% purpose in  th is  chapter i s  to conQ)are and to 
contrast Marcel and Camus, or, more p r e c ise ly  th e ir  
respective views on hope. But, in  trying to  do so , I 
encounter two problems: F ir s t , idaich Camus i s  to  be
compared to and contrasted  with Marcel? The Camus o f  
Sisyphus? Of The Plague? Of The Rebel? Second, the 
success o f any comparison, or any co n tra st, l i e s  in  the 
a b il i t y  to r e la te  the language and conceptual frame of 
one man to  the d iffe r e n t  language and conceptual frame 
o f the other. Even where common words are u t i l iz e d  by 
both, there i s  no guarantee that the words have the same, 
or sim ilar, meanings in  each conceptual frame.
In regard to  the f i r s t  problem I sh a ll  attempt to 
u t i l i z e  a l l  three stages in  Camus fo r  comparison to  
Marcel rather than l im it  the task  to one stage . One of 
the m erits o f  th is  approach l i a s  in  comparing Sisyphus 
and Marcel; fo r , contrary to the standard a n a lysis  of 
Sisyphus, Camus and Marcel do agree in  several important 
respects on the r e la tio n  between Sisyphus and hope. 
Another m erit l i e s  in  the cosparison and contrast between 
The Rebel and Marcel. As stated  in  Chapter Two, The Rebel 
i s  a stage grounded in  hope, and one might then suspect
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that Camus' Rebel and Marcel share much In common. But 
i t  i s  at th is  stage that the most s ig n if ic a n t  d ifference  
appears. Thus, the comparison and contrast w ill seek an 
ov era ll view o f Camus in  re la tio n  to Marcel.
In regard to the second problem I s h a ll ,  tdiere 
p o ss ib le , atten^t d e f in it iv e  and r ig id  comparisons or  
con trasts , and Wiere ambiguity ru le s  out such w ell-defined  
comparisons or contrasts, leave the re la tio n  open-ended.
I sh a ll point out, fo r  example, both the common elements 
and the d ifferen t elements in  M arcel's use o f mystery 
and Camus' use o f absurdity, without drawing any f in a l 
conclusions.
The stru ctura l procedure fo r  th is  chapter w ill be 
as fo llo w s: F ir s t ,a  d iscussion  o f  the s ig n ifica n t con­
tr a s ts  between Camus and Marcel; second, an examination 
of the questionable contrasts (i..e_., those relations that 
because o f both s im ila r it ie s  and d ifferen ces must remain 
d e f in it iv e ly  ambiguous, open); and th ird , an exploration  
of many s im ila r it ie s  between these two philosophers.
Contrasts (D e fin it iv e  D ifferences)
Four areas o f d ifference w i l l  be discussed: the con­
tr a s t  between Sisyphus and Marcel (a general d iscussion); 
contrasting views on transcendence ( th is  point must a lso  
be d iscussed  in  the next section  on questionable.
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open-ended co n tra sts); the absurd and m iracles; and hope 
and despair.
One might expect to  fin d  in  th is  section  on contrasts  
a d iscu ssion  on the d ifferen ce between absurdity and 
mystery, fo r  they are certa in ly  contrasting concepts. 
Indeed, the s ig n ifica n ce  of each concept could not be 
overestim ated, for Camus' thought can be understood as an 
attençt to trace out the im plications of absurdity and 
Marcel's that o f  mystery. Why then i s  a d iscu ssion  of 
the d ifferen ce between these two basic concepts omitted? 
Because, lA ile  contrasting concepts, they have in  common 
many fea tu res; and thus, while i t  i s  accurate to say that 
absurdity and mystery are not to be equated, i t  i s  also  
accurate to  say that they are in some ways sim ilar  con­
cepts. For these two reasons I leave a d iscu ssion  of 
absurdity and mystery to the second section  o f  th is  
chapter—open-ended co n tra sts .
S u p erfica lly , one o f the c lea rest con trasts between 
the thought o f Marcel and Camus i s  to be found in  re la tin g  
Homo Viator and Sisyphus. Homo Viator i s  a man o f hope; 
Sisyphus i s  a prophet o f no-hope. What i s  p h ilo so p h ica lly  
ch ttJfacteristic  of Sisyphus, of the absurd man, i s  h is  
c lea r-sig h ted  refu sa l to hope in a world tdiere p o s s ib i l i ty  
i s  reduced to a c tu a lity  and alienness i s  the dominant 
re la tio n  between man and the world. Sisyphus, as the
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absurd man, knows a universe that i s  lim ited , transparent, 
and fr ig id - - I n  other words, a universe that I s  nothing­
n ess—(see page 79), In th is  kind o f a universe Sisyphus 
has two options: he can hope, which i s  r e a lly  a re fu sa l 
to accept the universe—a delusion; o r , he can refuse to  
hope, idilch I s  a rational acceptance o f  the u n iverse.
As d iscussed  In Chapter Two, I t  Is the conscious power o f  
Induction, ! ,•£ ., the reduction o f p o s s ib i l i t y  to 
a c tu a lity , that resu lts in Wiat might be ca lled  a "logic  
of no hope," or as Camus puts i t ,  an "absurd lo g ic" :
• • carrying th is absurd lo g ic  to i t s  conclusion, I 
must admit that the struggle linp lles a to ta l absence of 
hope. . . . Marcel ' s man. Homo V iator, on the other 
hand, i s  never u ltim ately  without hope, lim ited  to
tile horizon mapped out by Induction and forever lo s t  in  
a strange world. Home V iator in  hoping denies both the 
power o f induction and a lien n ess; fo r . In M arcel's words, 
hope
. . .  con sists in  a ssertin g  that there I s  at the 
heart o f Being, beyond a l l  data, beyond a l l  
Inventories and a l l  ca lcu la tio n s , a m ysterious 
p rin c ip le  which i s  in  connivance with me, which 
cannot but w ill idiat I w i l l .  I f  what I w i l l  deserves 
to  be w illed  and I s , In fa c t , w illed  by the whole 
of my b ein g .2
^Albert Camus, The Myth o f  Sisyphus, p . 13.
^Gabriel Marcel, "Desli^ and Hope," Readings In 
E x is te n tia l Phenomenology, p . 281.
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la  trying to  understand the contrast between 
Sisyphus and Homo V iator ou tlined  in  the preceding 
paragraph, one must note that the word " su p erfica lly , ” 
which began the d iscu ssio n , i s  most s ig n ifica n t*  At 
f i r s t  glance the two p o s it io n s  seem decided opposites on 
the human condition* But there are many points of 
s im ila r ity  between Sisyphus and Homo V iator that w i l l  be 
discussed sh o rtly . The d ifferen ces and the s im ila r it ie s  
may be understood as issu in g  from the d ifferen ces and 
s im ila r it ie s  between absurdity and m ystery. For th is  
reason I sh a ll leave the contrast between Sisyphus and 
Homo V iator, only to return to i t  from several vantage 
points in  idiat i s  to fo llo w .
I t  i s  in  considering th e ir  3?espective  views on tran­
scendence that one comes to the most c r i t i c a l  contrast 
between Camus and Marcel, and y et, at the same tim e, to  
a point of agreement. To understand t h is  seemingly con­
trad ictory statem ent—that Camus and Marcel agree and 
disagree on transcendence—i t  i s  h e lp fu l to ask the 
question: What kind of transcendent re la tio n sh ip s , i f
any, are open to  man? I t  seems to me th at two p o s s i­
b i l i t i e s  are lo g ic a l ly  ava ilab le: F ir s t ,  man may have
the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f a rela tionsh ip  to the human community 
that could be described as transcendent, ^ .e ,., the human 
community may be considered as a r e a lity  that i s  more
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than a numerical c o lle c t io n  o f  in d iv id u a le; and second, 
man may have the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  a re la tion sh ip  to a 
r e a lity  that i s  supra-human (excluding the human com­
m unity), i.*e,*, to  an eiq>athetic natural read ity  (nature), 
or to a supernatural being (gh ost? ), or to  an Absolute 
Thou (a ground o f Being, a God). In a n u tsh e ll, Camus 
and Marcel fin d  some p oin ts o f  agreement in  admitting 
both the r e a l i ty  and the value o f  transcendence in  the 
f i r s t  sense , but they h e a r t ily  disagree on any transcen­
dent r e la t io n  in  the second sen se . I  sh a ll consider 
only the contrast in  th is  sec tio n  o f the paper, leav in g  
the comparison o f  transcendence and the human community 
fo r  the next se c tio n .
As has been sta ted , one o f the primary d ifferen ces  
between Sisyphus and Homo V iator i s  the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  
hope—for Sisyphus there i s  no hope and fo r  Homo Viator  
hope i s  a l i f e - s t y l e .  To answer the question, "Why?" 
about both, i s  not too d i f f i c u l t .  Why can Sisyphus fin d  
no hope? Because he has no transcendent source to  draw 
upon, no empathetic Being to lean  upon—he has only an 
in d ifferen ce  to fa c e . Another way to  say the same thing  
i s  that Sisyphus can fin d  no hope because there i s  no 
mystery in  h i s  lo n e ly  world, jL.e,., there i s  no r e a lity  
that transcends h is  e x is ten ce—which i s  a lso  to say that 
there are no p o s s ib i l i t i e s  beyond the a c tu a lit ie s  o f  h is
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absurd s itu a t io n . For Homo V iator the situ a tio n  i s  much 
d iffe r e n t, as i s  indicated in  the fo llow in g , which 
brings us to the heart of the most s ig n if ic a n t  contrast 
between Camus and Marcel: For Homo Viator there i s  a
r e a lity  in  lAiose "inward depth" he can fin d  an a l ly — 
indeed, r e a l i t y  i s  on h is  s id e , w illin g  >diat he most 
deeply w i l l s  or hopes (see page 36) .  I t  i s  th is  re a lity  
that makes hope as a mystery p o ss ib le  for  Homo V iator,
In other words, i t  i s  th is  r e a lity  that allows Homo 
Viator to a ssert a truth that goes " . . .  beyond a l l  
experience, a l l  p ro b a b ility , a l l  s t a t i s t ic s "  (see page 36) .  
That truth  i s  the empathy o f r e a l i t y  and the denial of 
induction. For Sisyphus there i s  no "inward depth" to 
r e a lity  and there i s  no ava ilab le  source o f enjpathy. While 
r e a lity  i s  not "hostile" for  him—since to be h o s t i le  
would n ec e ss ita te  some kind o f w i l l  (a c t iv ity )  in  the 
world—r e a lity  i s  " in d ifferen t,"  uncaring, and in e r t .
(See page 36) . This i s  a lso  to say that there i s  nothing 
"beyond a l l  experience, a l l  p ro b a b ility , a l l  s ta t is t ic s"  
for  Sisyphus. There i s ,  then, no p o s s ib i l i ty  (beyond that 
of in fa n t ile  escapism into se lf-d ecep tio n ) for Sisyphus 
to have a transcendent re la tio n  w ith r e a lity  (or the world, 
or nature, or a God). The world i s  in d iffer en t, in er t, 
dead to w i l l ,  and determined. Man, even fo r  Sisyphus, is  
caring, a c tiv e  a liv e  to w i l l ,  and a f ig h te r  for freedom
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amidst de term ini am. Mutual exclu sion  ru les out any 
re la tion sh ip  other than reb e llio n , idiich I  sh a ll take up 
la t e r  and which i s  not a transcendent re la tion sh ip  in the 
sense under consideration .
I t  i s  the lack  o f any mystery in  Sisyphus' world-- 
and Hieux's and the R eb el's, for that m atter—that rules 
out transcendence in  th is  sense. Camus and Marcel would 
probably agree that because o f the lack  o f such mystery, 
and the consequent lo s s  of any transcendent r e a lity ,  no 
hope i s  p o s s ib le . There w ill  be more on th is  in  the la s t  
section  on comparisons. Another way to see the contrast 
between the to ta l  Camus and Marcel i s  to consider the 
re la tion  between hope and m iracles, which i s  a restatement 
of hope as a den ial o f the power of induction, Marcel 
speaks o f the re la tio n  in  these words: " . . .  hope i s
p ossib le  only in  a world Wiere there i s  room fo r  
m iracles. . . Camus would, I th ink , agree w ith  Marcel
that hope i s  p o ss ib le  only in  a world xdiere m iracles 
occur. Put in  other words, a world where induction rules 
out the m iraculous, i,.o.*> a world where p o s s ib i l i t y  i s  
reduced to a c tu a lity , i s  one in which hope can be only an 
i l lu s io n .  The d isju n ction , e ith er  m iracles or not 
m iracles, i s  ex c lu siv e , as Camus in d icated  in  an essay
^Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having, p . 75.
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t i t l e d  "On a Philosophy o f Eagpression by B rice Parain": 
"The e s s e n t ia l in  any case i s  not yet to know which to  
choose: m iracles or absurdity. The important th ing i s
to show that they form the only possib le ch oice, and 
that nothing e ls e  m atters."^ As Camus sta ted : absurd
lo g ic  ru les out hope fo r  Sisyphus. One o f  the reasons 
i s  that absurdity and m iracles are m utually ex c lu s iv e .
Thus Camus and Marcel o ffer  contrasts as to  the 
nature o f the r e a lity  (world) in fhich man f in d s  h im self : 
for Marcel i t  i s  a r e a lity  that admits o f m iracles; fo r  
Camus i t  i s  a r e a lity  idiose absurdity excludes the 
miraculous at the le v e l  o f relationship  under considera­
t io n —that o f the p o s s ib i l i ty  of a transcendent r e la t io n ­
ship with the supra-human. Camus’ view ru le s  out hope 
W iile for  Marcel hope i s  a p oten tia l l i f e - s t y l e .  However, 
at a d ifferen t le v e l  o f  re la tion sh ip —that idxich Marcel 
c a l ls  communion and that explored by Camus in  The Rebel— 
both men speak o f hope. This comparison w ill  occupy the 
f in a l part o f th is  chapter.
Before moving to a consideration of open-ended con­
tra sts  we must consider one additional con trast. Marcel 
sta te s  c le a r ly  that the opposite of hope i s  d esp air, in
^Albert-Camus, "On a Philosophy o f  Expression by 
Brice Paraijn," L yrical and C ritica l Essays, p . 239.
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h is  words:
I b e liev e  that at the root o f  despair there i s  
always th is  affirm ation: 'There i s  nothing in
the realm o f  r e a lity  to tdiioh I can give  
c r e d it—no secu r ity , no gu aran tee.' I t  i s  a 
statement o f  conqplete in so lvency .
As against t h is ,  hope i s  vhat im plies 
c r e d it . . . .2
From th is  vantage point one might expect that Sisyphus,
the man without hope, would know despair. But Camus w ill
not agree to such: Despair i s  cr ip p lin g; something fo r
the weak and cowardly. Sisyphus does not hope, but he
does not despair, as Camus in d ica tes  in  the fo llow ing
two statem ents from The Myth o f Sisyphus ; ”. . .  carrying
th is  absurd lo g ic  to i t s  conclusion, I must admit that
the struggle iinp lies a to ta l absence o f hope (idiich has
nothing to  do w ith  despair) . . .  "Being deprived of
hope i s  not d e s p a i r i n g . ”7 What, then, i s  being deprived
o f hope fo r  Camus, what stands in  opposition  to
hope fo r  him? There i s  no answer to th is  question: On
only one occasion does Camus ra ise  the question as to
what i s  "contrary” to hope—page 26 o f  The Myth o f Sisyphus.
in  a d iscu ssion  centering on the thought o f Chestov. In
that d iscu ssion  he poses the absurd as the opposite of
% abriel Marcel, The Philosophy o f E x isten tia lism ,
p. 42.
^Albert Camus, The Myth o f Sisyphus, p . 23.
? Ib id ., p . 67.
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hope, and then r e je c ts  such an opposition* Thus, there 
i s  no answer to the question . One thing does seem clear  
to me: Camus rejected  despair as the opposite o f  hope
because despair i s  cr ip p lin g , and man (as Sisyphus,
Rieux, the Rebel) has w ithin h im self the sources to  
grapple with absurdity without s e l l in g  out e ith e r  to the 
"hoping" il lu s io n  that he has a transcendent a l ly ,  or to  
despair. For Marcel that a lly  u n d er lies the udiole of the 
human s itu a tio n . Yet, as far  apart as these two p o s i­
tio n s  may seem, there are many s im ila r it ie s ,  to which I 
now turn,
Open-Ended Contrasts (Comparisons)
This section  brings us to the most inqjortant con­
tr a s t  and comparison fo r  any atten ^ t to r e la te  Marcel and 
Camus: the re la tio n  between mystery and absurdity.
Absurdity and mystery are not to  be id e n t if ie d , but the 
elements they have in  common make any attempt to trea t  
them as only contrasts p h ilo so p h ica lly  in d e fe n s ib le .)  
Mystery and absurdity spring from the same s itu a tio n a l  
source—lAiat might, gen era lly , be ca lled  the "ambiguity 
o f the human s itu a tio n ."  Two p o in ts  may be made about 
th is  inherent ambiguity: F ir s t ,  the evidence fo r  the
ambiguity l i e s  in  what we lo o s e ly  c a l l  the "human fee lin gs,"  
which i s  to  say that ambiguity i s  a concept once removed
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from the s itu a tio n a l experiences to  idaich i t  r e fe r s—a 
concept lAiose purpose Is  s itu a tio n a l d escrip tion  and 
understanding. Second, there are two le v e ls  on d iich  
th is  ambiguity i s  operative—an ep istem ologica l one and 
an on to log ica l one. I now turn to a development o f th is  
ambiguity.
As s ta ted , the human s itu a tio n  i s  in herently  
ambiguous: Marcel develops th is  ambiguity in  terms of
mystery; Camus develops i t  in  terms o f absurdity . To 
say exactly  what th is  means for each e x i s t e n t ia l i s t  i s  
most problem atic because ambiguity i s  e lu s iv e . Thus, 
rather than attempt a d e f in it iv e  statem ent, I sh a ll con­
centrate on the evidence for such ambiguity and the 
contrasting as w ell as comparative im plication s each 
philosopher draws from the human s itu a tio n .
The primary evidence for the ambiguity o f the 
human s itu a tio n  i s  to  be found in  the human fe e l in g s .
Marcel and Camus agree on th is  p o in t. Human fe e lin g s  are 
never s t a t i c .  There are ups and downs, joys and sorrows, 
confidence and fea r , strangeness and belonging. These 
fe e lin g s  provide fo r  both human so lid a r ity  and individu­
a l ity :  s o lid a r ity  because joy and sorrow are common to
a l l  men; in d iv id u a lity  because the in te n s ity  and under­
standing o f  my joy and my sorrow are mine a lone. I t  i s  
true that a l l  human experiences and fe e l in g s  may be shared.
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but never in  conqpleteness. From th is  perspective the 
dynamic character o f  the human fe e lin g s  o ffe r s  evidence 
for the e x is te n t ia l  emphasis on the becoming o f man, 
which i s  a common p oin t o f  agreement I sh a ll consider  
la ter .®
There i s  a dynamic ambiguity to the nature o f human 
experience. In other words, for  both Marcel and Camus, 
there i s  an indefinab le element in  the nature of man, h is  
world, and h is  responses to that world. I t  must be 
emphasized that the immediate evidence fo r  th is  inde­
fin a b le  element l i e s  in  the responses, and both men agree 
that some responses ( fe e lin g s )  are more fo m a tiv e  fo r  
pointing out the nature o f  the human s itu a tio n . These 
f e e lin g s  are: strangeness, lo s tn e ss , hopelessness,
m eaninglessness, lo n e lin e s s , anxiety, e tc . The fe e lin g s  
that accompany a confrontation with what Camus c a lls  
absurdity and Marcel c a l ls  ca p tiv ity .^  I t  i s  not the
becom ing, as opposed to  being, i s  a process of 
ambiguity. I f  man i s  never cocç)lete, never capable of 
being captured by an adequate d e f in it io n , then just who 
man i s ,  idiere he i s  going, and what he w ill  be are 
questions that cannot be answered except in  the open- 
ended a c t iv ity  o f l iv in g .
^The th ird  se c tio n  o f th is  chapter w il l  o ffer  a 
comparison o f absurdity and ca p tiv ity . Absurdity i s  a 
concept which does double duty in  Camus, and th is  
accounts fo r  i t s  comparison to both mystery and ca p tiv ity .
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fe e lin g  o f  happiness or joy that rooks the complacency 
of man, but the fe e l in g s  arisin g  from the aaperience of  
absurdity or c a p t iv ity . Both Marcel and Oaxnus agree up 
to th is  p o in t: that the human situ a tio n  i s  ambiguous;
that man h im self and h is  world are ambiguous; that the 
human fe e lin g s  as responses to  the human s itu a tio n  are 
the primary evidence fo r  such ambiguity; and that the 
fe e lin g s  vàiich most c lea r ly  point out the nature of the  
human s itu a tio n  are the fe e lin g s  that acconçany a con­
frontation  w ith  absurdity or c a p tiv ity . But from these  
agreements they take o f f  in  d iffer en t d irection s: Camus
develops the human s itu a tio n  in  terms of the ambiguity 
of absurdity, jl.e.»» bhe divorce between man and an 
in d ifferen t world; Marcel moves from the experience of 
ca p tiv ity  to the ambiguity o f mystery as th a t which 
describes the re la tion sh ip  o f man to h is  world.
What Marcel means by mystery and Camus by absurdity  
have been developed resp ectiv e ly  in  Chapters One and Two, 
and i t  i s  not my in ten t to duplicate that work h ere. 
Instead, using the work o f those two chapters as a s t a r t ­
ing p o in t, the fo llow ing  comparisons are p o s s ib le .
F ir s t , as has been sta ted , the source o f both  
mystery and absurdity i s  to be found in the human s itu a ­
tion , e sp e c ia lly  the s itu a tio n a l relationsh ip  between man 
and h is  world. This ambiguity experienced as absurdity
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leads to  the divorce that Garnis speaks of between man, 
idio i s  a caring and valuing creature, and the in d if fe r ­
ence and s ile n c e  o f an in er t  world. The im plications o f  
th is  ambiguity o f  divorce are many: i t  de te  m in es the
response o f man to the world o f absurdity—reb ellion ;  
i t  destroys any hope b u ilt  upon a transcendent r e la tio n  
to th is  world because no such re la tio n  i s  p o ssib le; and 
i t  reduces p o s s ib i l i t y  to a c tu a lity  through the conquering 
power o f induction . This ambiguity experienced as mystery 
leads to  a p o te n tia l re la tio n  between man and h is  world, 
idiat Marcel c a l ls  the "ontological mystery," The ambi­
gu ity  o f  the re la tio n  leads to  hope and the denial of
induction .
Second, both Marcel and Gamus agree that the 
ambiguity of mystery and o f absurdity are most deeply 
esta b lish ed  in  the fe e l in g s  o f strangeness, or ca p tiv ity ;  
the fe e l in g s  that time and p o s s ib i l i ty  are "plugged up"; 
and the fe e l in g s  that something i s  wrong w ith the world, 
or w ith man, or with th e ir  re la tio n sh ip . A natural p lace  
to f in d  expressions o f these fe e lin g s  o f ambiguity in  the 
work o f both men would be in  th e ir  drama, and such i s  the
^^Although Marcel and Camus seem to  be apart on 
the meaning and the im plication s o f ambiguity as 
absurdity or mystery, such may not be the whole case. 
The conclusion to th is  chapter w ill  be a synthetic  
atten^t to  show that fo r  both men hope i s  a reb e llio n  
against absurdity.
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case. The fo llow ing words o f M arcel's Christiana could  
Just as w all have come from the mouth o f  Camus' C aligula, 
which a lso  fo llow  (the reverse would a lso  be accurate):
Don't you f e e l  sometimes that we are l iv in g  
• • • i f  you can c a l l  i t  l iv in g  • • • in  a broken 
world? Yes, broken lik e  a broken watch. The main­
spring has stopped working. Just to look  at i t ,  
nothing has changed# Everything i s  in  p la c e . But 
put the watch to your ear, and you don't hear any 
t ic k in g . You know what I am ta lk in g  about, the 
world, i^ at we c a l l  the world, the world o f human 
creatures . . .  i t  seems to  me th at i t  must have 
had a heart at one time, but today you would say  
that the heart has stopped b ea tin g .Ü
Men weep because . . .  the w orld 's a l l  wrong . . #
. . .  I  knew that men f e l t  anguish, but I d idn 't  
know Tdiat the word anguish meant. Like everyone 
e ls e  I fancied i t  was a sickn ess o f the mind—no 
more. But me, i t ' s  my body th a t 's  in  p a in . Pain 
everyidiere, in  my ch est, in  my le g s  and arras. Even 
my skin i s  raw, my head i s  buzzing, I f e e l  l ik e  
vom iting. But worst o f a l l  i s  th is  queer ta ste  in  
my mouth. Not b lood, or death, or fev er , but a 
mixture of a l l  three. I 'v e  only to  s t i r  my tongue, 
and the world goes black, and everyone looks 
h o rr ib le . How hard, how cru el i t  i s ,  t h is  process  
of becoming a man,12
C ertain ly C aligu la 's statement i s  much stronger than
C hristian a's; but th is  should not be su rp risin g , fo r
^ ^ a b r ie l Marcel, Ihe Mystery of Being, v o l. I . ,
P • 27 .
^^Albert Camus, "C aligu la ," C aligu la  and Three Other 
P lays, p . IS* Both o f these quotations appear e a r lie r  
in  the d isser ta tio n : see page i*.3 fo r  the quote by
C hristiane and pages 68-69 for the quote by C aligu la .
Both are repeated hare fo r  three reasons: fo r  the
dramatic e f fe c t  o f proxim ity; fo r  the convenience o f  the 
reader; and for fa c i le  comparison.
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C aligula i s  the v ir i l e  exnperor  ^ Christiane the tim id  
s o c ia lite *  Both do, however, in  th e ir  expressions, con­
fron t the ambiguity o f  th e ir  l i f e  s itu a tio n s , and Camus 
and Marcel do agree as to  one human response to  such a 
confrontation.
Third, at the ep istem ologica l l e v e l ,  absurdity  
shares several c h a ra c te r is tic s  with mystery: F ir s t ,  there
i s  no so lu tion  to absurdity; therefore absurdity cannot 
be reduced to the problematic* The same d is t in c tio n  as 
between mystery and problem holds between absurdity and 
problem* Second, absurdity and mystery as epistemo­
lo g ic a l  concepts p lace a lim ita tio n  on human knowledge 
and human truth* Absurdity lim its  knowledge and truth  to 
the re la tiv e  and the presen t, a lim ita tio n  that Camus 
f in d s  most discomforting* In h is  Notebooks Camus w rites  
th a t truth becomes "unacceptable" to  the "absurd thinker" 
Wio finds i t ,  and the re su lt  for the thinker i s  a 
"constant discomfort" (see page 7 k ) • Absurdity, then, 
l im it s  knowledge and truth  to the inductive actu a l, 
which excludes in tu it io n , value, and the realm o f  the 
improbable, e s p e c ia lly  that realm o f  the improbable ca lled  
the miraculous* I t  i s  a lim ita tio n  that at bottom i s  
contradictory, fo r  i t  says that knowledge and truth  are 
inductive fa c ts  ;diich u ltim ately  elim inate knowledge and 
tru th  from human l i f e ,  f o r , as Camus says, "* * * to  l iv e
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i s ,  in  i t s e l f ,  a value Judgment. ”13 Mystery also lim its  
human knowledge and truth , but in  a d iffer en t manner than 
absurdity. Absurdity l im it s  tdiat we may c a l l  knowledge 
and tru th  to  the in d u ctiv e ly  determined; mystery lim its  
man*8 capacity  to capture truth  since truth  i s  truth  
because i t  p a r tic ip a te s  in  Being, and Being i s  always 
hidden, at le a s t  in  part, fo r  Being i s  a mystery. In 
absurdity the universe i s  transparent, but truth and 
knowledge are m atters o f fa ctu a l in d ifferen ce; in  mystery 
the universe i s  opaque, and man must be s a t is f ie d  with  
only b r ie f  snapshots o f the idiole p ic tu re . Knowledge and 
truth  in  absurdity are c lea r  cut and d e f in ite , but 
strange and contradictory to man; knowledge and truth in  
mystery are d iffu se  cuad in d e f in ite , but supportive and 
va lu e-g iv in g  to man. Thus, both absurdity and mystery 
place lim ita t io n s  on knowledge and tru th , but they are 
d iffer en t kinds o f  lim ita t io n s .
Fourth, at the o n to lo g ica l le v e l ,  absurdity and 
mystery are both a lik e  and d iffe r e n t . F ir s t ,  as stated  
e a r lie r , both fin d  th e ir  source in  ambiguity. Second, 
both concepts are re la tio n a l ones. Absurdity i s  not 
something idiich i s  found in  the world or in  man, but i s  
the re la tio n sh ip  between the two. Mystery shares th is  
same s ta tu s , fo r  while i t  may not be Being that i s  a
l3A lbert Camus, The Rebel, p . 8 .
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mystery, i t  i s  Being that i s  a mystery ^  man. I t  i s  
because man p a r t ic ip a te s  in  Being that Being i s  a mystery 
to man, and that man i s  a mystery to  h im self. But th is  
point has already been made from an epistem ological 
p erspective. Third, mystery may have an o n to log ica l 
r e a lity  that absurdity la ck s: while i t  i s  true to say
that mystery i s  a re la tio n  between man and Being and man 
and h im self, an ep istem olog ica l re la tio n , mystery may 
p ossib ly  point to  an on to log ica l r e a lity , i,,e_,, a t bottom, 
because o f  the l im it  on knowledge and truth that mystery 
In^oses on man. Being may be on to lo g ica lly  m ysterious, 
or a mystery to i t s e l f .  Thus, mystery, unlike absurdity, 
may be something in  r e a l i t y ,  but man could never know 
one way or the o ther.
What can be concluded from th is  d iscussion? Only 
the modest claim  that absurdity and mystery are not 
id en tica l concepts, but n eith er are they exc lu sive ones.
Before proceeding to a discussion of comparisons, I 
shall consider two ad d ition al open-ended con trasts: the
p o s s ib il i ty  o f  a p h ysica l theory o f  hope and the hope of 
sa lva tion ,
Marcel i s  quite c lea r  on the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f a p hysi­
cal theory o f  hope: hope i s  ", , , only p o ssib le  on the
le v e l of the u s* . , , i t  does not e x is t  on the le v e l  of 
the so lita r y  ego, se lf-h ypn otized  and concentrating
133
ex c lu s iv e ly  on individual aims. • • Later in  Homo
V iator Marcel s ta te s  ca teg o r ica lly : ”. . .  the p rin cip le  
must be la id  down that any physical theory o f hope fa 
theory o f  hope based on sensation) i s  absurd and • • • 
contrad ictory. . . Camus* p o s it io n  i s  not as
unequivocal. As developed near the end o f Chapter Two, 
to vdiich I re fer  the reader, there are both passages in  
Camus idiich seem to rule out a theory o f hope based on 
sensation  and passages which suggest a p hysica l theory 
of hope. Thus, no unambiguous con trast or comparison 
between Marcel and Camus i s  p o ssib le  on th is  p o in t:  
perhaps they agree; perhaps not.
In considering the re la tion  between hope and sa lva­
t io n , Marcel and Camus come to another point o f agreement
with d iffe r en ce . Camus agrees with Marcel that ". . . a l l
hope i s  hope o f sa lvation , and i t  i s  quite im possible to
trea t o f  the one without trea tin g  o f  the o ther. Marcel
agrees w ith Camus that what i s  in se r t  ant i s  not the 
sa lvation  o f the individual but o f the community, the 
fo ca l point o f  hope and reb e llio n . As Camus puts i t .
l^G abriel Marcel, Homo V iator, p . 10.
^^Ibid. .  p . 36. Marcel i s ,  I th ink , in correct on 
th is  p o in t. A part of the th e s is  tdiich i s  to be 
developed in  Chapter Pour w ill  be a p h ysica l theory of 
hope, ^.2#* one developed on the le v e l  of sen sation .
l^G abriel Marcel, Being and Having, p . 7 $ ,
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quoting Karamazov» i f  only one i s  saved, vba.t good i s  
sa lv a tio n  (see page 96)? The cazq>arison between hope in  
Marcel and reb e llio n  in  Camus im plied in  th is  d iscu ssion  
w il l  be more f u l ly  developed in  the f in a l  section  o f  th is  
chapter. While Camus and Marcel do agree on the re la tio n  
between hope and sa lv a tio n , as sta ted  in  the preceding, 
they part ways over th is  question: For idiat kind o f
sa lv a tio n  may man hope? This d ifferen ce  i s  determined 
by th e ir  views on transcendence. For Camus the hope o f  
sa lv a tio n  l i e s  only w ithin the le v e l  o f  communion, 
on ly  w ithin  the p o s s ib i l i t i e s  and l im it s  o f human com­
munity, Marcel agrees up to a p o in t, but then proceeds 
one step further: the hope o f sa lva tion  l i e s  a lso , and
u ltim a te ly , in  the Absolute Thou, i.* £ ,, the transcendent 
realm of Being,
These thoughts on hope and sa lvation  conclude the 
second sectio n  o f th is  chapter on open-ended co n tra sts ,
I  now turn to  the many s im ila r it ie s  to be found in  the 
understandings o f Marcel and Camus,
Comparisons (S im ila r it ie s )
A natural p lace to  begin th is  section  on comparisons 
i s  with the s im ila r ity  that Marcel and Camus share on the 
nature o f man, a s im ila r ity  they share with many p h ilo so ­
phers, Man i s  not a fin ish ed  being; he i s  always in  the
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process o f  becoming. Man i s  always on the way—Homo 
V iator, as Marcel puts i t .  The c lea rest examples of th is  
common understanding by Marcel and Camus are passages 
that speak o f the sou l. Marcel w rites th at the soul i s  
the " tra v e ller ,"  the "being on the way" (see page 2i{.).
In a passage in  the Notebooks Camus w rites the followingk  
"If there i s  a sou l, i t  i s  a mistake to b e liev e  that i t  
i s  given us f u l l  created . I t  i s  created here, throughout 
a whole l i f e .  And l iv in g  i s  nothing e lse  but that long  
and p a in fu l bringing fo r th . common th e s is  in
these two statem ents i s  the on-going process o f hman 
l i f e .  While Marcel w rites o f  the actual ex isten ce  o f  the 
soul, Camus w rites o f  on ly  the p o s s ib i l i ty ;  th is  d if f e r ­
ence, however, does not negate the common acceptance o f  
becoming and process as the nature o f  man. Prom another 
perspective the development o f stages in  the thought o f 
Camus in  Chapter Two i s  a substantiation  o f th is  
s im ila r ity  with Marcel, as Germaine Bree has pointed out: 
", , ,  To speak o f stages in reference to  Camus i s  not 
a r t i f i c ia l ;  he h im self speaks o f h is  work in  th is  way . , 
, unlike Sartre, he i s  s t i l l  making h is  way through the 
chaos that confronts u s . He has not arrived ,
^^Albert Camus, Notebooks, h2-51, entry dated October 
19i|-9, p . 22h.
^^Geimaine Bree, "Camus and the Plague," Yale French 
S tu d ies, v o l. 8 (1951)» P* 93.
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The second comparison to be considered i s  the 
s im ila r ity  between absurdity and c a p t iv ity , with specia l 
emphasis on the temporal dimension o f each. The sim i­
la r i t y  between ca p tiv ity  and absurdity has already been 
p a r t ia l ly  explored in  th is  chapter. I t  i s  the fe e lin g  
of c a p tiv ity  that Christiane ^ ea k s o f in  terms o f a 
"broken world"; i t  i s  th is  same c a p tiv ity  under the name 
o f absurdity that Caligula speaks o f in  terms o f the 
"cruel . . .  process o f becoming a man." C aptivity and 
absurdity are known in  the fe e lin g s  o f  a lien n ess , 
lo n e lin e s s , m eaninglessness, lo s tn e s s , e t c .  The ca p tiv ity  
o f the absurd man i s  the ca p tiv ity  o f e x i le ;  the ca p tiv ity  
of Homo V iator i s  the absurdity o f death and despair. 
C aptiv ity  and absurdity re su lt  in  the same e f f e c t  on 
tim e. C aptiv ity  fo r  Marcel "plugs up," c lo se s  time; i t  
p oin ts to  temporal f in itu d e—to death a t the bottom of
tim e. Absurdity fo r  Camus a lso  p lugs up time: "The
19plague lea v es  no tim e." Thus, both men agree on the 
e f f e c t s  o f  c a p tiv ity  and absurdity on man*s re la tio n  to 
time, as they a lso  do on the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  struggling  
with and overcoming captive absurdity. This struggle takes 
the fo m  o f hope fo r  Marcel and re b e llio n  fo r  Camus, which 
are the same a c t , as I  sh a ll sh ortly  show.
19Albert Camus, Notebooks, entry dated November
19W , p . 88.
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Tha th ird  point o f  conç>arison involves the re la tion  
between hope and the s o li ta r y  ego. Both Camus and Marcel 
agree that on the le v e l  o f the so lita r y  ego no hope i s  
p o ss ib le . This i s  one o f the isqplications o f  M arcel's 
re jectio n  o f a theory o f hope based on sensation . He 
w rites that hope i s  "only p o ssib le  on the le v e l of the 
u s" (see page 2 8 ) . This i s  to  say that no hope i s  pos­
s ib le  at the le v e l  of the so lita r y  ego, l^ .e., or the 
le v e l  of sen sation . The evidence for Camus* rejectio n  o f  
hope on the le v e l  of the so lita r y  ego is  le s s  d ir e c t , and 
i t  i s  a lso  dependent upon h is  rejection  o f a physica l 
theory o f hope, idiich i s  an open question. However, 
granted th is  re jec tio n , an analysis o f  the s itu a tio n  of 
Sisyphus p o in ts out the im p o ssib ility  of hope on the 
ind iv idual l e v e l .  Of a l l  the exp erien tia l elements in  
the p lig h t o f Sisyphus i t  i s  the element of aloneness that 
i s  most d estru ctive o f the p o s s ib i l i ty  for  hope. Sisyphus 
i s  c lea r ly  and tr a g ic a lly  a lone. He has no one to draw 
upon for  strength and comfort. This i s  why there i s  no 
hope p o ssib le  fo r  him. As the Second Chapter p o in ts  out, 
Camus only begins to speak o f hope in  the re la tion  between 
Rieux and Tarrou. This l a s t  statement h in ts  at another 
comparison between Marcel and Camus: both agree that hope
f i r s t  appears on the le v e l  o f  communion, granted that 
Camus r e je c ts  a p hysica l theory of hope. I sh a ll e:q>lore
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th is  cou^arlsoQ sh o r tly .
A fourth p o in t o f comparison i s  to be found in  the 
consideration o f  hope as an act o f defiance against the 
power o f c a p t iv ity  or absurdity. For n either philosopher 
i s  hope as an act o f  defiance a boasting, proud a c t , but 
rather a quiet personal way in  idiich one stru gg les with 
absurdity. In an essay  t i t l e d  "The Wager o f Our Genera­
tio n ,"  Gamus w rites  o f hope as a defiance o f "maximum 
danger": " . . .  the maximum danger im plied the maximum
hope" (see page 9 8 ) . That danger for Camus would, I 
think, be n ih ilism , what Marcel c a l ls  despair in  these  
words:
I t  remains true . . .  that the correla tion  
o f hope and d e ^ a ir  su b s ists  u n t il  the end. . . . 
td iile the structure o f the world we l iv e  in  per­
m its—and may even seem to counsel—absolute der 
sp a ir , y e t  i t  i s  only such a world that can g ive  
r ise  to an unconquerable hope.20
A comparison o f  these two p o sit io n s  revea ls  an additional
agreement: c a p t iv ity  ("absolute despair"), or absurdity
("maximum danger"), i s  a necessary condition for the
advent o f hope, idaich lead s to  a f i f t h  comparison.
F if th , hope, fo r  both Marcel and Gamus, i s  more than
a struggling  defiance o f absurdity ( c a p t iv ity ) ;—i t  has
the power to conquer, to overcome ca p tiv ity  (ab su rd ity ).
20Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy o f  E x isten tia lism ,
p . 28. ----------------------------------------------------
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This power o f hope i s  evidenced in  Marcel by i t s  opening 
o f  time, by i t s  can cellin g  o f the inductive reduction o f  
p o s s ib i l i t y  to a c tu a lity , by i t s  free in g  o f the personal­
i t y  from the categories o f the p a st, and by i t s  working 
r e la t io n  to  lo v e . As Marcel says: to love  someone i s
"above a l l  to have hope in  them" (see page 33)* For 
Camus the power o f hope i s  evidenced vtien  he w rites that 
hope ended the plague: ", • • once the fa in te s t  s t ir r in g
o f  hope became p o ss ib le , the domain o f the plague was 
e n d e d , H o p e  can end the plague: that i s  evident fo r
both philosophers, A further a n a ly sis  o f  the preceding 
passages brings in to  focus another agreement regarding 
the nature o f hope.
S ix th , both Marcel and Camus are aware o f a common 
d is to r t io n  that might be ca lled  an "escapist hope,"
Hope can be, and has been regarded as, a passive means 
o f  escape from a cco u n ta b ility . This understanding i s  
often  echoed in  the words: "Well, a l l  we can do i s  s i t
back and hope," But such i s  not the case, for hope i s  an 
a c t iv ity ;  as Marcel w rites: "Between a ctiv e  waiting and
Hope there i s ,  i f  not id e n t ity , at le a s t  the c lo se s t
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proxim ity," For Marcel, hope i s  not an iso la te d  f e e l in g
^^Albert Camus, The Plague, p . 235.
^% abriel Marcel, "Desire and Hope," Readings in  
E x is te n t ia l Phenomenology, p , 281,
Iko
but an a c tiv e  engagement in  the community of man, as
Camus a lso  in d ica tes  in these words from The Rebel ;
"Real gen erosity  toward the future l i e s  in  g iv in g  a l l  to
the p r e s e n t . "23 This sense o f hope as an active waiting
was expressed by Camus in  July, 1943, in  a l e t t e r  to a
German fr ien d  ràien he spoke o f the need for a "desperate
patience" and a " v ig ilan t re v o lt ,"  for  France to  recover
from the war. This patience and th is  revo lt became for
Camus a source of hope (see  page 104)• Active w aiting,
desperate p a tien ce , v ig ila n t  r e v o lt , engagement, and
action  are not m atters o f  the human mind or human heart,
but the w i l l ,  a fa c t  vdiich brings us to  another comparison.
Seventh, i t  i s  the w i l l  o f man that i s  stubborn,
d efia n t, and the human capacity behind a c t iv ity . I t  i s
the w ill  that may refuse to g ive in  to absurdity or s e l l
out to ca p tiv ity ;  and thus, fo r  both Marcel and Camus,
there i s  the c lo s e s t  o f connections between hope and the
human w i l l .  In a rare passage in  The Philosophy of
E x isten tia lism —rare because i t  i s  one of only three
passages in  a l l  h is  work that o f fe r s  a d e fin itio n  o f hope—
Marcel r e la te s  hope and the w i l l :
. . .  the idea o f in e r t  hope seems to me a contra­
d ic tio n  in  tern s . Hope i s  not a kind l i s t l e s s  
w aiting; i t  underpins action  or i t  runs before i t .
^^Albert Camus, The Rebel, p . 304.
lip.
• • • Hence i t  has a f f in i t ie s  • • • w ith the w i l l .  
The w il l  implants the same refu sa l to ca lcu la te  
p o s s ib i l i t i e s .  . . . Gould not hope therefore be 
defined as the w i l l  ^Aien i t  i s  made to  bear on 
vh&t does not depend on i t s e l f , 2%
In The Plague Camus recognizes the same re la tio n  between
hope and the w i l l  vdien Rieux as the narrator speaks o f an
"old, gray hope" which i s  nothing more than the "dogged
w il l  to liv e "  (see page 6^1. From these two se lec tio n s
the agreement should be c lea r , but they a lso  in d ica te  a
d ifferen ce . For Marcel hope i s  the w ill  vdien turned upon
that which does not depend on i t ,  ^ , e , ,  on the resources
o f  Being; fo r  Gamus hope i s  the w ill  idien i t  i s  turned
in  upon i t s e l f  in  the "dogged w ill  to  l iv e ,"  or turned
upon the human community. This he in d ica tes  in  "The
Wages o f Our Generation" -vdien he w rites o f "a so lid a r ity
with the common man" and the "stubborn hope" which grows
cut o f th is  so lid a r ity  (see pages 6i;-65). That "stubborn
hope" i s  the human w il l  made to bear upon the s itu a tio n
of the human community, which brings th is  chapter to i t s
f in a l conç)arison.
Eighth, hope as a defiance, as active  w aiting, and
as a capacity o f the w i l l  i s ,  fo r  both Marcel and Gamus,
an authentic a c t iv ity  o f the human community. In other
words, what undergirds and strengthens hope i s  the love
^ ^ a b r ie l Marcel, The Philosophy o f E x isten tia lism ,
p . 33.
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that i s  always Integrated w ith i t .  One cannot separate 
love of one*8 brothers from hope in  one's brothers, as 
Marcel in d ica tes  in the numerous passages idiere he 
re la te s  hope and love (see Appendix A), Gamus makes a 
comparable p o in t when he w rites of love as a b asis and 
support for reb e llio n  (see pages 96-97). For Marcel, to 
love one's brothers i s  to  have hope in  and with them; 
for  Camus, to love on e's brothers i s  to rebel fo r  and with 
them* This comparison i s  a f i r s t  step in  reaching the 
conclusion toward which th is  chapter has been moving: 
that hope and reb e llio n  are one and the same a ct, ^ .£* , 
that to hope i s  to rebel and that to  rebel i s  to hope.
In other words, hope i s  a reb e llio n  against ca p tiv ity ;  
hope i s  a reb e llio n  against absurdity* Hope as a rebel­
lio n  i s  an act on the le v e l  of communion fo r  both Marcel 
and Gamus, The c lea rest  con^arison o f th is  common under­
standing i s  to  be found in M arcel's Homo Viator and Gamus' 
The Rebel, in the follow ing words: "I hope in thee for
us" (see page 29); and "I reb e l—therefore we ex ist"  (see 
page 9 6 ), The conclusion o f th is  chapter—based on 
Chapter one. Chapter two, and the preceding contrasts sind 
comparisons o f  th is  chapter—i s  that these two statements 
mean the same th ing, Marcel could ju st as w ell have 
w ritten: "I hope—therefore we e x is t* " Camus could just
as w ell have w ritten  "I rebel in  thee for us,"  with "thee"
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meaning the human community. In other words, hope, fo r  
both Marcel and Gamus, i s  a reb e llio n  against ab surdity . 
On the le v e l  o f communion—remembering that Gamus* Rebel 
does not have the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a transcendent r e la t io n  
other than p o ssib ly  to  the human community--Marcel*s Homo 
Viator (Hoper) i s  the same man as Gamus* Rebel. Hie 
r e s tr ic t io n  in  dashes i s  important: the Rebel does not
have the same transcendent grounding as Homo V iator.
But the r e s tr ic t io n  does not damage the conclusion:
Gamus* Rebel and Marcel*s Homo Viator are the same man 
on the le v e l  o f communion. In other words: Hope Is  a
R ebellion Against Absurdity.
These r e f le c t io n s  conclude th is  chapter on con trasts  
and comparisons. The fourth and f in a l chapter w i l l  o f fe r  
a c r i t ic a l  eva lu ation , apart from comparison or co n tra st, 
of the p o s it io n s  on hope of Marcel and Gamus. The major 
to o l fo r  th is  c r i t i c a l  evaluation  w il l  be a development 
of my own th e s is  on the nature of hope—a th e s is  idiich 
suggests the fo llow in g  chapter t i t l e :  "The Intimacy o f
Hope•"
CHAPTER POUR; THE INTIMACY OF 
HOPE
The purpose o f th is  concluding chapter as indicated  
in  the Introduction i s  twofold: f i r s t ,  a development o f
my own th e s is  on the nature o f hope i s  to  be given  within  
certain  lim ita tio n s ;  and second, a c r i t i c a l  commentary on 
both Camus and Marcel i s  to be o ffered  mainly through 
development o f  the former purpose. The lim ita tio n s  just 
mentioned w il l  be explained in  the fo llow in g summary of 
my agreements and disagreements with Camus and Marcel* 
Marcel spoke o f three le v e ls  o f p a r tic ip a tio n  in  
Being: sen sation , communion, and transcendence. F ir s t ,
as discussed in  the e a r lie r  chapters, Marcel denied any 
theory of hope on the le v e l  of sen sation , and Camus 
evidenced enough p o ss ib le  ambiguity on a p h ysica l theory 
of hope to make any comparative judgement problem atical.
I sh a ll argue fo r  a doctrine of hope on the le v e l  o f sen­
sation  and fo r  the n ecess ity  of such a doctrine for  the 
appearance of any hope on the le v e l  o f communion. Such 
a doctrine w il l  then be a cr it ic ism  of Marcel and 
p o ssib ly  a c r it ic ism  o f  Camus. In respect to Marcel i t  
w ill  a lso  be a c r i t i c a l  comment on an in con sisten cy  in 
h is  re jectio n  o f a physica l doctrine o f hope and h is  th e s is  
that sensation  i s  a mystery, not a problem.
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Second; both Marcel and Camus agree on the creative  
p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  hope on the le v e l  o f  communion and par­
t i a l l y  agree on the nature of hope at th is  le v e l .  My 
th e s is  w i l l  be b a s ic a lly  in  agreement with the common 
p oin ts o f both men but w il l  at times more c lo se ly  approach 
one or the other, I do not find  much to  argue with in  
e ith er  philosopher on th is  le v e l ,  but my th e s is  on hope 
at the le v e l  o f  communion w ill  emphasize a new perspec­
t iv e —the p lace that pain p lays in  the development o f  
communal hope—and o ffe r  two elements that neither Marcel 
nor Camus d iscu sses: the maturation o f  hope in human
growth and the cu ltu ra l factors in  hoping. In addition , 
my view on the re la tio n  between the w i l l  and hope w il l  
be a syn th esis o f  Marcel and Camus.
Third, the real heart of the d ifferen ce  between 
Camus and Marcel i s  th e ir  disagreement on transcendence. 
Other than to make a few comments on th is  disagreement 
that might be characterized as pragm atic, I  sh a ll omit 
the question o f transcendence from t h is  chapter, a fte r  
having j u s t i f ie d  such omission in r e la t io n  to Chapter 
Three.
This chapter w il l  then conclude in  a statement with  
idiich, most probably, both Marcel and Camus would agree, 
but one which n either has e x p lic it ly  developed in  h is  own 
understanding o f hope: intimacy i s  a d e f in it iv e
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ch a ra c ter is tic  o f hope, and hope i s  a d e f in it iv e  character­
i s t i c  o f intim acy. In other words, without intim acy there 
i s  no hope, and without hope there i s  no intim acy.
A Physical Theory o f Hope
Both Marcel and Camus are sen s itiv e  to  that human 
phenomenon Wilch i s  in d ica tiv e  o f some connection between 
hope and sensation: su ic id e . Marcel considers th is
phenomenon and concludes two th ings: that the absence of
hope i s  the p r ior  condition  for su icide ( ^ .£ . , a necessary  
but not su ff ic ie n t  con d ition ), and that such a negating  
re la tion  i s  evidence for  re jectin g  hope on the le v e l  o f  
sensation . He i s ,  according to the th e s is  to be developed, 
correct in  regard to  the former and in correct in  regard 
to the la t t e r .  Camus considers the same r e la t io n  and 
concludes two th ings: that i t  i s  the absence of hope
that makes su icide a seriou s e x is te n t ia l  problem (esp e­
c ia l ly  fo r  S isyphus), and that lack  o f  hope i s  no 
ju s t if ic a t io n  for su ic id e . Camus i s ,  I th in k , correct on 
both p o in ts, but f a i l s  to  e x p lic it ly  see th a t both lead  
in the d irectio n  o f  a p hysical doctrine o f hope.^
^As noted in  the second chapter, the two p la ces idiere 
Camus comes c lo s e s t  to  a physical doctrine o f hope are: 
Marie's v i s i t  to  Meursault at the v is i t in g  room in  the j a i l ,  
and Rieux's comments on hope and the w il l  to l i v e ,  near 
the end o f the p lague.
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I concur that there i s  some re la tio n  between su ic id e  
and hope, the lack  o f hope. This i s  to  say that
the absence o f  hope—idiat we might c a l l  hopelessness  
(or, idxat Marcel c a l ls  d esp a ir )--may be f in a liz e d  in  the 
destru ction  o f sensation , ^.e^., su ic id e . As evidence fo r  
th is  re la ted  f in a l i t y ,  consider the fo llow ing poem 
w ritten  Just before the su icid e o f a six teen -year-o ld  
g ir l :
I wandered the s t r e e t s ,
I was lon ely ; I was co ld .
Weird music f i l l e d  the a ir .
I t  grew louder and louder  
There was no other sound—
Only weird, te r r ib le  music.
I began to run as though I were being chased: 
Too te r r if ie d  to look back,
I  ran on in to  the darkness,
A l ig h t  was shining very b r ig h tly , fa r  away.
I must g et to i t .
When I reached the l ig h t ,
I saw m yself.
I was ly in g  on the ground 
Hy skin was very xdiite 
I was dead,'^
One could characterize the s itu a tio n —p h y sica l, psycho­
lo g ic a l ,  and environmental—which confronted th is  g ir l  
in  any number of ways: c a p tiv ity , absurdity, hopelessness,
e t c .  The nomenclature i s  in s ig n if ic a n t . What i s  s i g n i f i ­
cant i s  the re la tio n  between such a condition and the
^Karl Menninger, The V it a l  B a la n ce , p. 267.
resu ltin g  d estru ction  o f sensation , and to  leave open 
the judgment as to  whether such a re la tio n  ru les out a 
physica l doctrine o f  hope. I t  would seem reasonable to  
conclude that I f  the s itu a tio n  o f  hopelessness i s  a 
necessary cond ition  for su ic id e , then there must be some 
re la tio n  between hope and the continuance of p hysica l 
l i f e .  Karl Menninger, who p ersonally  knew the s ix tee n - 
year-old  ju st  mentioned, has a lso  noticed  the same con­
nection and put i t  in  these words: that in hope we see
". . ,  another aspect o f  the l i f e  in s t in c t ,  the creative  
drive which wars aga in st d isso lu tio n  and d estru ctive­
ness.*'^ Camus comes c lo se  to th is  view when he r e la te s  
hope to the "dogged w il l  to  liv e "  and a "new zest for  
l i f e ."  But he stops short by concurring with Marcel in  
re la tin g  hope to  the w i l l  alone, although such a con­
clusion  In regard to  Camus may be inaccurate, fo r  any 
atten^t to d is t in g u ish  between a "dogged w ill to  liv e "  
and a " life  in s t in c t"  could be most problem atic. There­
fo re , I w il l  sh o rtly  argue with more d irect evidence than 
su icide that hope i s  re la ted  to both in s t in c t  and w i l l ,  
and that I t  i s  mistaken to  separate In stinct and w i l l  at 
the le v e l  o f  sen sa tion .
3lb ld .. p. 385.
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Suicide as evidence fo r  a p hysica l doctrine o f hope 
i s ,  at b est , on ly an in d ir ec t  evidence* The d irect  
evidence l i e s  in  tinderstanding the meaning and function  
of pain . However, before turning to such a d irect  
development, I sh a ll consider two examples re la tin g  lack  
o f hope to su ic id e  on the le v e l o f  sensation , 
hopelessness to  the can cellin g  o f  the l i f e - i n s t i n c t .  This 
la s t  statement does ra ise  a problem; idiat ju s t if ic a t io n  
can be o ffered  fo r  speaking of in s t in c t  on the le v e l  of 
sensation? The ju s t if ic a t io n  i s  a r e la t iv e  one, i * e , ,  
r e la tiv e  to  th is  d is se r ta tio n . I f  one i s  to speak of 
three le v e ls  o f ex isten ce  (sensation , communion, and 
transcendence), then by elim ination  in s t in c t  i s  a sensual 
phenomenon. This i s  a lso  to say that the ju s t if ic a t io n ,  
at th is  p o in t, i s  a metaphysical one. At a la t e r  point I 
w ill o f fe r  a pragmatic j u s t i f ic a t io n .
The fo llow in g  d iscu ssion  p o in ts to one conclusion: 
that hope i s  an aspect o f  a l i f e - i n s t i n c t ,  i^ .e,, that hope 
does function  on the le v e l  of sen sation . Consider, fo r  
in stance, the number o f voodoo deaths, in  which no appar­
ent cause of death can be found. This suggests that 
hopelessness in  man cancels out the l i f e - i n s t i n c t .  This 
i s  not to  deny that many other e x is te n t ia l  phenomena may 
overcome the l i f e - i n s t i n c t .  Many philosophers and 
p sych o log ists consider m eaninglessness the central feature
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in su ic id a . But maaninglessness i s  not the problem in  
the voodoo deaths mentioned above, nor I  think in  a l l  
cases o f su ic id e  by terminal p a t ie n ts . Rather, h opeless­
ness i s  what i s  central to su ic id e . In other words: 
h opelessness i s  a necessary part o f  any experience o f  
m eaninglessness idiioh leads to su ic id e , but the reverse 
i s  not tru e . One might f e e l  that h is  l i f e  i s  meaningless, 
but s t i l l  hope that somehow i t  may be overcome. This 
hope, however sm all, w i l l ,  I th ink , negate the need for  
ending i t  a l l .  Any coroner i s  fam iliar  with such cases, 
as R ichter in d ica tes: ". . . Dr. R. S. F ish er , coroner
of . . . Baltim ore, to ld  me that every year men die a fter  
su ic id a l attempts when the skin has scarcely  been 
scratched or only a few aspirin  ta b le ts  have been 
ingested ."^  These cases lead , I think, to  the same point: 
hope i s  an aspect o f the l i f e - in s t in c t .  However, since  
such a statement i s  an in terp reta tion , and, thus, only 
an in d irec t ju s t if ic a t io n , I now turn to  the most s ig n i f i ­
cant and d ire c t evidence for hope on the le v e l  o f  
sensation: Fain.
Before developing an argument r e la tin g  pain and hope, 
I sh a ll c la r ify  two p o in ts: the nature o f pain and the
re la tio n  between physica l and mental p a in . In an a r t ic le
^Ibid., p. 311.
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in  The American Handbook o f  Psychiatry Thomas Szasz 
summarizes the nature o f pain in  these words: "Pain i s
a sensation . By th is  i s  meant that there i s  a r e la t iv e ly  
constant and pred ictab le re la tion sh ip  between sensory 
input, or stim ulus, and the resu ltan t pain sensation  
which i t  i s  thought to invoke. The structures to  which 
pain p o in ts as a referent i s  the body as a physio-chem ical 
machine."^
"Pain i s  a sensation" vdiose "referent i s  the body as 
a physio-chemical machine." Such seems to be the 
standard way o f understanding the nature o f pain . I t  i s ,  
as I hope to  show, mistaken. I t  may be true that pain  
i s  a sensation; but, i f  so , i t  i s  a lso  much more. In 
other words, that pain and the body are re la ted  i s  
unquestionable. But, ju st ^diat that r e la tio n  i s ,  i s  very 
hard to  say! To sta te  that the re la tion  i s  a sensual one 
i s ,  f i r s t ,  s im p lls t ic a lly  mistaken; and, second, u ltim a te ly  
rests  upon e ith er  d u a lis t ic  assumption or a reductive  
monism (i,.e^., m ateria lism ).
There seems to  me to be an ambiguity that i s  in tr in ­
s ic  to idiat we c a l l  pain that refu tes any attempt to  l im it  
i t  to a sensual nature. Pain in  not merely a sen sation , 
i t  i s  an ejcperience ( ^ .e . ,  an e x is te n t ia l one): thus.
^Thomas Szasz, "Language and Pain," The Am erica  
Handbook o f  Psychiatry, vo l I ,e d . by S. A r le t i ,  p .
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the in tr in s ic  ambiguity. Put another way, the e x is ­
te n t ia l  ambiguity o f pain-experience i s  the re su lt  o f the 
fa ilu r e  to ever bracket i t  (using H u sserl's  tem in o lo g y )• 
Or, in  M arcel's tenus, pain i s  a phenomenon that p a r t ic i­
pates in  Being. Perhaps in  th is  sense fo r  Marcel pain  
i s  "a m ystery ." This i s  to say th at pain i s ,  in  part, 
a sen sation , but more. A b e tte r  way to see th is  i s  to  
return to the re la tio n  between pain and body: i t  can be 
said  that the re la tio n  i s  a necessary one but not su f­
f i c i e n t ,  and i t  i s  lack o f su ff ic ie n c y  that lead s to the 
ambiguity. That sensation i s  necessary for the pain- 
experience i s  cer ta in , but i t s  su ff ic ie n c y  i s  questionable 
as the problem o f  pain-b lindness, or pain in a m issing  
limb, shows (I  w il l  take up these two phenomena in  a la te r  
con text) .
Szasz seems to be p a r t ia lly  aware o f th is  ambiguity
when he w rites:
Pain i s  an a f fe c t .  By th is  i t  i s  meant that the 
personal, including the s o c ia l ,  ch a ra c ter is tic s  
o f  the ind ividual experiencing pain are regarded 
as the most important . . .  d ata . For example, 
even in  the case df p h ysica l pain  . . . the 
experiencing ego's or ien ta tio n  to the body i s  the 
conceptual framework fo r  the understanding of pain. 
The ob ject to which pain p o in ts  i s  the body as a, 
p sych olog ica l object . . . personal o b je c t ,. . . °
^Ibid.. p . 986.
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The crucia l statem ents fo r  observing th is  ambiguity 
are: "The structures to which pain p o in ts as a referent
i s  the body as a physio-chem ical machine" and "The object 
to which pain p o in ts i s  the body as a psychological 
o b jec t, . . The "structures" are necessary for the 
pain-eaperience, but the s ig n if ic a n t  question i s :  Are
they su ff ic ien t?  I think not, fo r  to s ta te  that they  
are assumes a dualism, or monism, to which I shall shortly  
turn. Consider, for example, a two- or three -year-old  
ch ild  who has cut h is  f in g e r . That the neurological 
structures are necessary fo r  the pain-experience i s  c lea r . 
But are these stru ctures s u ff ic ie n t  fo r  examining the  
nature o f the pain-experience? D efin ite ly  not! I t  i s  
more than a n eurologica l experience for the child; i t  i s  
an e x is te n t ia l one. The c h ild ’s psychologica l and 
cu ltu ra l frame o f reference c lea r ly  en ters in to  the 
t o t a l i t y  of the experience, even to the point of determin­
in g , in part, the in te n s ity  o f  the pain (o ften  considered  
only a neurological problem concerning the p a in -thresh old ). 
Put in  other words: e x is te n t ia l  anxiety i s  as in tegral
to the experience as neurologica l stru ctu re . Consider an 
adult with the same cu t, and b a s ic a lly  the same neuro­
lo g ic a l structures, but w ith a markedly d ifferen t  
psychological and cu ltu ra l frame o f reference: h is  pain-
experience i s  of a much d iffe r e n t  quantity ( in te n s ity )
155
and q u a lity  (a n x ie ty ).
Such considerations are, I  think, su ff ic ie n t  evidence 
fo r  refu sin g  to  accept pain as a merely neurological 
phenomenon. They are a lso  s u f f ic ie n t  fo r  treatin g  pain  
as an e x is t e n t ia l  experience and accepting the inherent 
ambiguity that fo llow s.
The p o s it io n  I have taken i s  sim ilar  to that o f  
P. J. J . Buytendijk in the two fo llow in g quotations:
The nature o f pain contains i t s  s ig n ifica n ce . 
'V ita lly*  speaking, i t  i s  without sense, nor has i t  
any bearing on psychic fu n ctio n s. I t s  purpose i s  
f u l f i l l e d  in  the a ttitu d e which the man who i s  
a f f l ic t e d  by i t  adopts to h is  own bodily ex isten ce , 
to h im self and the ground o f  h is  being in  the world. 
Fain i s  the touchstone o f idiat i s  actual and 
deepest in  man. This i s  . . . the person, l iv in g  
through h is  in ten tion a l a c ts  and becoming v is ib le  
to h im self in  them. 7
My view can be simply put: I consider pain a
phenomenon in tim ately  connected with the r e a lity  
of human nature. A deeper in s ig h t in to  th is  r e a lity  
teaches us that i t  i s  characterized  by an ambiguous 
re la tio n sh ip  between the subject and h is  body. This 
i s  'r a tio n a lly ' incom prehensible. We are in a 
certa in  way our body and we have a body. As Gabriel 
Marcel has sa id , we cannot id e n tify  our se lf-b e in g  
com pletely with our body and we cannot completely 
d istin g u ish  our ' s e l f  from our body. I b e liev e  
th is  French philosopher has spoken tru ly  that:
'The s i t e  o f pain appears to be the zone where having 
emerges in to  being.'B
^P. J . J . Buytendijk, Pain, I t s  Modes and Functions, 
p. 132.
Gib id . ,  p . 171.
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For Marcel, lAat lead s to  h is  thoughts on the ambiguity 
of the pain-experience i s  h is p o sitio n  that sensation  
p a rtic ip a tes  in  mystery, ^.e_., sensation cannot be 
reduced to  a neurological problem. Buytendijk's p o s it io n ,  
without introducing the category o f  mystery, seems very 
c lose  to that o f  Marcel. That I  agree in re jec tin g  the 
neurological reduction should be c lea r . The agreement, 
however, concerns only that conclusion in  regard to  
Marcel, for  he f a i l s  to fo llo w  the lo g ic  o f h is  p o s it io n .
Marcel's view that sensation  i s  a mystery, coupled 
with h is  statement that the union of mind and body i s  a 
mystery ( i t  i s  a mystery for  many reasons, one o f  tdiich 
i s  the union o f substances so d iffe r e n t) , evidences an 
inconsistency . The in con sisten cy  can be summarized as 
fo llow s: Sensation i s  a way o f p a rtic ip a tin g  in  Being,
and th is  accounts fo r  i t s  q uality  of mystery. The same 
statement can be made regarding hope and the mind-body 
union. I t  would seem, then, that to maintain a l l  three of 
these p o s it io n s , Marcel could not argue against a doctrine  
of hope on the le v e l  o f  sensation  without being in c o n s is ­
ten t. In other words, to  argue against a p h ysica l 
doctrine o f hope Marcel would have to g ive up e ith e r  the 
mystery o f the mind-body union (i.* e ., he could maintain  
both by Cartesian dualism) or the mystery o f sensation  
(i^ .e ., he could maintain i t  in  one of two ways: argue for
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sensation as mystery and fo r  a p hysica l doctrine o f hope 
or argue against both). Marcel cannot maintain these 
contrad ictions: mystery o f  mind-body union and denial o f
bodily hope; mystery of sensation and mystery o f hope 
and denial o f  hope on the le v e l  o f sensation; or, mystery 
of hope and mystery of mind-body union and denial of 
bodily hope. Thus, Marcel can argue against a physical 
doctrine of hope only by denying the nature of sensation  
as mystery or assuming a Cartesian dualism between mind 
and body. Another way to  sta te  th is  argument i s :  the
presence o f mystery i s  a m etaphysically su ff ic ie n t  condi­
tion  fo r  the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  hope. Marcel f a i l s  to  see 
the nature o f  th is  su ff ic ie n c y  at the le v e l of sensation  
and th is  r e su lts  in h is  in con sisten cy . He cannot maintain 
mystery in sensation  and a lso  deny a doctrine of hope on 
that l e v e l .9
Stated in  terns of my own p o s it io n , the argument i s  
as fo llow s: To hold that pain i s  an e x is te n t ia l exp eri­
ence ( i..£ . » that i t  i s  irred u cib le  to  a neurological
^At th is  point an observation from Chapter One should 
be offered  which poses a problem for the argument o f su f­
f ic ie n c y . Mystery i s ,  fo r  Marcel, a lso  a necessary condi­
t io n . But ca p tiv ity  i s  as w ell a necessary condition . I f  
t^ere are two necessary conditions the problem i s :  how
can one of them be su ff ic ie n t?  An answer to th is  puzzle  
l i e s ,  I  think, in  recognizing that i t  i s  the awareness of 
mystery and ca p tiv ity  that are necessary conditions, i . e . ,  
they are ep istem olog lca lly  necessary. But, from a meta­
physical (on to log ica l) perspective mystery alone i s  su f­
f ic ie n t .
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problem) I s  to  deny an actual d iv is io n  between mental 
pain and p h y sica l p a in . Or, the pain-experience i s  a 
u n ified  experience in  *^ich the physical and the mental 
merge beyond anything other than a v ir tu a l d is t in c t io n .10 
However, to  be honest, th is  p o sitio n  r e s ts  upon a 
questionable assumption to which I now turn: the re je c ­
tion  o f  any mind-body dualism.
F ir s t ,  any so -c a lle d  so lu tion  to  the mind-body 
rela tion  i s  u su a lly  a d isgu ised  inference at b est and a 
disgu ised  assumption a t worst. Recognition of th is  w ill  
a ffe c t  the nature o f c r ite r ia  for  judging any p o s it io n  
on the r e la t io n .
Second, i t  seems to me that only i f  one accepts the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  "absolute bracketing" to the extent o f the 
mental com pletely e ffa c in g  the physical can any dualism  
be m aintained. In agreement with both Camus and Marcel 
concerning the ambiguity o f the human s itu a tio n  (idiich 
includes the mind-body r e la t io n ) , I re je c t any such 
bracketing.
Third, I consider the work o f G ilbert Ryle (and 
others fo llow in g  h is  lead) as prima fa c ie  evidence fo r  
questioning any dualism. As prima fa c ie  evidence i t  i s
^%y v ir tu a l I mean a d is t in c tio n  whose b a sis  l i e s  
in  the operation o f the in t e l le c t  rather than in  
r e a lity .  By actual I mean a d is t in c tio n  whose b asis  
l i e s  in r e a l i ty  independent o f the in t e l l e c t .
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not s u ff ic ie n t  for  re je c t in g , but for questioning both 
the accuracy and adequacy o f a d u a lis t ic  view.
Fourth, that experience we c a l l  pain seems to be the 
most d irec t evidence th at the mental and the physical 
cannot in  a c tu a lity  be separated (I  refer  back to the 
discussion  o f in fan t p a in ) . However, with deference to  
lo g ic , there i s  a certa in  c ir c u la r ity  in  th is  fourth  
argument. I t  i s  a c ir c u la r ity  which i s ,  I think, 
in ev ita b le  in  any p o s it io n  taken on the mind-body r e la ­
tion . This i s  to say th a t, to e s ta b lish  a d u a lis t ic  
conclusion, one must begin w ith an implied dualism in  the 
conceptual framework o f  the prem isses. The same would 
apply to  any u n ified  p o s it io n . I t  i s  for th is  reason and 
for that in  the second point that I would p refer to c a ll  
any p o s it io n  on the mind-body re la tio n  an " in feren tia l 
assunqption, " i . .£ . ,  an assunç)tion with some evidence but no 
absolute certitu d e—a r e su lt  o f  the fa ilu re  o f bracketing.
F if th , i f  one s ta r ts  w ith the " in feren tia l assump­
tion" that the u n ity  o f  the mind-body re la tio n  precludes 
any actu a l, though not v ir tu a l, dualism, then many o f the 
p hilosophical problems o f dualism can be avoided, This 
i s  not to  say that no problems occur, but the most 
problematic one disappears: lii dualism, how can
substances so d iffe r e n t  have any causal relation?
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To conclude: I  sh a ll from th is  point continue on
the as3unç)tion o f  a mind-body unity; I sh a ll further  
develop the s ig n if ica n ce  o f pain as an e x is te n t ia l  exp eri­
ence removing the tra d itio n a l b ifu r ica tio n  between 
physica l and mental pain on the le v e l  o f  a c tu a lity , but 
holding on to the value o f  a v ir tu a l d is t in c tio n ;  and I 
sh a ll add ad d ition al evidence fo r  p o s it in g  the p o s s ib i l i ty  
for a doctrine o f hope at the le v e l  o f sensation , 
re a liz in g  that to  speak o f  a separate le v e l  o f  sensation  
i s  p o ss ib le  only on the b a s is  o f a v ir tu a l d is t in c t io n .
The b est d ir e c t  evidence for  hope on the le v e l  o f  
sensation i s  to be found in  the re la tio n  between pain and 
survival: su rv iva l i s  dependent on pain . This i s  to say
that both pain and hope are functions o f the l i f e  
in s t in c t .  Buytendijk summarizes the in^ortance o f such 
functions idien he w r ites: "The importance o f  any human
function  l i e s  in  i t s  a b i l i t y  to  f u l f i l l  the aim of the 
organism: namely to  b ^  to r e s is t  d estru ctive  change from
within and w i t h o u t , T o  i l lu s t r a te  th is  requires l i t t l e  
more than reference to  pain-b lind  people, !.•«.•» people vdio 
have no receptors or fa u lty  ones fo r  pain stim u li ; thus, 
they f e e l  no p ain . Related to su rv iva l, the primary 
function o f pain i s  the warning of danger ahead, as Szasz
l i p .  J. J . Buytendijk, 0£ . c i t . .  p . H}.8,
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p o in ts out: ”. . .  F ir s t ,  pain in d ica tes  the danger o f
the disruption o f the continuity o f  the body and the 
danger o f lo sin g  a part of the body. . . . Secondly pain  
i s  a reaction  to  and a warning against the danger of 
excessive  stim u la tio n .”^  ^ Any person with a neurological 
fa u lt  blocking the bod ily  awareness o f  pain i s  in  grave 
danger, such that there are recorded in stan ces o f death 
resu ltin g  from third-degree sunburn. I t  i s  thus that 
pain functions as an aspect o f the l i f e  in s t in c t  and as 
a source fo r  hope on the le v e l of sensation .
Another way to  understand pain as a source of 
p h ysica l hope l i e s  in  considering the dynamics o f p e r s is ­
ten t p a in . There are two considerations: F ir s t ,
p e r s is te n t  pain may function as hope, or , in  Szasz‘s 
words, as reassurance:
. . .  the general meaning of p e r s is te n t  pain seems 
to be thàt o f a reassurance that the body part in  
question s t i l l  h urts, and i s ,  th erefore , s t i l l  
presen t. The pain i s  on a more unconscious le v e l ,  
a denial o f , and a reassurance aga in st, the danger 
o f bodily lo s s .  . . .
. . .  i f  we are anxious, th is  a ffe c t  not only  
means that we are afraid  o f  something, but a lso  
t e l l s  us that we are prepared and v ig ila n t , and 
therefore, unafra id .13
The pain  that an amputee fa e ls  in the m issing member i s
the hope that i t  i s  s t i l l  there, i , .£ . ,  the a c t iv ity  o f  the
l^Szasz, Handbook o f  Psychiatry, v o l. 1 , p . 986. 
l ^Ibid. , pp. 992-93.
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l i f e  in s t in c t  struggling with the destructive e f fe c t  of 
despair over the m issing member. Second, p er s is ten t pain 
may not only function  as a source o f hope (reassurance), 
but may, when near or at the threshold of t# lerance, 
function to overcome the l i f e  in s t in c t , jL.e ,^, lead  to  
d estructive despair. Such would be the case in  regard to 
su ic id e: the l i f e  in s t in c t  has fa lle n  to the onslaught
of p ers isten t p ain —to the despair of su ic id e . When th is  
threshold i s  reached, the l i f e  in s t in c t  functions as hope 
on one or both of two actu a lly  in tegrated  but v ir tu a lly  
d is t in c t  le v e ls :  sensation and consciousness. In the
la t te r ,  idiich i s  not a concern at th is  po in t, the l i f e  
in s t in c t  becomes actualized  in the hope of a way o u t. In 
the former, the l i f e  in s t in c t  may be actualized  in  the 
axi^utee's hope ju st mentioned or in  the sh o rt-c ircu itin g  
of the pain process, i , . e . , the tenq)orary experience o f pain- 
b lin d n ess—the tençorary lo s s  of pain sensation . This 
temporary pain lo s s  can be accon^lished by drugs as w ell 
as by p ers is te n t  pain above the threshold of to lerance.
The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations  
i s  the fo llow ing: On the basis o f  an understanding o f the
dynamics o f pain in re la tion  to the l i f e  in s t in c t ,  a 
doctrine o f hope on the le v e l  o f sensation can be j u s t i ­
f ie d . This i s  to conclude many things in  terms o f  th is  
d isser ta tio n : F ir s t ,  Marcel i s  incorrect Wien he re jec ts
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a theory of hope on the le v e l  o f sensation . Second, Camus 
comes c lose  to  agreement w ith  the th e s is  I have ou tlined  
when he d iscu sses hope as "the dogged w ill  to  liv e "  and 
as a "new z e s t  fo r  l i f e ."  Third, that any re jec tio n  o f  
hope on the le v e l  o f sensation  and acceptance o f such on 
a psychic le v e l  must, as an assumption, make the 
Cartesian mistake o f a mind-body dualism. Fourth, to  
develop a p hysica l doctrine o f  hope i s  to  emphasize the 
unity  o f the human being, to deny, except v ir tu a lly ,
any mind-body d iv is io n . F if th , to develop hope on the 
le v e l o f sensation  i s  a lso  to  provide a b a sis  fo r  hope 
on the le v e l  o f  communion, which lead s to the f in a l  p o in t. 
Sixth , hope on the le v e l o f  sensation i s  a way o f s tr e s ­
sing the p h ysica l element in  any re la tio n  o f  intim acy.
Before taking up a d iscu ssion  o f "Hope on the Level 
of Communion," I must make several add itional comments 
regarding the p ostu la tin g  o f  a l i f e - in s t i n c t .  These com­
ments can be b est sta ted  by re la tin g  them to two ob jections  
which can be raised  about such a p o stu la te . F ir s t ,  there 
i s  no ju s t if ic a t io n  given fo r  the l i f e - in s t in c t  p o stu la te . 
Surely p h ilosop h ica l l ic e n s e  cannot be stretched  th is  far? 
This ob jection  seams, to me, to carry l i t t l e  w eight. To 
suppose that an organism stru gg les for survival i s  almost 
a n a ly tic . To further suppose that i t  i s  a l i f e - in s t in c t  
that wages the struggle seems a reasonable in feren ce . I t
I6i|.
i s ,  however, a c ircu la r  one because o f  the near synonymity 
between organism and l i f e .  This i s  to say, then, that 
the c ir c u la r ity  i s  not d ec is iv e; rather, i t  i s  in tr in s ic  
to  the problem. These considerations lead  to another, 
more d i f f i c u l t  ob jection .
Second, granted that there i s  a l i f e - in s t in c t  which 
i s  operative in  su rv iva l, o f  what explanatory value i s  i t ,  
i . ( 9 . , i s  i t  vacuous? In other words, what i s  the p h ilo ­
sophical value o f saying that organism A s tr iv e s  for  
survival because he ( i t )  has a l i f e  in s t in c t?  This i s  a 
d if f ic u l t  ob jection  to answer on a p r io r i grounds. Indeed, 
there may be no unproblematic answer. However, on the 
em pirical l e v e l  of life -b eh a v io r  the s itu a tio n  i s  d iffe r e n t .  
The p o stu la tin g  o f a l i f e  in s t in c t  on th is  le v e l has one 
major advantage : from such a p o stu la te  su icide must be
judged to be abnormal behavior. In judging the advantages 
versus the problems o f th is  p o stu la te  I g ive precedence 
to th is  consequence regarding su ic id e .
In re la tio n sh ip  to th is  d is se r ta tio n  there are two 
further advantages for the p o stu la te :  F ir s t ,  the re la tin g
o f hope and l i f e - in s t in c t  on the le v e l  o f sensation has 
the advantage o f unifying the human being by providing 
con tin u ity  between hope on th is  l e v e l  and that of Com­
munion; second, the postu late and i t s  re la tio n  to hope w il l  
reappear in  d iscu ssion  of the p h y sica l element in intim acy.
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Hope on the Level o f Communion
As pointed out on the f i r s t  page o f th is  chapter, I 
am in b a sic  agreement w ith both Marcel and Camus on the 
nature of communal hope. I sh a ll develop my th e s is  on 
th is  le v e l  by summarizing some of the areas o f  agreement 
and emphasizing the new elements or d ifferen t perspec­
t iv e s  I  have to o f fe r .  The best way to begin th is  task  
i s  by re la tin g  t h is  section  of the chapter to the preced­
ing one.
To summarize the re la tio n  the fo llow ing should 
su ff ic e :  The hope o f communion l i e s  in  p a in . Asenath
P etr ie , in  the a r t ic le  "Pain," in  The Encyclopedia of 
Mental H ealth, s ta te s  the th e s is  as fo llo w s:
A man pursues h is  aims and goa ls  at le a s t  in  
part because o f the . . . pain that he experiences  
idien he has not y e t  reached these g o a ls . . . .  I t  
i s  thus d i f f i c u l t  to conceive of man 'actin g  ju s t ly
and lov in g  mercy' i f  unfair and cruel action s never
caused him mental pain . . . .
The su rv iva l o f  any so c ia l group depends . . .
on concern fo r  the pain o f another.
Marcel and Camus hold the same th e s is  that the hope (one
could a lso  say the survival as w ell as the q u a lity ) o f
communion (thus, community) l i e s  in  pain . Marcel speaks
o f the change in  re la tio n  from a nameless i t  to an intim ate
Thou as based in  the knowledge that he too passed th is
l^Asenath P e tr ie , "Pain," The Encyclopedia of Mental 
Health, Vol. i|., ed . by A. D. Deutsch and u . Fishman, 
p .
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way, knew the same joys and sorrows, e t c .  Gamus w rites  
that the i n i t i a l  awareness prior to  reb e llio n  i s  the 
recogn ition  o f the so lid a r ity  of human su ffer in g . I  
h e a r t ily  concur with both men, but add the claim that my 
th e s is  o f fe r s  a stronger case for the hope of community 
ly in g  in  pain by providing fo r  continuity in  regard to  
hope from sensation  to communion* Marcel and p o ssib ly  
Camus, on the other hand, are committed to an unnecessary 
d isco n tin u ity ,
I agree w ith both Marcel and Camus that, on the le v e l  
o f communion, hope i s  a rebellion  against absurdity, and 
that the q u a lity  of communion (the m aturity and health  of 
a community) i s  determined by the v is io n  o f those who 
reb e l. I  a lso  agree with both that hope i s  re la ted  to  
the human w i l l .  Marcel w rites that hope i s  the w il l  
turned ou t, ^ .e ,., when i t  i s  made to depend upon a source 
other than i t s e l f ,  Gamus w rites th at hope i s  the w ill  
turned inward to  draw upon the c r ea tiv ity  of human sources. 
Their resp ective  views on transcendence aj?e idaat account 
fo r  th is  d ifferen ce . My th e s is  on the re la tio n  between 
hope and the w i l l  i s  a synthesis: hope i s  the w il l
turned f i r s t  inward, then outward. To understand th is  I 
remind the reader, in consistency with past developments, 
that the w ill  cannot be lim ited  to  a psychic a c tu a lity , 
as i s  u su a lly  done.
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One way to see th is  i s  to  examine two p ossib le  
meanings o f Camus' phrase "the dogged w ill  to l iv e ."  
C learly th is  phrase may in d icate a conscious e f fo r t  to  
bring a l l  one's ind ividual resources to bear upon the task  
of su rv iv a l. In th is  sense the w i l l  operates not on the 
in s t in c t iv e  le v e l  o f  sensation but on that of conscious 
a c t iv ity .  Such a "dogged w ill"  may muster p h ysio log ica l 
a l l i e s  in  the stru gg le , but the e f fo r t  i s  consciously  
d irected . However, there i s  another leg itim ate use of 
th is  d escrip tive phrase, and one that functions on an 
in s t in c tu a l l e v e l .  Within a c l in ic a l  s itu a tio n  i t  i s  not 
uncommon to  find  in  a comatose sta te  what could be ca lled  
a bod ily  w il l  to l i v e ,  ^ .e .., the body musters i t s  a l l i e s  
in  the struggle fo r  survival apart from consciousness.
As a part o f the ambiguity of that human cap ab ility  d esig ­
nated by the term "w ill,"  th is  comatose example seems to  
me to be as v iab le as a ttr ib u tin g  w ill  to the former 
conscious example.
To put th is  d iscussion  in  another perspective we 
return to the mind-body (physical-m ental pain) d is t in c t io n .  
The "dogged w ill  to  liv e"  i s  an in tegrated  movement o f  
the human being that further evidences the union of mind- 
body. Indeed, these considerations about the w ill  could 
have been offered  as a s ix th  p o in t for  re jectin g  any 
dualism of mind-body.
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An ad d ition a l reference to "hope on the le v e l  o f  sen­
sation" i s  in  order at th is  p o in t: I f  a doctrine o f  hope
on a sensual le v e l  has been e s ta b lish ed , as I think i t  
has, then th is  le v e l  i s  the primary example o f hope as 
the w ill  turned inward. In other words, hope as the 
w ill  turned inward i s  an example o f  idiat Marcel denies: 
hope at the le v e l  o f  the s o lita r y  ego. Apart from these  
considerations there are ce r ta in ly  exazq>les o f men and 
women who have turned th e ir  w i l l  inward to g ird  up th e ir  
ind ividual psychic and bodily  a b i l i t i e s  in  a heroic  
struggle fo r  su rv iva l. Granted the struggle i s  o f a 
d ifferen t order when the w il l  (hope) can be turned outward 
to community, but th is  i l lu s t r a t e s  another re la tio n  
between hope on the two le v e ls :  sensation (w ill inward—
so lita ry  ego) and communion (w ill  outward).
The r e la tio n  between hope on these two le v e ls  can 
best be described as one o f recip roca l dependency. The 
dependency from sensation to  communion i s  one of continu­
i t y ,  The dependency from communion to  sensation  i s  one 
of so lid a r ity . Perhaps the b est  way to see th is  
rec ip ro c ity  i s  to return to the re la tio n  between pain and 
hope. As developed e a r lie r  pain i s  an e x is te n t ia l  
phenomenon which p o in ts to both so litu d e  (in  that I must 
experience and endure my own pain) and to community (in  
that my understanding o f pain i s  a factor  in  i t s  endurance.
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and th is  understanding i s  w ithin  a communal c o n tex t--!  
sh a ll have more to say on th is  sh o r tly ) .
F ir s t , my understanding o f  another*s pain i s  depen­
dent upon my own understemding of p a in . But th is  la t t e r  
i s  b u ilt  w ithin and upon the communal understanding of 
pain.^^ Here the recip roca l dependency stands ou t.
Unless I have known p a in — (in  the e x is te n t ia l  sen se )— 
on the le v e l o f sen sation , ^.e^,, u n le ss , w ithin  my own 
so lita r y  ego, I have grappled with pain , then the task o f  
understanding another*s pain i s  bound to fa d l ,  I  may 
gain a conceptual understanding but never am e x is te n t ia l  
one. In other words, pain as an experience o f  the 
so lita r y  ego provides the necessary con tin u ity  fo r  the 
experience o f  pain at a communal l e v e l .  But as already  
sta ted , the struggle w ith  pain of the s o lita r y  ego i s  
already a struggle in tegra ted  with the communal under­
standing o f pain; and thus, the necessary so lid a r ity  of 
the pain-experience i s  evidenced. In other words, pain  
on the le v e l o f sensation  and on the le v e l  o f communion 
share the same recip roca l dependency that hope on both 
le v e ls  in d ica te s .
^^This statement i s  a development o f the d iscu ssion  
regarding the e x is t e n t ia l  character o f pa in . However, 
i t  can be supported from another quarter, fo r  i t  i s  a 
consequence o f W ittgensteins' argument against the p o s s i­
b i l i t y  of a private language in  the P hilosophical In v esti­
g a tio n s.
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Second, any hope fo r  growth or Intimacy to occur on 
the l e v e l  o f communion depends upon the pain o f empathy, 
j^ .e., u n less the su ffer in g  o f  another enqsathetically  
becomes my su ffer in g , I w i l l  make no communal act of 
r e b e llio n . The pain o f  en^athy develops out o f  pain on 
the l e v e l  o f  the so lita r y  ego and pain on the le v e l o f  
communion. In other words, empathy could be defined as 
that ezperienoe where community pain and ind iv idual pain  
merge, i..e .., where s o lid a r ity  and so litu d e come together. 
To summarize: the hope o f  community, fo r  con tin u ity ,
depends upon the hope o f  the ind ividual (i.»®.*» liop© as 
the w i l l  turned inward); and the hope o f  the individual 
(jL .e., the w i l l  turned outward), fo r  so lid a r ity , depends 
upon the hope o f community.
In concluding th is  sec tio n  o f the chapter, I  would 
l ik e  to b r ie f ly  develop two aspects o f hope on the le v e l  
o f  communion that Marcel and Camas are e ith e r  unaware of 
or f a i l  to  develop: the maturation o f hope and the
cu ltu ra l fa c to rs  in  hoping.
F ir s t ,  i t  i s  p o ss ib le  to speak of a maturation o f  
hope. Two factors en ter t h is  maturation: ind ividual
m aturity and the in d iv id ual environment. In regard to the 
f i r s t  fa c to r , to speak o f a maturation o f hope i s  to speak 
o f  hope as a part o f  the developmental process and, thus, 
to  acknowledge that hope grows and changes according to
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the developmental le v e l  reached by the individual* From 
th is  perspective hope i s  a part o f the g o a l-se tt in g  
p rocess, a way o f active-w a itin g  (to use M arcel's words) 
on the future, and as such i s  an i% ortant m otivator fo r  
fu lf i l lm e n t . I t  would not be incorrect to say, rather  
ly r ic a l ly ,  that hope i s  a way o f  liv in g  in  the future— 
t h is  I  w ill  explore at the end of th is  chapter in con­
sid erin g  the intimacy o f hope. Hope as a part of the 
g o a l-se t t in g  process undergoes a maturation, a maturing. 
While the in tern a l dynamics o f  hoping may not substan­
t i a l l y  d if fe r  between ch ild  and adult, the content o f  
hope changes, grows, and matures. For example, a c h ild 's  
hopes are m ostly ego-centered, ^ .e ,,  evidence the w il l  
turned inward; an a d u lt's  hopes may mature to  branch 
outward. Maturity brings a change in  the locus of hope — 
a change that lead s to hope on the le v e l  o f  communion. 
Hope as a reb e llio n  for ua i s  a mature act o f  reb e llio n  
and not a c h ild ish  tantrum. Indeed, I would agree with  
both Marcel and Camus that one o f the fo llow in g  would be 
representative o f the most mature act o f  hope: "I hope
in  You fo r  Us" or "I hope; therefore. We are."
In regard to the second factor, in d iv id ual environ­
ment, I would agree in  part with both Marcel and Camus 
that one's situ a tion -in -th e-w orld  (ind iv idual environment) 
p lays a s ig n if ica n t role in  the dynamics of hoping. They
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are correct in  id en tify in g  the part that c a p tiv ity , or 
absurdity, p lays in  hoping; but both philosophers ignore 
the sig n ifica n ce  o f cu ltu ra l fa c to rs , to which I  sh a ll 
turn sh o rtly . The ind ividual environment, as Marcel 
puts i t ,  may counsel despair, or become the groundwork 
fo r  the growth o f hope. In the la t t e r  case i t  i s  the 
m aturity o f  the in d iv id u a l, i , . e . ,  the maturation le v e l  
o f hope, that provides the source from which hope may 
a r is e .  In th is  sense the individual builds upon those 
p a st hopes which have become integrated  in to  h is  l i f e ­
s t y le .  I t  i s ,  thus, that hope becomes a reb e llio n  (an 
a ctiv e  way of grappling with the present s itu a tio n )  
against ca p tiv ity  and an opening of the future freed  of 
the lim ita tio n s  o f the present ca p tiv ity . This considera­
t io n , then, brings up the question of the re la tio n  
between the ind ividual dynamics o f hoping and the cu ltura l 
s itu a tio n .
Second, the b est way to see that cu ltural fa cto rs  
p lay  a s ig n if ic a n t ro le  in  the maturation o f hope i s  to 
return to pain . The th e s is  concerning pain, hope, and 
culture can be stated  as fo llow s: An in d iv id u a l's
cu ltu ra l and ra c ia l background a ffe c ts  the way in  idiich 
he experiences and in terp rets  pain, and, thus, a f fe c ts  
the maturation o f h is  hope. The raw data fo r  such a th es is  
come from a study by Mark Zborowski, under a grant from
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the U. 8, Public Health Service, and reported in  The 
Journal o f  S ocia l Issues under the t i t l e  “Cultural 
Con^onents in  Responses to Pain." The se tt in g  fo r  th is  
study was the Kengsbridge Veterans H ô p ita l  in  Bromc,
New York. The techniques fo r  data c o lle c tio n  were mainly 
two: (1 ) observation o f p a tien ts  during times o f pain,
and (2 ) in terview s with doctors, nurses, and p a tien ts  
about such pain a fte r  and, where p o ss ib le , during the 
experience. In addition to the p a tie n ts , h ea lth y  members 
of the same ethnic and cu ltural background were in te r ­
viewed to  compare a ttitu d es and reaction s to  pain in  
order to t e s t  the follow ing hypothesis: that the a t t i ­
tudes and reaction s to pain o f  p a tien ts  and o f healthy  
members o f  the same ethnic and cu ltu ra l background would 
be sim ila r , and th at sickness would only bring them in to  
sharper fo c u s . According to the conclusions o f those 
conducting the study under Zborowski's lead ersh ip , the 
hypothesis was ju s t i f ie d .  This i s  to say that pain 
behavior, i,*^.} pain response and understanding, i s ,  in  
part, learned behavior. The basic  groupings fo r  the 
study were as fo llow s: Old American (members of the
melting p ot so c ie ty , ^ .e ,., those idiose cu ltu ra l mixing 
lo s t  any b a sic  id e n tity  other than American), I ta lia n ,  
Ir ish , and Jewish. The find ings o f  the study pointed to  
d efin ite  cu ltu ra l determinants in  the way a person reacts
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to  and understands h is  pain .
A summary o f the re su lts  in  the Zborowski study i s  
as fo llo w s:1^
1 . The I ta lia n  and Jewish groups were very emotional 
about th e ir  pain, and tended to  exaggerate the 
pain they were experiencing. On the other hand, 
the o ld  Americans were almost the op posite , 
wanting to minimize the pain when p o ss ib le .
2 , While the I ta lia n  p a tien ts  seemed to  be mainly 
concerned with the immediacy o f  the pain  
experience, the Jewish concern was more centered  
on the meaning of the pain for the fu tu re . . . .
3* The I ta lia n  p a tien t quickly c a l ls  fo r  pain-
reducing drugs, and fo r g e ts  the pain idien i t  has 
been masked by the drug; the Jewish p a tien t i s  
relu ctan t to  accept any drug, worrying about i t s  
future impact on h is  h ea lth .
4 , ^o sum up^ The I ta lia n  a ttitu d e  i s  characterized  
by a p resen t-orien ted  apprehension w ith regard 
to pain , while the Jew tends to m anifest a 
fu tu re-orien ted  anxiety as to thé syinptomatic 
and general meaning o f the pain experience#
5* There i s  l i t t l e  en^hasis on emotional complaining 
with the Old American.
6, The Old American d esires  to  be alone when in  
severe pain id iile  the I ta lia n  and the Jew desire  
conç)any.
7. (to sum upQ . . .  the Old American a ttitu d e  
toward pafn i s  disturbance over the symptomatic 
aspects o f pain and concern over the in cap aci­
ta tin g  aspects of pain, but the future i s  viewed 
in  o p tim ist ic  terms with confidence in  science  
and the doctor.
Other variants in  one's a ttitu d es  toward pain found in  the 
study were the fa c to rs  o f  in d iv id u a l environment: occupa­
t io n , education, fam ily , sexual image, e t c .
^^Mark Zborowski, "Cultural Components in  Responses 
to Pain," The Journal o f Social Issu es , Vol V III, No. 4 
(1952), pp. 22:23:
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In terms o f  the concern o f th is  d isse r ta tio n , and 
with reference to  Zborowski*s study, the follow ing can 
be concluded: Since cu ltu ra l and r a c ia l backgrounds
a ffe c t  the way that a person experiences and in terp rets  
pain , the same a lso  a ffe c t  h is  capacity  to hope, jL.£«, 
the maturation le v e l  o f h is  hope. I t  should not, then, 
come as a surprise that the Jewish capacity  to hope has 
reached a high maturation le v e l ,  fo r  what culture has 
more deeply known the absurdity o f ca p tiv ity ?  Nor should 
i t  be su rp rising  that the tech n o log ica l pragmatism o f  
America i s  decried  by Marcel as a danger to the hoping 
process, i.«£*» why the su icide le v e l  seems to  increase  
in  d irect proportion to the tech n o log ica l le v e l  of 
advancement. The th e s is  i s ,  I  think, substantiated .
Hope on the Level of Transcendence
The question o f transcendent re la tio n sh ip s i s  a 
most problem atic question, as has been evidenced in  
Chapters One, Two, and Three. I t  i s  the question over 
which Marcel and Camus show the w idest divergence. I t  i s  
a lso  a question  which I sh a ll leave undeveloped since the 
main concern o f th is  d isser ta tio n  i s  hope on the le v e ls  
of sensation  and communion. The ju s t if ic a t io n  for omit­
tin g  a d iscu ssion  o f transcendence in  th is  chapter i s  a 
pragmatic one, and one that has already been im plied in
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the conç)arisen  o f  the Rebel and Homo V iator; On the le v e l  
o f communion the Rebel and Homo Viator are the same man.
In other words, on the le v e l  of communion an act of hope 
i s  a reb e llio n  and a reb e llio n  i s  an act o f hope. At the 
id eo lo g ica l le v e l  the Rebel and Homo Viator would o ffer  
d ifferen t reasons ( ju s t if ic a t io n s )  and draw upon d ifferen t  
sources for  th e ir  communal a c t iv i t i e s .  The difference  
would r e s t  upon the question of transcendence. But from 
the pragmatic standpoint, i , e , ,  concern over the func­
tio n a l consequences of action s, the Rebel and Homo Viator  
would be found engaging in  the same a c t iv i t i e s .  For th is  
reason I  consider the question o f transcendence an in s ig ­
n ifica n t one fo r  the worldly community; i t  i s  not, 
however, in s ig n if ic a n t  for the in d iv id u a l. The individual 
idio b e liev es  in transcendence i s  a member of two 
communities. But, from the standpoint o f th is  d isserta tio n , 
the other-worldly community i s  s ig n if ic a n t  on ly to the 
extent that i t  d ir e c ts  human m otivation in  the worldly 
community. In o th er  words, fo r  community i t  i s  a person's 
action s that are s ig n if ic a n t , not h is  ju s t if ic a t io n s  for  
those a ctio n s, except in  those in stances t^ere the 
ju s t if ic a t io n s  lea d  to ir r e sp o n s ib ility  in  the worldly 
community.
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The Intimacy o f  Hope
The conclusion to th is  fourth chapter can be stated  
as fo llo w s: On both the le v e l o f  sensation and the le v e l
o f communion the ch aracteristic  most d e f in it iv e  o f  hope 
i s  intimacy# On the le v e l  of sensation  th is  should be 
easy to understand, fo r  a man’s re la tio n  to  h is  body i s  
ce r ta in ly  in tim ate—so much so that one can conclude with  
Marcel, "I am my body, " vdiile a lso  maintaining with him 
that I a lso  am not my body. In other words the re la tio n  
i s  one o f intimacy because I cannot id e n tify  m yself with 
my body, nor can I completely d istin g u ish  m yself from my 
body. On the communal le v e l of personal re la tion sh ip  
hope i s  the most intim ate act two people can share. This 
i s  to say that hope as intimacy contains two elements: 
sensation and communion.
The f i r s t  step in  substantiating the intimacy of 
hope i s  to  define "intim acy," Webster d efines "intimacy" 
as the a c t iv ity  or "instance o f being in tim a te ,"17 
"Intimate" in  turn i s  defined in  the fo llow ing terms:
1 , In tr in s ic ;  innem ost; hence, very personal, 
p r iv a te ,
2 , Characterized by or a r isin g  from close union, 
contact . , , as intim ate fr ien d s . , , «
3 , C losely  p erson a l,. ,
^^Webster’s Hew C ollegiate D ictionary, p . Wjl, 
l8 ib id .
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In a book t i t l e d  Intimacyi Gina Allen and Clement Martin
d iscu ss intimacy as fo llow s:
The p sych olog ica l need fo r  meaningful contact 
with another human being i s  as g rea t, and p o ssib ly  
greater, than the physical* I t  can 't be re liev ed  
without a partner. U nrelieved, i t  s p e lls  anxiety , 
lo n e lin e ss , and despair.
P hysical union devoid o f a caring component i s  
no remedy fo r  these psychological i l l s .  . . . The 
inmost man i s  s t i l l  l e f t  a beggar at the f e a s t .
Ha i s  nourished only idien emotion i s  joined to  
physical passion , and s p ir its  ^  w ell as bodies are 
allowed to  touch in  a ffec tio n  and mutuaT affirm a­
tio n . That i s  intim acy,19
What emerges from these considerations i s  that intim acy
i s  a re la tion  where sensation and communion become
integrated  in to  a u n ity . In regard to the in d iv id u a l th is
u n ity  i s  often  expressed as the union o f mind and body—
a most intim ate union, so intim ate that any d is t in c tio n
between body and mind i s  merely a v ir tu a l one. In regard
to personal re la tio n sh ip s  intimacy i s  the d e f in it iv e
ch a ra cter is tic  o f  those idiere sensation: and communion are
u n ified  in  c lo sen ess . As Allen and Martin put i t ,
. . s p ir i t s  as w ell as bodies are allowed to touch in
a ffec tio n  and mutual affirm ation ."  Such touching in
intimacy has a sacred q u a lity  fo r  those involved , and
th is  quality  r e s u lts  in  the privacy mentioned by Webstar.
Marcel i s  s e n s it iv e  to th is  same q uality  in  hope, for  hope
shared has a precious q u a lity  that approaches secrecy .
*^^ Gina A llen  and Clement Martin, Intimacy, p . 3»
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This way o f  defin ing intimacy r a is e s  a problem: 
intimacy seems to  require touching, but cannot intimacy 
e x is t  without touching? For d iscu ssio n , the meaning of 
the touching element in  intimacy should be broadened to  
refer  to any sensual element. Thus, intim acy seems to 
require a r e la t io n  at the le v e l  of sensation  as w ell as 
communion. The problem can now be resta ted : can intimacy
e x is t  apart from the le v e l o f  sensation? Or, can intimacy  
e x is t  where the sensual re la tio n  i s  absent or lacking?
At f i r s t  glance the answer seems to  be a d e f in ite  y es .
But I wonder? Does i t  make sense to  consider intimacy 
p o ssib le  ràiere the sensual re la tio n  i s  absent. I w ill  
consider two p o ss ib le  examples.
What about intimacy at long d istance? Is  i t  not 
p ossib le?  My answer i s  yes and no, depending upon the 
d is t in c tio n  between tho sensual r e la t io n  being absent or 
cou p letely  la c k in g . I t  i s  a common experience fo r  lovers  
who have become p h y sica lly  separated to  maintain the 
sp ir itu a l intim acy o f th e ir  re la tio n sh ip  and the memory 
of the sensual intim acy. Such ejq>eriences seem to  be 
behind such a th o u ^ t as: "Absence makes the heart grow
fonder." The cru cia l d is t in c tio n  i s  th at the sensual 
element i s  not lacking; i t  i s  absent. I f  i t  were lack ing, 
then memory would be unable to r e c a ll i t .  But sin ce the 
element i s  merely absent, not only can i t  be reca lled , but
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memory may serve as the source fo r  the hope o f sensual 
ccanmunlon in  the fu tu re . I t  i s  c e r ta in ly  true that one 
may think o f  sensual communion w ith someone he (or she) 
has never a c tu a lly  seen (the dream g ir l  or man, the movie 
s ta r ) , but t h is  i s  not hope or intim acy; i t  i s  fan tasy .
To conclude: th is  example shows the need fo r  a sensual
element in  t h is  re la tion sh ip  o f  in tim acy. Absence does 
not negate intim acy, but the lack  o f  a sensual element 
does not allow  intimacy even a b e g in n in g .^0
What about the intimacy o f a th le t ic s ?  The le v e l  o f  
sensation  i s  cer ta in ly  evident h ere . I t  i s  quite often  
not a g en tle  element, but nonetheless p resen t. In fa c t ,  
the growth o f s p ir itu a l intimacy b u ild s  upon the c lo se ­
ness (intim acy?) of the p hysica l r e la t io n  among the team 
members.^^ However, a th le t ic s  p o in t out that sensation  
i s  not s u f f ic ie n t  for  intim acy, but i s  p ossib ly  necessary. 
N ecessity  (or p o ss ib le  n ecess ity )  i s  the p o sitio n  I am 
taking. As in  the case o f parted lo v e r s , intimacy may 
continue between departed team members. In th is  case.
20I t  i s  true that people have occasion a lly  held  the 
p o sitio n  that intim acy could develop through something 
l ik e  l e t t e r  exchanges. I have two responses: f i r s t ,  i f
intim acy can occur in  such a s itu a tio n  i t  i s  certa in ly  
the exception  rather than the ru le; and, second, the use 
of "intimacy" in  th is  context may be a m isuse.
^^The tra d itio n a l act o f "butt-slapping" in  th is  
In terp retation  can be understood as a form of intim ate  
address.
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memory often  serves to  r e c a ll the past sensual and com­
munal re la tio n sh ip s, and, in  so doing, to renew the 
intimacy* Those in d iv id uals who were not a sensual part 
of the intim acy w i l l ,  I  think, always remain ou tsid ers  
to the f u l l  comradeship o f the s itu a tio n .
The conclusion to  which these exaa^les lead  i s  as 
fo llow s; Intimacy i s  that re la tio n  in  Wiioh sensation  
and communion merge in  "affection  and mutual admiration."
Taking the d iscu ssion  o f th is  chapter in to  account,
I sta te  the conclusion to  th is  study to be; intim acy i s  
a d e f in it iv e  ch a ra c ter is tic  o f hope, and hope i s  a 
d e fin it iv e  ch a ra c te r is tic  o f intim acy. In other words, 
without intim acy there i s  no hope, and without hope 
there i s  no intim acy. Where hope i s  shared, intim acy i s  
present and b asic  to  the re la tion sh ip , fo r  there i s  
nothing more precious and personal to any man than h is  
hope, h is  dreams. One's hopes are guarded and protected; 
they are shared only where deep tru st u n d erlies the 
re la tio n sh ip , i.e .» , only in  a rela tionsh ip  o f authentic  
intim acy, a re la tion sh ip  of "affection  and mutual affinfla­
tio n ."  On the other hand, where intimacy e x is t s  in  a 
re la tio n sh ip , hope undergirds i t .  Authentic intim acy  
involves two ten tera i re la tion sh ip s; through sensation , 
a shared l iv in g  in the present and memory o f the p ast in 
the present; and through communion, a shared l iv in g  o f the
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future in  the p resen t, i , . e . ,  a non-temporal l iv in g  because 
i t  does away w ith  the standard presen t-fu ture d is t in c t io n .  
In other words, a relationsh ip  o f  intimacy i s  a shared, 
a ctive w aiting on the future, i..e .., bringing the "as yet 
unborn" o f  the re la tion sh ip  in to  the p o s s ib i l i t y  of 
present experience. Real intimacy knows no l im it s  to the 
re la tio n sh ip , and, thus, i t  i s  a denial o f  induction . I t  
i s  an inner readiness to bring in to  being deeper and more 
varied depths to the re la tio n sh ip . Intimacy i s  never 
concerned w ith  the past as past but always w ith  the f r u it ­
fu ln ess o f  idiat l i e s  ahead and the way in  which the 
future can be b u ilt  upon remembered communion. A ll of 
th is  i s  to say that idiere intimacy e x i s t s ,  i t  e x is t s  in  
hope. Where hope e x is t s ,  i t  e x is t s  in  intim acy. %us, 
in  hope I conclude th is  explanation!
CONCLUSION: HOPE—A 
NEW EXPLORATION
I f  the analyses, contrasts, coaparlsons, and évalua­
tion s o f the nature and dynamics o f  hope o ffered  in  th is  
d isser ta tio n  have been accurate, then the follow ing con­
clu sion s seem to  be ju s t if ia b le :
(1) Gabriel Marcel i s  the m etaphysician, the 
phenomenologist, o f  hope. His phenomenological descrip­
tion  o f the nature o f hope and the dynamics o f the hoping 
process stands out in  the lite r a tu r e  on hope fo r  both 
i t s  system atic adequacy and d escrip tive  depth. Hope for  
Marcel i s  not a fa ce t of l i f e ;  i t  i s  a way o f l i f e .  His 
an alysis o f ca p tiv ity  as a necessary source fo r  the 
growth o f  hope o ffe r s  an in s ig h t most relevant to the 
growing despair and impotence many men face in  today's 
anonymous world o f technology. M arcel's in s is ten ce  on 
the fonnative p lace that hope p lays on the le v e l  o f un 
o ffers  a needed in s ig h t in to  the dynamics o f human love  
as i t  stru gg les in  the modern jungle o f human c o n flic t  
that e x is t s  in  the home, the communities, the nation, 
and the world. Marcel’s in s is ten ce  on the transcendental
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ground idiich u nd erlies a l l  that hope im p lies, o ffers  to  
the contenQ>orar7 t h e is t ,  C hristian  or otherw ise, a keen 
phenomenological descrip tion  o f a depth in  h is  e:gperi- 
ence that i s  heading toward communal sa lv a tio n .
Apart from lAat Marcel’s understanding o f  hope has 
to o f fe r , the development of h is  thought in  Chapter One 
i s  a concise and system atic a n a ly s is  o f  hope as the 
central focus o f h is  p h ilosop h ica l th inking. Related 
to Appendix A, th is  i n i t i a l  chapter o ffe r s  the reader the 
b est research to o l for  understanding Marcel and h is  view  
of h o p e .l Thus, the f i r s t  chapter not only g iv es  an 
an a lysis o f hope in  Marcel's thought, but from the common 
vantage p o in t o f  a centra l concept, hope, g ives a view o f  
h is  to ta l thought.
(2) Albert Camus i s  an o ften  misunderstood thinker. 
The temptation to id e n t ify  Camus and Sisyphus i s  amply 
substantiated  by reference to p h ilo so p h ica l l i t e r a tu r e .  
Such an id e n t if ic a t io n , however, represents only a 
p a r tia l view o f Camus. Sisyphus i s  but a stage on l i f e ' s
Inhere i s  a d isse r ta tio n  by N. L. B u tler , A Theory 
o f Hope Based upon Gabriel Marcel w ith ImplicatTons fo r  
^ e  P sy ch ia tr is t  and th e T ïin ls tr y ; see Appendix D.
"Élis i s  ah e x c e lle n t  study, but i t  does not approach the 
concept o f hope in  re la tio n  to the e n tir e ty  o f M arcel's 
thought. Also i t s  in te r e s ts  l i e  more within the psychology  
and theology o f hope, idxereas Chapter One in  th is  d is se r ­
ta tion  i s  a p h ilosop h ica l en terp r ise .
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way fo r  Cbjhus—a f i r s t  stage . The lo n e ly  struggle with  
the absurd in  which Sisyphus i s  engaged g iv es  way to the 
brotherhood o f  Rieux and Tarrou, and D*Arrast and the 
cook. This struggle of brothers aga in st the absurd i s  
but an interm ediate sta te  that culm inates in  an act o f  
r e b e llio n , and the Rebel undertakes a struggle in  
brotherhood fo r  a l l  o f  humanity. Thus, i t  i s  correct to  
say th at Camus i s  a l l  o f the fo llow in g: the absurd
heroes—C aligula, Meursault, and Sisyphus; the b rothers-- 
Rieux and Tarrou, and D'Arrast and the cook; and the 
Rebel, One o f the contributions which Chapter Two makes 
to p h ilo sop h ica l l ite r a tu r e  i s  a system atic development 
of a l l  the stages in  Camus; and, thus. Chapter Two o ffe r s  
a p h ilo sop h ica l corrective to  a widespread m istake.
The contribution  which Camus has to make to the 
understanding o f hope i s  to be found in  the absurd: Hope
for  Camus i s  a reb e llio n  against absurdity . The g rea test  
strength  in  Camus' thoughts on hope as a reb e llio n  i s  the 
tender empathy which underlies such an a c t . Here i s  
h is  importance fo r  our contemporary struggle with 
absurdity: h is  c a l l  to a l l  men to jo in  in  the f ig h t ,
Camus, without a God, extends a challenge to  a l l  men, 
whatever th e ir  r e lig io u s  stances, to jo in  in  the e f fo r t  
to remake the fu tu re, i.e^ ,, to  a c t iv e ly  l iv e  in  hope. An 
ad d ition al contribution  which the second chapter makes i s
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i t s  development o f  th is  understanding of hope in  Camus; 
i t  i s  a contribution  because there are no other stu d ies  
of hope in  Camus.
(3) Both Camus and Marcel, without agreeing as to  
the ex isten ce o f transcendence, o ffe r  a promising view of 
hope on the le v e l  of community. On th is  le v e l ,  absurdity 
and ca p tiv ity  reduce to the same th in g . The understanding 
of hope as an a c t iv ity  o f the present in  response to  
absurdity and ca p tiv ity  has much to o f fe r  modern man. I t  
i s  a c a l l  for  work, fo r  brotherhood, fo r  v is io n , and fo r  
courage. I t  i s  an indictment o f escapism in  any form— 
alcohol, drugs, Having, concern for  merely the individual 
sa lvation  of the so u l. I t  i s  a c a l l  which o ffe r s  no 
guarantees, but i t  i s  a c a l l  which does not lead  to  
n ih ilism . While i t  i s  a c a l l  that o ffe r s  no guarantees, 
and thus, requires courage, i t  i s  a c a l l  with a promise: 
WE] Because each man stands at a d iffer e n t s itu a tio n a l  
perspective in  hearing and responding to the c a l l—Marcel 
as a man supported from without by a transcendent ground 
of Being; Camus as a man without a transcendent a l ly  vdio 
must look w ith in  fo r  support—the two o ffe r  a united  c a ll  
fo r  hope as a c tiv e  work to a l l ,  and any, man, whatever 
h is  s itu a tio n a l p ersp ective .
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The s ig n if ic a n t  contribution o f Chapter Three i s  to  
be found in  i t s  presentation  o f th is  united c a l l ,  and, as 
sud i, i t  i s  o r ig in a l in  the ph ilosoph ica l f i e ld  concerned 
with Marcel and Camus.
(!{.) The re la tio n  between pain and hope i s ,  as y e t ,  
an unexplored r e la t io n . One of the reasons fo r  th is  i s  
the Cartesian hangover of mind-body dualism resu ltin g  in  
the m ental-physical pain dualism. This la t t e r  b ifurca­
tion  has resu lted  in  the standard lim ita tio n  o f  the 
pain-hope r e la t io n  to  the mental pain-hope re la tio n . 
Chapter Pour o ffe r s  a corrective to  th is  kind o f thinking. 
Because the re la tin g  o f hope to a t o ta l  view o f  pain i s  
soraevdiat novel, e sp e c ia lly  any consideration o f  a theory  
of hope on the le v e l  o f sensation , one of the values o f  
th is  chapter i s  suggestive and exploratory. Iftich addi­
tio n a l data, consideration , and an a lysis  are needed 
before any d e f in it iv e  statements can be made concerning 
a theory o f p h ysica l hope. A theory o f hope on the le v e l  
o f sensation  o ffe r s  two additional p o s s ib i l i t i e s  beyond 
a corrective on the nature o f pain: an integrated  view
of the ind iv idual as a unity  ( i . .e . ,  hope as an aspect o f  
the l i f e  in s t in c t )  and an in s ig h t in to  both the nature 
and the value o f human empathy for the growth of com­
munity.
188
(5) The re la tio n  between hope and intim acy, while 
not an unknown or unconsidered re la tio n , i s  one which has 
yet to be given e x p l ic i t  treatment in p h ilosop h ica l 
l i t e r a tu r e . This i s  the second contribution tdaich the 
fourth chapter makes. As developed in that f in a l  chapter, 
hope and intim acy turn out to be the same fa c e t  in the 
human confrontation with the absurd. We l iv e  in  a time 
when intimacy has become a serious need, and, thus, a 
time in  which exp lorations in to  the nature and dynamics
of human intim acy have ju st  begun. It i s  hoped that the 
b rie f development o f intimacy and hope w ill make a con­
trib ution  to  th is  exp loration—an exploration o f utmost 
importance today,
(6) Man i s  a being lAo i s  always on the way. This 
in sig h t brings us to  the f in a l concluding remark--one which 
i s  im plied in the t i t l e  to th is  brief conclusion: "Hope —
A New Exploration," To say that man i s  a being who i s  
always on the way i s  to  say two things in  re la tio n  to th is  
study; F ir s t ,  i f  man i s  a being on the way, then hope
i s  a necessary part in  such a journey, i f  man i s  to help  
make h im self and h is  future world. This i s  to  say that 
in  the process o f  the journey, i t  is  hope, more than any 
other fa c to r , th at dete naines the journey’s d irec tio n .
This i s  the inç)ortance o f  hope. Second, any inquiry in to
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the nature o f hope must always conclude w ith modesty; for  
i f  man i s  always on the way, so must be any study of 
hope. Thus, th is  "E:g)loratiDn o f  Hope" must always g ive  
way to  a "New Exploration o f  Hope" with the empathetic 
hope that the present study has o ffered  a small v ic to ry  
to the united  struggle w ith absurdity which l i e s  ahead.
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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
This d is se r ta tio n  i s  to explore the nature o f hope 
and the dynamics o f  hope from f iv e  p ersp ectiv es: Gabriel
Marcel's understanding o f hope; Albert Camus* under­
standing o f hope; comparison and contrast o f Marcel and 
Camus; development of a theory of hope on the le v e l  o f  
sensation; and, consideration of the r e la t io n  between 
intimacy and hope*
Marcel s ta te s  that there are three le v e ls  o f  human 
p artic ip ation  in  Being: sensation; communion; and tran­
scendence. Sensation does not admit a thei y o f  hope.
I t  i s  at the le v e l  o f communion that hope x ir s t  becomes 
p o ssib le , fo r  hope e x is t s  only on the in tersu b jectiv e  
le v e l  of “Us." At th is  le v e l  hope becomes a force in  the 
au th en tic ity  and depth o f personal r e la t io n s , and in  i t s  
most authentic form issu e s  in to  the formula: "I hope in  
thee fo r  us."  Hope at the le v e l  o f  communion foreshadows 
a more s ig n if ic a n t  r e la tio n : re la tio n  to the Absolute
Thou at the le v e l  of transcendence. Hope at th is  ultim ate  
le v e l becomes the hope o f sa lva tion —the power to overcome 




Camus has o ften  been ca lled  the philosopher of "no 
hope," Such staraotyped understanding o f Camus r e su lts  
from id en tify in g  him with Caligula, Meursault, and 
Sisyphus. This id e n tif ic a tio n  i s  in correct, fo r  Sisyphus 
i s  but a f i r s t  stage for Camus. The heroic and lo n e ly  
struggle o f Sisyphus with the absurd g ives way in  Camus 
to a second and inteim ediate stage: the shared struggle
against the absurd by Rieux and Tarrou o f Ihe Plague, 
and the cook and D’Arrast of "The Growing Stone," ühis 
interm ediate stage g ives way in turn to the shared 
struggle with absurdity on the part o f the Rebel fo r  the 
b en efit  o f a l l  men: "I rebel; therefore , we e x is t ,"
The Rebel i s  a man of hope, and h is  reb ellion  i s  the 
alpha and omega o f such hope.
The d ifferen ces between Marcel and Camus seem much 
greater than the s im ila r it ie s . However, th is  i s  not true. 
At the le v e l  of communion, Marcel's Homo Viator and Camus' 
Rebel are one and the same man reb e llin g  (hoping) against 
absurdity (c a p tiv ity ) , and "I hope in thee fo r  us" i s  
leen to be the same as "I rebel; therefore, we e x is t ,"
Hope i s  seen to have an integrated re la tio n  to pain  
as an aspect o f the l i f e  in s t in c t . On the b a s is  o f th is  
re la tio n  a theory of hope on the le v e l o f sensation  i s  
developed. In considering the meaning o f human intimacy 
and the nature o f hope, what emerges i s  a necessary
21ii_
re la tio n  between these two, such th at: idiere hope i s
lack ing intim acy i s  im possib le, and Wiere intimacy i s  
not shared hope cannot be a part o f  the re la tion sh ip ;  
thus, hope i s  a d e f in it iv e  aspect of intim acy, and i n t i ­
macy i s  a d e f in it iv e  aspect of hope.
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Appendix A
Index to  Gabriel Marcel's Major Passages on Hope*
P hilosophical Fragments
Page
Marcel on the p lace o f hope
in  h is  philosophy 19
Metaphysical Journal
In d irect d e fin it io n  o f hope 266
Presence and Immortality 
agape and hope
a n tic ip a tio n  and hope 51
certitu d e  and hope 171
death, lo v e , and hope 230
degrading o f hope 182
meeting again and hope lo7
prophetic character o f hope 232
s a c r if ic e  and hope ^6
The Philosophy o f E x isten tia lism
a c t iv i t y ,  hope as 33
b arriers to hope 14-3
despair and hope 27-8
m etaphysical hope 31
o n to lo g ica l mystery and hope 28
*Appendix A f i r s t  appeared in  an unpublished th e s is  
w ritten for the U niversity  o f  Oklahoma: Albert B. Randall,




affirm ation , hope as 60
a v a ila b il ity  and hope 10
ca p tiv ity  and hope
creation and hope 52, 58
creative f id e l i t y  and hope 93
hope, d e fin itio n  o f 67
despair and hope 36
despair, time and hope Penq)lrism and hope 10, 60
eaperienoe and hope 36, 51, 67
freedom and hope 55
"I hope in  ïhoe fo r  us" 61
love and hope 66
mystery, hope as 25
on to log ica l p o s it io n  o f hope 47
optimism and hope 33-4
pregnancy and hope 31
reason and hope 64“ 5
renewal (reunion), hope as 67
s e l f  and hope 41
silen ce  o f hope 50-1
soul and hope 10-11
t r ia l  and hope 39
v ir g in ity  o f  hope ?way o f l i f e ,  hope as 61
Being and Having
anxiety (despair, d isp o sa b ility ) and hope 73
death and hope 93
eter n ity  and hope 7^
magic (degrading o f)  and hope 76
m iracle and hope 75
prayer and hope 7^ .
p rob ab ility  and hope 79
r e a lity  and hope I k S
sa lvation  and hope o f 75
soul and hope 8o
su icide and hope 88
techniques and hope 76-7
Thou and hope 79
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The Mystery o f  Being, v o l. 11 Page
being and hope 5^
ca p tiv ity  and hope 177
fear and hope 177
resurrection  and hope I 83
times and hope I 8I
Fresh Hope fo r  the New World
change and hope 215
choice and hope 9
sou l, s t i l ln e s s ,  and hope 2
way o f l i f e ,  hope as 216
The E x is te n tia l Background of Human D ignity
being and hope 76
freedom, love and hope 198
”1” and hope ll\2
inner c a p tiv ity  and hope 1^3-^
p atience, hum ility  and hope II42
Creative F id e lity
d isp o sa b ility  and hope 77
f id e l i t y  as a commitment o f hope I 67
sa c r if ic e  and hope 77
unhope Sk
"Desire and Hope”
active  w aiting and hope 28 l
desire and hope 280-1
freedom and hope 285
in tera ctio n  and hope 283
obsession and hope 282
Searchings
ju s t ic e  and hope 13-14
love and hope 65-6
syitç>athy and hope 13-14
Total Number o f Passages L isted: 83 passages
Appendix B 
Index to  Albert Camus' Passages on Hope
Note: The appendix idiich i s  to fo llow  was constructed
mainly as a research too l fo r  Chapter Two. As 
such i t  w il l  be seen to  d iffe r  in  many ways from 
Appendix A lA iile accon^lishing the same purpose: 
lo c a tio n  in  Camus o f passages on hope. The s ig ­
n ifican ce o f  these d ifferen ces has already been 
discussed  as w ell as the chronological order 
o f  the fo llow in g . The f i r s t  date o f  pub lication  
w il l  be in  parentheses beside each t i t l e .  The two 
c o l le c t io n s , L y r ic^  and C r itic a l E ssays and 
R esistance. R ebellion and Death, w i l l  occur as the 
l a s t  two e n tr ie s  in  th isa p p en d ix , w ith the years 
spanned by th e ir  contents in  parentheses. The 
fo llow ing guide w il l  be u t i l iz e d :
* Passages lAiere Camus (according to the in terp reta ­
tio n  o f  th is  reader) denies that hope i s  p ossib le  
fo r  man;
** Passages where Camus . . .  affirm s the p o s s ib il i ty  
o f  human hope;
Passages idiere ambiguity or suspension o f judgment 
do not permit the preceding ch aracteriza tion , or, 
passages idiere the use o f hope i s  a borderline  
p h ilo sop h ica l usage, jL.e., where the usage may be 
co llo q u ia l and p h ilo sopF ically  t r i v i a l .
Notebooks 1935-L2 (19i|2)
Page
* the two women and no hope $-6
•Jttf- a t i t l e :  hope 16
hope, despair, su icide 28
* hope and a graveyard 55
* hope and the body 10^^5
» hope and the absurd 115-6
* doing without hope 131-2
A ctu elles I:  Chroniques 19iUl--19it-8 (1950)




* hope in  Wntherlng H eights 35
* hone and irtxe P la^e 53. 55
** hope in  55
* hope and the fo o l—despair and the coward 80
** hope o f love 155
hope and cred it 21l|.
The Stranger (19lj2)
. . hope I wasn't fe e lin g  badly . . . 31
"I hope I'm not disturbing you." ij.9
" . . .  hope the dogs won't bark, . . . "  59
** ". . . a vague hope . . . ." 89
** hope and M arie's shoulders 92
■K- hope "knocked down" 137
hope and death ll}.?
* ". . . emptied o f hope. . . ." —freedom l5ii
The Myth o f Sisyphus (19i|2)
* hope o f  a promised land 5
* hope as an evasion 7
absurdity , hope, and su icid e 7
ab surdity , hope, and death 8
"c . • to hope in  sp ite  o f  everything?" 12
mind and "motionless world o f i t s  hopes" II4.
* absurd lo g ic  = absence o f hope 23-4
* forced  hope in  e x is te n tia lism  2k
* hope and the contrary o f the absurd 26
* hope and the absurd man 26
$ hope = ly in g  38
* ". . . forgotten  how to  hope . . . "  39
* ". .  . devoid o f hope" ii.0
*  freedom and the privation  o f hope k2.
* death and the "slave without hope . . . "  li2
* the absurd man and "his re fu sa l to hope . . . "  ljl|.
* hope and s t e r i l i t y  51
hope and melancholy 52
* hope and Don Juan 52
* the f u t i l i t y  o f l iv in g  on hope 53
* regret as a form of hope 54
hope and despair 67
* ". . . think c le a r ly  and have ceased to  hope" 68
* absurd art and the i l lu s io n s  o f hope 75
* hope as i l lu s io n  76
" . . .  b lind  hope" 80, 82
* ". . . man's struggle against h is  hope" o2-3
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* to be free  o f hope
*  a le r tn e ss  to  absurdity = denial of hope
* ", . * a soul forever freed  o f hope."
* Sisyphus - . , f u t i l e  and hopeless labor,"




C aligula and Three Other Plays (19i|i*.- -^8)
"Caligula":
the word hope does not appear in the dialogue
"The Misunderstanding":
k i l l in g  and the hope to "get away together"
. hope o f s leep ."
* ", , , h is  hopes o f l i f e  are made over
to in d iffer en t hands,"






"State o f Siege .
*  arr iva l o f  the plague - "abandon hope" 133» IS^ I-
hope = to "act l ik e  a man" 210-11
"The Just Assassins":
hope to k i l l  the Grand Duke 2?1|.




-  f u t i l e
The Plague (1947)
"Isn ’t  there any hope le f t ?  , , ,"
"Let’s hope i t  won't prove any worse,"
"Let’s hope they’re quick about i t ."
Hope and the plague
, hoped ir r a t io n a lly , , , ,"
, the gradual lo s s  o f hope, , ,
• begin to  hope again. . , ,"
"Oh, I do hope. , , - an i l lu s io n
" . . .  many continued hoping, . ,
God’ s "eternal hope was too 
long deferred , , . ," 
it* "He hoped against hope, .  .
. l is te n e d  hopefully"
, a f u t i le  hope, , , .
, one would only hope, , , - Rieux
- , a se tt in g  so hopelessly  remote,
, a gleam of hope . . .  died out."
, purgatory could not be hoped fo r . • .
-  Paneloux



























** "a very o ld , gray hope” = ”a dogged w ill
to  l i v e ” 226-7
«* ”. * • began to nurse hopes, , . 233
" . . .  h a lf-h earted  hope. . . . "  235
** "way o f hope" = end o f the plague 235
" . . .  r is in g  wind of hope • . •
sort of pain. . • • " 230
hoarded hope 237-8
hope = ", « • a new zest fo r  l i f e "
Tarrou - ". . . never known hope's solace" 253-4
hope and love  negate the e x i le  261
The Rebel (1951)
reb e llio n  = "hope fo r  a new creation" 11
* Epicurus and hope 29-30
* Golgotha = destruction  of the "hope o f
eternity" 32
* Milton on hope, quotation 48
the romantic rebel and hope ^
N ietzsch e's  "only hope" 71
** rebel and "the hope o f finding a new god. " 101
rebel i s  "without hope o f immortality" 102
renunciation, hope, and death 170
H itlerism  and hope 186
Marxism and prophetic hope 189
Marxism and "mystic hope" 193-4
if# Marxism as a betrayal of hope 210
** Marxism as the "burning hope o f  . , , 1917." 211
h isto ry  alone o ffers no hope." 21^ 9
hum iliation , reb e llion , and hope 250
20th c . r e b e llio n 's  only hope 280
* murder and hope 282
*  n ih ilism  and hope 282-3
The F a ll (1956)
", , , I dare hope he understood me. . . 3
" . . .  I had hoped, . , 38
" . . .  I  hope, you give me c r e d it , , . ." 69
, merely hope, . . . "  82
*  "I had hoped to fin d  calm. , • •" 100
*  "idiat hope was there. . • •" 100
*  in to x ica tio n  and hope 102
*  crime, fa ith , and hope 110
*  ". , . b ligh ted  hopes. . . . "  130
"Let's hope they are bringing good news" 144
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E xile and the Kingdom (1957)
"The Adulterous Woman"
no p h ilosop h ica l use o f "hope"
"The Renegade"
* . . the F e tish  • • . my hope." 50
* "I hoped they would m u tila te . . . . "  55
"I hope he comes soon. . . . "  5o
"The S ilen t Men"
no use o f  the word hope
"The Guest"
no use o f the word hope
"The A rtis t  at Work"
no p h ilo sop h ica l use of "hope"
"The Growing Stone"
no use o f the word hope
Speech: "Acceptance o f the Nobel Prize fo r  Literature"
(1957)
** ". . . the tr ib u la tio n  and hope we shared." 3k
The Possessed (1959)
*  "We had hope th en j" 7
"of hope. . . . "  Il4-
* ". . . there i s  no hope" 52 
« • " . . .  to  l iv e  without hope o f returning
. . . ." 66
"I hope so."  87
"I was hoping fo r  something. . . . "  I 83
** ". . . i n  the hope o f being k il le d
f o o l i s h ly ." 136
** ". , . except lo s in g  the hope you gave
me. . . ." 153
Lyrical and C r itic a l Essays (19l|2-59)
"The Wrong Side and the Right Side"
* in ju s t ic e , poverty, " life  with hope" 8
** hope in  l i f e  and the powerlessness o f God 20
221;
* o ld  age and hopelessness 26
"Between Yes and No"
*  hope and despair 37
** e te r n ity  and hope 60- l
"Nuptials"
* ", . . death without hope#" ?6
*  . . joys . . • without hope." 81
** " fo o lish  hope" 89
* hope as resignation  91-2
* the body and hope 9^-S
* . • happiness from the absence
o f  hope. . . . "  lOl}.
"Summer"
** hope fo r  beauty 153
*  hope and the p ast 163
** hope fo r  courage 169
"On the Future o f  Tragedy"
** tragedy - ", . . between . . . extreme
n ih ilism  and unlim ited hope." 30i|-“5
tra g ic  clim ate - ". . . torn between
absolute hope and f in a l doubt." 307
R esistance, R ebellion , and Death (191+3-1958)
"Letters to a German Friend"
«• "We had to  give up . .  . our hope . . . ." 6
hope fo r  France 7-8
** lo v e  and hope in France 9-10
hope from a human's v o ice , a story
of the war 11-13
** wrath as hopeless hope: France 11+-15
. . the hope o f  Europe." 15
"The Blood o f Freedom"
hope on the eve o f the lib er a tio n  of
Paris 28-9
"The Night o f  Truth"
"tortured by hope." 30
"The Flesh"
on the death of Rene Leynaud: "we hope" 3l+-5
"Speech at the Dominical Monastery o f  
Latour-Mauboarg in 19^8"
*Camus and the Christian hope 53
225
** hope and the fu ture: anguish 56
"Preface to Algerian Reports"
"reasonable hope" 63
"Letter to  M. Aziz Kessous"
«* ". • • we share the same hope. . . . "  94
Lectures (1956): "Appeal for  a C iv ilia n  Truce"
** ". . .  a community o f hope. . . . "  101
«* ". . . we  may hope someday. . . . "  103
"Kadar Had H is Day of Fear" (on the Hungarian 
rev o lt o f  1957)
** "I hope with a l l  my strength . . . . "  I I 8- I23
"R eflections on the G u illo tin e
" . . .  torture through hope. . . . "  152
"The Wages o f Our Generation"
** ". . . help from hope." 182-3
** the common man and "a stubborn hope." I83
the re jection  o f n ih ilism  lea d s to  hope I 87-8
** ". . . the maximum danger im plied
the maximum hope." 189
"Create Dangerously"
. .  gentle s t ir r in g s  o f l i f e  and
hope. . . . "  208-9
Totals (including The Myth o f Sisyphus) :
* 73 passages 
52 passages 
37 passages
Totals (excluding The Myth o f S isyphus) :
* 48 passages 
52 passages 
37 passages
Total Number o f Passages L isted: 162 passages
Appendix C
Alcohol and the Absurd
The purpose o f th is  appendix i s  merely suggestive:  
to suggest a p o ssib le  theme in  Gamus that has not been 
recognized and which, in  th is  w r iter 's  mind, opens a door 
for  understanding a modern "plague "—alcoholism . I t  would 
seem that there i s  p sychologica l as w ell as empathetic 
m erit in  viewing alcoholism  as one "escapist" response to  
the absurd. That th is  connection was considered by Camus 
I sh a ll  now i l lu s t r a t e .
The absurd—as d iscussed  in  Chapter Two—i s  a many- 
faceted  concept in  Gamus. One of the e f f e c t s  of a man's 
confrontation o f the absurd i s  the fe e lin g  o f  being con­
demned by h is  own impotence to change the " silen ce  o f the 
world," Drinking, a lco h o l, then can be u t i l iz e d  to  
" fo rg etfu lly  struggle"  with th is  impotence, Camus, in  an 
entry dated October, 19ii6, in  h is  Notebooks, shows an 
awareness o f th is  connection: " . . .  Why does one drink?
Because in  drink everything assumes importance, everything  
takes i t s  p lace on the h ighest p lane. Conclusion: one
drinks through impotence and through condemnation,"^
^Albert Camus, Notebooks, 192 2^- 1951, p , 147.
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Caznus emphasized that the absurd a r ise s  out o f  the 
confrontation o f a conscious mind and an in d ifferen t world. 
Thus, one way to p rotect oneself from the anxiety-producing  
confrontation i s  to d u ll or cloud the mind with a lcoh o l.
Dr. Rieux, in  h is  ear ly  role as unknown narrator, spoke o f  
"heavy drinking" as a response to the plague (of 
absurdity) :
The ca fes , thanks to the big stocks accumulated 
in  a town Wiere the wine and liquor trade holds a 
pride o f  p lace , were equally able to cater fo r  th e ir  
patrons. And, to t e l l  the truth, there was much 
heavy drinking. One of the ca fe ’s had the b r i l l ia n t  
idea of putting up a slogan: ’The best protection
against the in fec tio n  is  a b o ttle  of good wine’ . . .
The d u llin g  or clouding o f  the mind by alcohol accom­
p lish e s  not only the well-known erasing o f past and present 
plagues, but a lso  erases in  the mind any consciousness of 
the fu ture, that i s ,  the erasing of one’s "tortured" hopes 
to be r id  of the absurd. This iso la t in g  e f f e c t  of a lcohol 
on the absurd i s  known by Clamance when he speaks of h is  
personal struggle in  The P a ll; "At a certa in  degree o f  
lu c id  in to x ica tio n , ly in g  la ta  at night between two p r o s t i­
tu tes  and drained o f a l l  d esire, hope ceases to be a 
"3ijorture. •  •  •
^Albert Gamus, The Plague, p . 68.
^Albert Camus, The F all, p. 102.
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That Camus recognized a connection between the 
escapism o f alcohol and the confrontation o f the absurd . 
i s ,  I think, shown in the preceding. I t  i s  a f e r t i l e  con­
nection for both the understanding and perhaps "the 
beginning of a cure." How f e r t i le ?  That, the reader w ill  
have to decide.
